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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has become a prominent 
sender of international sanctions. Most of its sanctions regimes have been imposed to 
address human rights violations and democratic shortcomings in autocratic regimes. 
While these developments have attracted an increased attention by academics and 
practitioners alike, not much is known about the underlying factors that trigger the EU’s 
decision to impose sanctions in the very first place.  
Using a new database of EU democratic sanctions between 1989 and 2010, this thesis 
develops a theoretical model that shows that the imposition of sanctions is the result of a 
strategic bargaining process between a sender and a target country. I argue that 
sanctions are only one possible outcome of this process, and claim that the likelihood 
that sanctions are imposed depends, to a large extent, on the target country’s decision to 
comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed or, alternatively, on its 
determination to ignore the sender’s threat of sanctions and resist its pressure. I show 
that the target’s decision to comply or resist is the result of an endogenous policy-
formation process, which is determined by the target regime’s domestic institutional 
setting.  
Different types of institutions (regime types) impose varying degrees of constraints on 
the ruler’s margin of manoeuvre and shape her policy choices vis-à-vis the threat and 
imposition of sanctions. I demonstrate that regimes that face no domestic constraints 
and rely on a small winning coalition of supporters are likely to be strong and willing to 
resist the sender’s pressure, thereby “self-selecting” themselves into sanctions. By the 
same token, regimes that face many domestic constraints are vulnerable to sanctions, 
and face incentives to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed.  
My thesis makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides a theoretical 
explanation of how domestic institutions matter in the imposition of sanctions, and 
identifies a set of conditions under which sanctions are more likely (not) to be imposed. 
Second, it empirically demonstrates the presence of selection effects in the study of 
sanctions imposition, and shows that these are channelled through the target regime’s 
domestic institutions. Finally, my findings have relevant policy implications, as they 
suggest that sanctions are more likely to be effective against certain types of targets. I 
show that sanctions are more likely to succeed against politically constrained regimes at 
the threat stage or early during a sanctions episode, whilst they are likely to fail against 
highly authoritarian regimes which rule free of domestic constraints.   
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CHAPTER 1. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
1.1. Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU) use of sanctions to address human rights abuses and 
democratic shortcomings in third countries has increased systematically since the end of 
the Cold War (De Vries and Hazelzet, 2005; Elliott, 2005; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003; 
Kreutz, 2005). Sanctions have been routinely imposed by the EU to respond to the 
deterioration of democracy and the rule of law in countries like Belarus, Myanmar and 
Zimbabwe; to restore the democratic order after coups d’état in Fiji, Honduras and 
Guinea; and to address blatant and systematic human rights violations in Liberia, 
Uzbekistan and Sudan. In the absence of more coercive instruments to alter a target
1
 
country’s behaviour, sanctions2 have become one the Union’s most prominent foreign 
policy instrument to promote democracy and human rights abroad (Lehne, 2012; Smith, 
1998, 2008). 
However, the EU’s growing activity in this field is at odds with the extended belief in 
policy and academic circles that economic sanctions do not work. Indeed, the empirical 
record of several cases in which sanctions were applied casts doubts about the 
effectiveness of these measures in influencing − let alone altering − the behaviour of a 
target country (Doxey, 1972; Doxey, 1971; Galtung, 1967; Green, 1983; Lindsay, 
1986). As detractors of sanctions contend, sender states almost never attain their policy 
goals through the use of sanctions and, in the few cases where they do, other 
accompanying policies such as the threat or the actual use of military force are likely to 
be responsible for the success (Haas, 1997, 1998; Pape, 1997, 1998).  
                                                          
1
 In line with the sanctions literature, I refer to a “sender” of sanctions as the country that initiates a 
coercion attempt, whereas a “target” is the addressee of this coercion attempt. 
2
 Throughout the thesis, I employ the terms sanction, democratic sanction, and economic statecraft 
interchangeably.  
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Critics also claim that sanctions have adverse side-effects. Sanctions generate important 
disruptions in the economic relations between countries, imposing a huge burden on the 
societies of both the sender and the targeted countries (Pape, 1997). Even worse, 
sanctions can contribute to the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in a 
sanctioned country (Weiss, 1999), as the sanctions imposed against Iraq in the 1990s or 
the current sanctions in place against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria have evidenced 
(Allen and Lektzian, 2013; Moret, 2015; Seeberg, 2015).  
At the heart of the criticism is the causal mechanism that is thought to operate when 
sanctions are imposed. Sender countries generally use sanctions with the expectation 
that the economic hardship inflicted on the target country will ultimately force the latter 
to alter its behaviour and make political concessions (Baldwin and Pape, 1998). 
Underlying this assumption is the reasoning that higher levels of economic hardship 
will push the population of the target country to increase pressure on its government, 
which in turn will be forced to concede and alter its policies. In this way, the society of 
the target country acts as a “transmission belt” that transforms the economic hardship 
caused by sanctions into political concessions by the targeted country (Galtung, 1967). 
However, Galtung (1967) himself criticised this belief as inaccurate and naïve. Indeed, 
targeted countries often find ways to circumvent or evade sanctions, as the disruption of 
trade between a sender and a target generates great incentives for third countries to fill 
in the void left and reap the benefits (Andreas, 2005; Early, 2011). Moreover, sanctions 
might trigger a “rally-around-the-flag-effect”, where target regimes increase their 
domestic support by using sanctions to flare up nationalistic feelings amongst the 
population and blame foreign powers for the economic woes of the country (Galtung, 
1967; Selden, 1999). Also, sanctions can have other perverse effects when imposed 
against autocratic regimes, as ruling elites shield themselves from the impact of 
14 
 
sanctions and transfer the cost to the innocent population (Allen, 2008a, b; Brooks, 
2002). If sanctions are doomed to fail, why do international actors like the EU still 
employ them to pursue their foreign policy goals?   
This thesis advances an innovative theoretical approach to answer this “sanctions 
paradox”. In line with game theoretic approaches, I develop an argument which portrays 
the imposition of sanctions as the product of a complex strategic bargaining process – a 
“sanctions game” – between a sender and a target. I claim that, once a sender is 
determined to threaten the use of sanctions, the likelihood that these are imposed 
depends on the target’s willingness to comply with the sender – and avoid being 
sanctioned –, or on its willingness to resist the latter’s pressure – and be punished in 
return. Importantly, I argue that the incentives that drive a target’s response are 
determined by its domestic institutional setting, which constrain and shape the ruling 
elite’s margin of manoeuvre to respond to a sender’s threat and imposition of sanctions.  
Following these premises, I define regimes that rely on small coalitions of individuals to 
rule – i.e. military and one-party regimes – as “strong” regimes, as they are able to 
shield themselves from the effects of sanctions and resist their pressure. As a 
consequence, these regimes face incentives to resist, and are therefore more likely to be 
sanctioned. On the contrary, I categorise regimes that are based on large coalitions – i.e. 
multi-party regimes – as “weak” regimes, as rulers face more challenges to maintain 
their coalition together when faced with external shocks. In this sense, sanctions 
generate incentives for members of the coalition to defect and create alternative 
coalitions to take office. Given that these regimes are more likely to be destabilised by 
sanctions, I show that they are also more inclined to comply with the sender when 
sanctions are threatened, and avoid thereby being punished.  
15 
 
 
1.2. Accounting for the imposition of sanctions 
1.2.1. Sanctions as a signalling or constraining tool 
For some scholars however, the answer to this “sanctions paradox” lies elsewhere. They 
claim that sanctions fulfil secondary functions other than seeking to alter a target 
country’s behaviour. For instance, sanctions can be employed to constrain a target 
country’s actions (Giumelli, 2011). Moreover, a sender might employ sanctions to 
signal to its domestic constituencies that it is doing something about the target’s 
behaviour (Barber, 1979; Giumelli, 2013a; Walldorf, 2010), or because certain pressure 
groups demand action from their government to protect their interests (Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 1988, 1992). In this sense, sanctions are frequently regarded as a cheap 
instrument that goes beyond issuing mere political declarations, but the economic 
effects of which are much more limited and less devastating than those of war (Dunne, 
1998; Wallensteen and Staibano, 2005). Finally, sanctions might also be useful in 
inhibiting a target country from misbehaving in the future or to deter other countries 
from following the steps of the transgressing country (Barber, 1979; Lindsay, 1986; 
Peterson, 2013).   
However, while these arguments are useful to understand why senders impose 
sanctions, they are less well suited to explain the variation that exists in the imposition 
of sanctions. Indeed, these explanations focus on the reasons that might trigger the use 
of sanctions, but they do not identify clearly the conditions under which negative 
measures are more likely to be imposed. For instance, in cases where sanctions are 
employed to promote generalizable and vague international norms like human rights or 
democratic principles, these arguments cannot explain why some countries that violate 
16 
 
these norms are sanctioned whilst others with similar or worse records of violations are 
not (Morgan and Miers, 1999).
3
  
 
1.2.2. The “conditional” effectiveness of sanctions 
A different explanation to the sanctions paradox has been provided by scholars who 
believe that these measures are more effective than previously thought (Elliott, 1998). 
According to these “optimists”, the assumption that sanctions do not work is misleading 
because it is based solely on the analysis of a handful of sanctions episodes. To prove 
the point, Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (2007) – hereafter HSE – analyse over 200 
cases where sanctions were imposed and conclude that sanctions worked almost a third 
of the times depending on the presence or absence of specific conditions. 
The prominent work of Hufbauer et al. (2007) triggered a shift in the research agenda, 
increasing the academic interest on the specific attributes of the sender and the target 
countries that were supposed to facilitate the success of sanctions. For instance, some of 
the studies employing the new dataset found that sanctions were more likely to be 
effective if the economic asymmetry between the sender and the target was large 
(Krustev, 2007; McLean and Whang, 2010; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997) and if the 
previous relationship between a sender and a target was cordial (Drezner, 1998, 1999). 
Other studies showed that sanctions worked best when a target was undergoing a period 
of political or economic instability (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Jing, Kaempfer and 
Lowenberg, 2003; Lam, 1990) and when the sender’s demand was modest (Dashti-
Gibson, Davis and Radcliff, 1997; Lektzian and Souva, 2007).  
                                                          
3
 In fact, this inconsistency can trigger harsh criticism about double standards when imposing sanctions 
against sender governments.  
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Scholars also claimed that unilateral sanctions were more effective than multilateral 
ones due to collective action problems (Doxey, 1980, 1987; Doxey, 1971; Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg, 1999; Miers and Morgan, 2002). However, this result changed when an 
international organisation was present during a sanctions episode, as it reduced 
uncertainty and coordination problems between multiple senders (Bapat and Morgan, 
2009; Drezner, 2000; Martin, 1992; Martin, 1993). Studies also found evidence that 
sanctions were more likely to succeed if a target was dependent on trade from the 
sender (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997; Miyagawa, 1992; Van Bergeijk, 1994). Finally, 
some studies associated sanctions success to high cost to the target (Doxey, 1980; 
Lektzian and Souva, 2007), whereas others suggested that less harmful sanctions were 
more effective (Eaton and Engers, 1992). 
However, a few caveats about the higher efficacy of sanctions are necessary. First, even 
if sanctions were to succeed more often than previously thought, Hufbauer et al. (2007) 
estimation that they work one-third of the times is, after all, a meagre rate of success.
4
 
Moreover, if sanctions are more efficient under specific circumstances, we should 
expect senders to refrain from using them in cases where success is unlikely, and 
witness instead a more selective use of sanctions. Paradoxically however, the empirical 
record shows an increase in the use of sanctions over time, suggesting that these 
measures are not necessarily employed in such a selective way as awaited (Morgan and 
Miers, 1999). Lastly, newer studies employing the HSE data have not been able to 
replicate some of the abovementioned findings despite using similar research designs 
(Bapat, Heinrich, Kobayashi and Morgan, 2013; Morgan, Bapat and Krustev, 2009).  
                                                          
4
 Pape (1997, 1998) has even criticised this rate for being too optimistic. His recoding of the HSE 
database estimates the success rate of sanctions at 5%, a significantly lower figure. 
18 
 
The lack of consistent findings in the literature and the inability of these approaches to 
provide a convincing explanation for the sanctions paradox can be accounted for by two 
factors. First, until recently the HSE dataset was the only comprehensive dataset on 
economic sanctions available, leading researchers to rely excessively on it to test 
hypotheses about the effects of sanctions in large-n studies. One problem with this 
choice is that about 80% of the cases recorded in the dataset are cases where the United 
States (US) was the first or unique sender of sanctions. This renders it difficult for 
making generalisations about the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by other senders 
than the US.  
A second and more problematic issue relates to the fact that most studies have reached 
conclusions about the effectiveness of sanctions based on cases where sanctions were 
actually imposed, but not on cases where sanctions were threatened but not enforced 
(Drezner, 2003; Nooruddin, 2002). This seemingly insignificant distinction between the 
threatening and the actual imposition of sanctions has gone relatively unnoticed in 
empirical studies assessing the effectiveness of sanctions. Yet this difference is likely to 
have important repercussions on how sanctions work and when they are more likely to 
be used to begin with.  
 
1.2.3. Sanctions, target state calculations and selection effects 
As game theorists have posited, the imposition of sanctions can be viewed as the result 
of a complex bargaining process between a sender and a target state. In this process, the 
strategies pursued by the sender and the target are determined by the utility that each 
obtains from following one strategy over another. In this sense, the imposition of 
sanctions is only one possible outcome of this process that is likely to be attained when 
19 
 
both actors reach a point (equilibrium) from which none of them faces incentives to 
deviate. However, other outcomes are possible as well. For instance, a target might 
believe that it will better off by complying with the sender at the threat stage, i.e. before 
sanctions are actually employed.
5
 In this case, sanctions will not be imposed and the 
threat of sanctions will have sufficed to achieve a target’s acquiescence. This example 
suggests that the incentives and policy preferences faced by a target country during a 
strategic bargaining process play an important role in predicting the outcome of this 
process and, specifically, in determining whether the sender will adopt sanctions or not 
(Allen, 2005; Eaton and Engers, 1992; Smith, 1995).  
Indeed, a target country is likely to undertake a cost-benefit calculation regarding the 
utility that it obtains from conceding to the sender before sanctions are imposed against 
the utility that it gets from resisting its pressure. In other words, a target should be able 
to anticipate a sender’s next move and choose a strategy according to the utility that it 
will receive from it. If a target prefers to comply with a sender before sanctions are 
enacted, then no sanctions should be observed and the threat of sanctions will have 
sufficed to obtain a target’s compliance. On the contrary, if a target prefers to stick to its 
policy rather than to comply with a sender, then sanctions are likely to be imposed. 
While game theoretic approaches provide an elegant answer to the sanctions paradox, 
they also point to the existence of an important empirical problem: the existence of 
selection bias (Morgan and Miers, 1999; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Nooruddin, 
2002). As it can be derived from this line of reasoning, target countries that choose to 
defy the sender and resist its pressure are likely to do so because they know that they are 
better-off doing so and because they have privileged information regarding their 
                                                          
5
 I develop this reasoning in more detail in Chapter 2.  
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capacity to withstand sanctions. In other words, these targets are likely to be “hard” 
cases that “self-select” themselves into sanctions. As a consequence, they will bias the 
estimates of the efficacy of sanctions downward(Marinov, 2005). In the same vein, 
weak targets are likely to be aware of their vulnerability to sanctions. Thus, they will be 
likely to comply with the sender at the threat stage, and avoid having to bear the cost of 
sanctions. Therefore, no sanctions will be observed and, somewhat paradoxically, 
sanctions will have succeeded before actually being imposed (Eaton and Engers, 1999).  
If selection effects are indeed present, then most of the sanctions literature is likely to be 
affected from a severe selection bias problem (Blake and Klemm, 2006; Drezner, 2003; 
Morgan et al., 2009; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Nooruddin, 2002). This is a 
relevant issue that has important academic and policy implications, as it affects our 
understanding of when sanctions should work best. For instance, it is plausible that the 
low success rate reported in HSE’s work – and in successive studies that use the HSE 
dataset – is driven by the inclusion of many hard cases that “self-select” themselves into 
sanctions in the database (Whang, 2010). If this is true, then many studies might be 
grossly underestimating the effectiveness of sanctions, since most cases where sanctions 
should work best are not observed – and, therefore, not recorded in the HSE database. 
Yet most importantly, it also implies that selection effects need to be modelled in 
empirical research in order to explain the variation in the imposition of sanctions.  
Yet when will sanctions be imposed? And under which circumstances will a target 
decide to resist the sender’s pressure or, alternatively, to comply with it before sanctions 
are imposed? Providing a conclusive answer to these questions is the main goal of this 
thesis. To account for selection effects in the imposition of sanctions, I develop a 
strategic bargaining model where policy preferences are formed endogenously and 
where a target country’s decision to comply or resist a sender’s pressure is determined 
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by its domestic institutions. I argue that different types of autocratic regimes are 
characterised by particular institutional settings, which impose different levels of 
constraints on them, and limit thereby their political leeway. Institutions influence the 
calculations of autocratic regimes about the utility that they obtain from accommodating 
the sender’s demands versus the utility that they receive from resisting its pressure. 
Regimes that face a low level of constraints (i.e. “strong” regimes like military and one-
party regimes) have incentives to withstand the sender’s pressure, whilst regimes 
dealing with a high level of constraints (i.e. “weak” regimes like multi-party regimes) 
are more inclined to comply with the sender at the threat stage. 
 
1.3. Strategic bargaining, domestic constraints, and the imposition of sanctions 
A widespread belief in the literature posits that economically troubled or dependent 
countries constitute easy targets for senders. As such, sanctions should destabilise them 
easily and force them to capitulate early during a sanctions episode (Hufbauer et al., 
2007; Van Bergeijk, 1994). Thus, sanctions against these targets are often regarded as 
“cost-effective” measures that almost certainly guarantee a sender’s success at a low 
cost (Soest and Wahman, 2015). Somewhat surprisingly however, some examples of 
economically vulnerable countries like Fiji, Togo or Zimbabwe seem to question the 
veracity of this claim, as they have shown a remarkable resilience towards sanctions 
despite suffering from long-term economic stagnation, hyperinflation and high rates of 
unemployment.  
The problem with this “cost-effectiveness” assumption resembles that of the naïve 
theory of sanctions in that it places too much emphasis on the economic costs that 
sanctions impose on a target, whilst it forgets to acknowledge the political costs that 
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sanctions impose on a target (Blanchard and Ripsman, 1999). Given that political 
leaders want to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 
2003), the response of targets is likely to be motivated by the value that these place on 
the policy that the sender wants to redress (Smith, 1995), and how the policy choice 
affects their survival in office. If the utility that a target country obtains from the policy 
is lower than the cost of sanctions, then it should be willing to comply with the sender. 
However, if the utility that it receives from sticking to the policy is equal or higher than 
the cost of sanctions, then the target’s incentive to resist the sender’s pressure increases. 
Therefore, the way in which target countries react to a sender’s threat and imposition of 
sanctions is likely to be influenced by internal calculations regarding the regime’s 
stability, its legitimacy and control over the state apparatus, its internal cohesion and, 
most importantly, the fate of its leaders if they leave office (Escribà-Folch, 2013; 
Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). These calculations 
vary enormously between presidential and parliamentary democracies (Cheibub and 
Limongi, 2002), but also between different types of authoritarian regimes (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 2002). The main reason for this variation – and 
therefore, for a target regime’s decision to comply with a sender or to withstand 
sanctions – is likely to be found at the domestic institutional setting of the target 
country. 
Political institutions are frequently described as the ‘rules of the game in a society’ 
(North, 1990: 3). They structure the interactions between the incumbent and the rest of 
society, ‘providing information and enforcement mechanisms that reduce uncertainty 
about the corresponding behavior of others’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 7).  Institutions can 
be formal or informal, yet they are important inasmuch as they shape and channel power 
relations between different political factions, segments of society or, most importantly, 
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between the ruler and her domestic competitors (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). In 
other words, the institutional setting in a country determines to a large extent the power 
that a ruler has to impose her decisions on society and the ease with which she does so 
(Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Roller, 2005). 
This logic also applies to autocratic regimes. Indeed, institutions in authoritarian 
countries are far from being a mere façade or a simple window dressing (Gandhi and 
Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 1999, 2003). On the contrary, they are a reflection of the 
power relations between an autocrat and her challengers. Institutions serve the autocrat 
to divide or co-opt the opposition (Wright, 2008), yet they also limit and reduce the 
autocrat’s leeway by imposing formal and informal constraints on her rule. As a 
consequence, regimes that face low or no domestic constraints have a large margin of 
manoeuvre, as they are accountable to few . At the same time, rulers that face many 
constraints or veto players have their leeway restricted and their power limited, as they 
need to satisfy the needs of a larger spectrum of actors to rule.   
Importantly, the variation in the type of institutions and the constraints that these 
impose on different types of autocratic regimes is likely to have an important effect in 
the way these respond to the threat and imposition of sanctions. Indeed, just as domestic 
institutions affect a wide variety of political outcomes like conflict onset (Bueno de 
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith, 1999; Choi, 2010; Filson and Werner, 2004; 
Russett, 1994; Weeks, 2012), economic development (Gerring, Bond, Barndt and 
Moreno, 2005; Helliwell, 1994; Przeworski, 1991, 2000), or the quality of governance 
(Jensen, 2003; Jensen, Malesky and Weymouth, 2013; Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002), 
domestic institutions are likely to shape an autocratic regime’s policy choices towards 
the threat of sanctions by constraining or increasing the political leader’s margin of 
manoeuvre (Allen, 2008b; Brooks, 2002). Regimes should be politically vulnerable to 
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external shocks like sanctions when they face large domestic constraints to their rule. 
On the contrary, regimes that face less constrains should be less exposed to sanctions, as 
their internal cohesion and concentration of power should allow them to shield the 
country’s ruling elites from the effects of sanctions.  
Thus, I expect politically constrained regimes (i.e. weak regimes) to be more likely to 
comply with the sender in the threat stage, while regimes that face small or no 
constraints (i.e. strong regimes) should be more likely to ignore the sender’s threat 
(Hypothesis 1 or H1). Consequently, weak regimes should be less likely to be 
sanctioned, while the opposite should be true for strong regimes (Hypothesis 2 or H2).  
However, it is still possible that weak targets miscalculate their ability to withstand 
sanctions and decide to resist the sender’s pressure. In this case, weak targets should 
become aware of their mistake soon after sanctions have been imposed and comply with 
the sender in due course (Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz, 2005). Thus, I expect weak targets 
to be sanctioned for shorter spells than strong targets (Hypothesis 3 or H3). Finally, 
sanctions should also be more likely to destabilise weak regimes rather than strong ones 
(Hypothesis 4 or H4).  
In sum, I expect selection effects to be present at the target regime’s level and to be 
mediated by its domestic institutional setting. If my argument holds, we should observe 
variation in the response to sanctions amongst different types of autocratic regimes. 
Regimes that sustain their rule on a broad coalition that brings together various different 
societal actors – i.e. multi-party regimes – face more constraints in their response to the 
threat and imposition of sanctions. Therefore, they should be more likely to comply 
with the sender during the threat stage and avoid being sanctioned. Likewise, regimes 
facing lesser institutional constraints – i.e. military and one-party regimes – should be 
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more likely to resist the sender’s pressure and, as a consequence, be more likely to be 
sanctioned.  
 
1.4. Research design and case selection 
To test my argument about the existence of selection effects at the target’s domestic 
level, I employ a mixed methods approach that combines a statistical analysis on the 
imposition of EU sanctions with the qualitative analysis of several case studies where 
the EU imposed sanctions to redress an autocratic target regime’s violation of human 
rights and/or democratic principles.
6
 The use of a mixed methods approach suits the 
purpose of this thesis in two respects. 
First, I attempt to capture the variation that exists in the way sanctions are imposed 
across different autocratic targets through the use of a statistical analysis. To capture 
this variation, I model two stages of the strategic bargaining process that are relevant to 
my model: first, the stage where a target country decides whether to comply with a 
sender or not (H1); and second, the stage where the sender decides whether to impose 
sanctions or to refrain thereof (H2). In addition, I also model the length of the sanctions 
spell (H3) and test whether sanctions are more likely to destabilise weak regimes more 
than strong ones (H4).  
The quantitative analysis on the drivers of EU sanctions is then complemented by five 
case studies where sanctions were imposed by the EU. These cases are selected 
according to my theoretical model and to the results of my statistical analysis. One set 
of cases are typical cases that reflect situations where my model predicts the outcome 
                                                          
6
 As a matter of fact, the EU has only imposed sanctions to address violations of human rights and 
democratic principles against non-democratic regimes.  
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well (i.e. cases that fall “on the regression line”). The other set of cases concerns 
instances where my model fails to predict the outcome correctly (i.e. cases that fall “off 
the line”). The first three cases that my model predicts correctly are the two sanctions 
episodes against Fiji – first between 2001 and 2003 (Fiji I), and again between 2006 and 
2014 (Fiji II) –, and Myanmar, which are discussed in Chapter 5. The other two cases 
where my model performs poorly are Belarus and Zimbabwe, which I discuss in 
Chapter 6. As I show in Chapter 4, these cases are exceptional and can be considered to 
be clear outliers to my theoretical argument. 
The case studies complement the large-n statistical analysis in two important ways. 
First,  the typical cases of Fiji I, Fiji II, and Myanmar (Chapter 5) illustrate my 
argument empirically, and provide a more nuanced account of the dynamism that takes 
place during the strategic bargaining process and which is not entirely captured by the 
more static statistical analysis. By focusing on the micro-level dynamics that take place 
at the target country’s level i) before sanctions are imposed and ii) during the time that 
they are in place (Kirshner, 1997), these case studies allow me to identify small changes 
in the bargaining positions of the sender and the target during the sanctions episode. In 
this way, I am able to observe how domestic institutions at the target country shape its 
response to the threat and imposition of sanctions, and how this behaviour changes – if 
it does – throughout the sanctions episode. Thus, the cases of Fiji I, Fiji II, and 
Myanmar help me to trace the causal mechanisms that influence a target regime’s 
response to sanctions during the strategic bargaining process.  
Second, the cases of Belarus and Zimbabwe (Chapter 6) are useful to examine the 
validity of my argument in light of the deviance of the two regimes, and to examine the 
extent to which additional factors that I did not include in the statistical analysis can 
help to explain these cases. For example, the case studies allow me to control for an 
27 
 
important variable that cannot be easily measured in the statistical analysis: the presence 
of the so-called “black knights” (Early, 2009, 2011; Galtung, 1967; Green, 1983; 
Hufbauer et al., 2007). This term is employed in the literature to refer to third parties 
that step up their diplomatic and economic support to a sanctioned country due to 
geopolitical and strategic considerations, or due to the more than profitable business 
opportunities that the disruption of trade and investment caused by sanctions generate. 
Since this assistance might allow a sanctioned country to circumvent and offset the 
impact of sanctions, I control for its relevance in the case studies.  
Moreover, even though my strategic bargaining approach to the imposition of sanctions 
can theoretically be applied to any sender of sanctions, I focus on those sanctions 
imposed by the EU for several reasons. First of all, the EU has become one of the most 
prominent senders of international sanctions since the end of the Cold War, lagging 
only behind the US (Elliott, 2005). However, its growing use of sanctions has only 
recently attracted the attention of scholars, and remains largely unexplored.  In fact, only 
three books and a handful of academic papers have been written on the topic (Eriksson, 
2011; Giumelli, 2011, 2013a, b; Giumelli and Ivan, 2013; Kreutz, 2005; Portela, 2005, 
2010), yet none of them controls for the existence of selection effects during the 
imposition of sanctions. Thus, my thesis is pioneering in empirically identifying the 
presence of selection effects in the study on the imposition of sanctions, and makes an 
important contribution to understanding the circumstances under which EU sanctions 
are more likely to be imposed – and eventually work.  
Second, the EU is also an interesting case study as a sender because it employs many 
different tools that, due to their punitive logic, might be classified as sanctions. Indeed, 
although there is no common definition of sanction, different interpretations exist, from 
those that take a minimalist view and consider only those measures imposed under the 
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Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework as sanctions (Eriksson, 2011; 
Giumelli, 2013b), to those that adopt a broader definition and catalogue CFSP 
measures, aid suspensions under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, trade related 
measures such as the General System of Preferences (GSP) suspension, and other 
informal measures as sanctions (Hazelzet, 2001; Portela, 2010). The last interpretation – 
to which this thesis subscribes –, is interesting because of the richness of the tools 
employed, but also due to the different legal and formal mechanisms that regulate the 
use of each set of measures.
7
   
To test my hypotheses I develop an original dataset on EU sanctions. The need to create 
a new database stems from the fact that, unfortunately, most EU sanctions episodes are 
not included in the two most comprehensive datasets on economic sanctions – HSE’s 
“Economic Sanctions Reconsidered” and Morgan et al’s. (2009) “Threat and Imposition 
of Economic Sanctions” (TIES). Since the database constitutes in itself an original 
contribution to the literature, I devote Chapter 3 to a discussion of the data gathering 
process and the sources employed for the operationalisation and coding of the variables. 
Finally, even though my model on the imposition of sanctions can be applied to 
different issue areas, I focus on “democratic sanctions” − i.e. those measures that the 
EU imposes to address human rights violations and democratic wrongdoing in third 
countries. The interest in this topic stems from the salience and contentiousness that it 
has generated in academic and policy circles, as the usefulness of sanctions in 
improving a target’s respect of democracy and human rights is often questioned 
(Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014; Lopez and Cortright, 1997; Peksen, 2009, 2011; 
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 Indeed, as Portela (2010) shows in her book, the use of each of these measures varies depending on the 
distribution of competencies between EU institutions, but also on the majorities required to impose, 
change, extend, and eventually lift the sanctions.  
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Peksen and Drury, 2010; von Soest and Wahman, 2014). Therefore, my theoretical 
model can shed new light on this debate.  
 
1.5. Findings 
My thesis confirms that selection effects are present at the target country’s level and, 
most importantly, that these are mediated by the target’s domestic institutions. The 
large-n empirical analysis in Chapter 4 evidences that an important variation exists in 
number of sanctions that are imposed by the EU against different types of autocratic 
regimes. The four hypotheses that I test are corroborated by my results, which show that 
regimes facing more domestic constraints (weak regimes) are more likely to comply 
with the sender’s demands in the threat stage than those regimes whose power is less 
constrained by veto players (strong regimes) (H1). Likewise, my results confirm that 
weak regimes are less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes (H2). Noteworthy, the 
findings are consistent and robust across different model specifications, and they remain 
the same when I control for alternative explanations of sanctions impositions.
8
 
The statistical analysis also confirms my expectation that weak regimes are sanctioned 
for shorter spells than strong regimes (H3). This finding supports my claim that weak 
regimes sometimes miscalculate their strength, but that they acknowledge their mistake 
soon after sanctions start to bite. Finally, my results also corroborate my expectation 
that weak regimes are more likely to be destabilised by sanctions than strong regimes 
(H4).  
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 See section 2.7 in Chapter 2 for a full description of alternative explanations to the imposition of 
sanctions.  
30 
 
In addition to the quantitative analysis, the case studies provide further insights into the 
strategic interaction process between the EU and the targeted countries during the threat 
and imposition of sanctions. I find that the institutional setup of the target country plays 
a very important role in the target’s decision to comply or resist the sender’s pressure. 
This is evidenced in the case of Fiji I (2001-2003), where the authorities displayed a 
clear predisposition to accommodate the EU’s demands from the very beginning by 
establishing a roadmap to return to the democratic rule within a short period of time. 
The case study also shows that, when a ruling coalition is large, internal divisions are 
likely to appear and undermine the regime’s capacity to withstand international and 
domestic pressures.  
However, the case studies also demonstrate that sanctions are less likely to destabilise 
strong regimes that rely on a small coalition to rule. Indeed, the military regimes in Fiji 
II (2006-2014) and Myanmar (1990-ongoing) were able to survive in power for 
prolonged periods of time despite having to bear the economic burden of sanctions. As I 
show in Chapter 5, the Fijian military regime was able to eliminate all forms of 
domestic opposition and to tighten its control over the state apparatus thanks to the 
regime’s internal cohesion around the figure of Commodore Frank Bainimarama. This, 
in turn, allowed it to ignore and resist the impact of sanctions, as no domestic opposition 
structures were able to transform the discontent with sanctions into political pressure 
against the regime. Similarly, the Myanmar military junta’s cohesiveness and its 
targeted system of patronage allowed it to keep a firm grip on power despite suffering 
the impact of economic sanctions for more than two decades.   
Finally, my case studies provide evidence about role of black knights in offsetting the 
effects of sanctions in Belarus and Zimbabwe. These cases show that Russia’s support 
of Alexander Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus, and South Africa’s legitimation of 
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Mugabe’s rule in Zimbabwe were necessary but insufficient conditions to explain why 
these regimes were able to survive in power despite facing international sanctions and 
profound economic crises. Indeed, besides the role of black knights, another factor that 
allowed Lukashenka and Mugabe to rule almost unrestrained was the failure of the 
opposition to organise a united front in Belarus, and the opposition’s incapacity to 
maintain it after entering the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe. In any case, 
the sanctions episodes against Belarus and Zimbabwe are quite exceptional and could be 
described as “outliers” to my theoretical account. 
 
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
In Chapter 2 I introduce my theoretical framework on the strategic bargaining process 
that takes place between a sender and a target of sanctions. Borrowing from the game 
theoretic literature, I generate a “sanctions game” where a sender and a target interact, 
and where the result of their interaction leads to different outcomes or equilibria, 
including the imposition of sanctions. I develop my argument on the role of the 
domestic institutions in determining the target’s response to sanctions, and argue that 
politically constrained regimes are more likely to comply with the sender and avoid 
being sanctioned, whilst regimes that are less constrained by their domestic institutions 
are more likely to defy the sender and be sanctioned. More specifically, I claim that the 
size of a regime’s “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) – i.e. the 
number of individuals that guarantee the stability of an autocrat’s rule –, determines 
whether an autocratic regime is able to withstand external pressures like sanctions.  
Chapter 3 lays out the research design of the thesis. First, I describe in detail how my 
new dataset on EU sanctions has been developed. I discuss the operationalisation and 
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coding of the dependent and independent variables, and disclose the sources that I have 
employed for this purpose. The chapter also examines certain methodological problems 
that arise in the econometric analysis, and discusses the solutions that I have used to 
address these issues. Finally, the chapter concludes by explaining the criteria that have 
been employed to select the case studies of Chapter 5 and 6.  
Chapter 4 then introduces the results of the statistical analysis. My first models present 
the results of the compliance and the sanctions stages and confirm i) that politically 
weak regimes are more likely to comply with the threat of sanctions; and ii) that they 
are less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes. These analyses are then 
complemented by two more models, which provide evidence i) that weak regimes face 
shorter sanctions spells; and ii) that they are more likely to be destabilised by sanctions 
than strong regimes. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 I analyse the four case studies where EU sanctions were imposed. 
Chapter 5 first analyses the cases of Fiij I (2001-2003) and Fiji II (2006-2014) and then 
proceeds to examine the sanctions regime against Myanmar since 1990. In Chapter 6 I 
analyse the EU’s sanctions episodes against Belarus and Zimbabwe, two of the most 
notorious and longest-lived sanctions regimes ever imposed by the EU.  
Finally, Chapter 7 wraps up the main findings of the thesis and discusses their value to 
the literature and to sanctions practice in general. First, I discuss the main strengths and 
limitations of my theoretical approach and of my empirical results, and review the 
generalizability and applicability of my model to other senders and issue areas. In 
addition, I suggest new lines of research that could help to advance our knowledge on 
selection effects and on the actual efficacy of sanctions. To conclude, I briefly discuss 
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the substantive meaning of my findings for practitioners, and examine ways in which 
the use of sanctions could be enhanced.  
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CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THE SANCTIONS GAME 
2.1. Introduction 
When do Western countries use sanctions to address human rights violations and 
democratic wrongdoing in autocratic regimes? And under which circumstances will 
they decide to impose sanctions? Economic statecraft has become an increasingly 
popular foreign policy tool since the end of the Cold War, as countries have made a 
growing use of it to deal with international crises (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Haas, 
1998; Jones, 2007). However, considering the widespread view that sanctions do not 
work (Pape, 1997), it is surprising that their increasing use in international politics has 
not been matched by a theoretical explanation of when and why countries resort to them 
at all. After all, sanctions are only one amongst many instruments available to a sender 
to attain foreign policy goals, and it is by no means clear that the use of economic 
coercion is necessarily the most efficient way to do so.  
As a matter of fact, countries have a wide choice of tools at their disposal to influence a 
target’s behaviour (Holsti, 1995). Amongst others, they can employ diplomacy, the use 
of positive and negative incentives or – at the other extreme – they can rely on military 
force (Baldwin, 1985). Furthermore, even when sanctions are considered, they are 
rarely the most imminent and direct reaction that senders employ when they feel uneasy 
about a target’s behaviour. On the contrary, they tend to be preceded by the issuance of 
political statements, diplomatic consultations and, eventually, by threatening economic 
coercion. 
Sanctions are often regarded as drastic measures (Council of the European Union, 
2004a) that are only employed when a target is unwilling to change its behaviour and 
comply with the sender’s demands. The recourse to economic statecraft thus conveys 
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the message that diplomatic means have failed to solve an international conflict and that 
a political stalemate has been reached. Consequently, sanctions become an attractive 
option for policy-makers when negotiations with a target stall and the sender has no 
room for manoeuvre left. 
Portraying the use of economic coercion as the outcome of a failed negotiation is a 
promising starting point to understand why sanctions are imposed – and why they so 
often fail to achieve their goals (Lacy and Niou, 2004). For quite some time, game 
theorists have advocated that the imposition of sanctions can be regarded as a strategic 
bargaining game between two actors with diverging interests (Drezner, 1998; Tsebelis, 
1990). The usefulness of this approach as an analytical tool resides in its focus on the 
process that leads ultimately to the imposition of sanctions, which can be viewed as an 
outcome of this process (Nooruddin, 2002: 66-67). 
This chapter develops this argument and builds up the analytical framework of the 
thesis. Section 2.2 presents the argument that the imposition of sanctions needs to be 
regarded as a strategic bargaining game and discusses the potential of such an approach. 
Section 2.3 analyses the presence of selection bias in the study of sanctions and 
proposes ways to address it. In the following part, I introduce my argument that 
domestic institutions account to a large extent for target selection effects. I claim that 
strong regimes that rely on a small winning coalition to rule face little domestic 
constraints and therefore have incentives to resist the sender’s threat of sanctions. As a 
consequence, they are also more likely to be sanctioned than weaker regimes with large 
ruling coalitions. This premise allows me to provide the causal mechanism that lead 
different types of autocratic regimes to respond in different ways to the threat and 
imposition of sanctions in section 2.4. The main hypotheses of this study are outlined in 
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sections 2.5 and 2.6, whilst alternative explanations are discussed thereafter. Finally, the 
last section summarises the main ideas of the chapter and concludes. 
 
2.2. Sanctions as a strategic bargaining game 
Strategic bargaining approaches allow predicting the circumstances under which certain 
outcomes or equilibria might result from the interaction between two actors. Thus, 
depending on the individual strategies pursued by each actor individually, different 
equilibria will be reached (Fearon, 1998; McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007; Osborne, 
2004). The strategic behaviour of two actors has important implications for the study of 
economic statecraft, as it allows understanding the imposition of sanctions as only one 
possible outcome (equilibrium) out of many. The relevant puzzle is therefore to 
understand how different strategies and policy choices lead the actors to reach a specific 
equilibrium over others and, in particular, the equilibrium where sanctions are imposed. 
Conceiving of the imposition of sanctions as a strategic bargaining game has important 
analytical advantages, since a coercion attempt is only one possible way in which a 
sender may seek to alter a target’s behaviour (Krustev, 2010). As I have argued above, 
the sender has various other options available to influence a target. But also, it is 
perfectly possible that a sender does not need to use sanctions at all to make a target 
change its behaviour. In fact, senders might achieve a target’s compliance when the 
latter fears that sanctions will impose a huge burden on it. In these cases, the mere threat 
of sanctions can induce a target to modify its behaviour and sanctions will not be 
required. 
Recall that what I have dubbed the cost-effectiveness approach assumes that 
economically and politically vulnerable countries are more likely to be sanctioned, since 
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the probability that they will suffer under sanctions – and thus concede to the sender’s 
demands – is much higher. While this line of reasoning underlines the sender’s rationale 
for using sanctions, the interactive dynamics highlighted by game theoretic approaches 
also attribute an important role in the bargaining process to the other player of the game 
– i.e. the target. In fact, the intuition behind strategic bargaining approaches is that it is 
ultimately in the target’s hands to decide whether sanctions will be imposed or not, 
since it is in its discretion to choose whether to comply with the sender or whether to 
defy it.  
In game theory, actors select those strategies that maximise their pay-offs or utilities 
(McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007; Osborne, 2004). However, they do so by anticipating 
the moves of the other player. This means that the strategy chosen is conditional on the 
other player’s moves. Consequently, both actors anticipate each other’s’ actions and 
choose their best response to the other’s move. In the case of economic coercion 
attempts, a target should be able to anticipate whether a sender is determined to impose 
sanctions or not, and to choose its reaction correspondingly (Drezner, 1998, 1999).  
According to approaches based on the “cost-effectiveness” argument, senders should be 
more likely to sanction weak and unstable countries. In this sense, weak countries 
constitute easy targets, since they are more likely to capitulate to the pressure of 
sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Game theorists however claim that, by the same token 
as senders are likelier to target weak countries, weak targets should be able to anticipate 
that the imposition of sanctions would render them worse off than if they would comply 
with the sender (Morgan and Miers, 1999; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997). As Drezner 
(2003: 644) has succinctly put it, ‘if the target prefers conceding to incurring the cost of 
sanctions, it has an incentive to acquiesce before the imposition of sanctions’.  
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Crucially, this reasoning implies that sanctions will only be imposed under very specific 
circumstances: namely, when a target prefers to resist a sender’s pressure. Such 
behaviour is what game theorists refer to as “self-selection”, as it is entirely in the 
target’s discretion to choose between defying the sender – and thus be sanctioned – or 
complying with it – and avoid bearing the cost of sanctions.  
Game theorists assume that targets will self-select themselves into sanctions when the 
cost of compliance is higher or equal to the cost of resisting. Thus, targets that care 
about the policy that has upset the sender will face higher incentives to resist the latter’s 
demands as long as doing so is cheap. At the same time, senders that are concerned 
about the target’s misbehaviour and have already threatened sanctions will face higher 
incentives to respond coercively as long as doing so is less costly than backing down. In 
these circumstances, sanctions should be more likely to be imposed, as none of the 
players has incentives to compromise (Smith, 1995). 
Following this argument, we can theorize about potential outcomes or equilibria that 
might be reached when two actors interact in a “sanctions game”. Consider, for 
instance, a simplified game where a sender can impose sanctions or refrain thereof and a 
target can comply with the sender or resist its pressure. The possible options that the 
actors face are presented in graph 2.1. 
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Graph 2.1. Game tree of a sanctions game 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
In this game, the target (T) makes the first move.
9
 If it decides to comply (c) with the 
sender (S), it goes down the left branch of the tree and the game ends. In this scenario, 
the sender’s threat has been sufficient to achieve a target’s compliance. This scenario is 
likely to occur when targets are vulnerable to sanctions, which have the potential of 
                                                          
9
 Note that I am not focusing on the reasons that might lead a sender to threaten sanctions. The “threat 
stage” could be modelled by adding an additional level on the top of the sanctions tree. In this case, the 
sender would face the options of threatening sanctions (t) or refraining thereof (~t). Modelling this stage 
is beyond the scope of this study. For examples of games where the threat of sanctions is studied, see 
Whang, McLean and Kuberski (2013), Peterson (2013) or Krustev (2010). 
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jeopardising the target’s regime position. Consequently, T will be better off by 
complying with the sender. 
However, if the target decides to resist (~c), the game proceeds down the right branch of 
the tree. This can occur when T does not held the sender’s threat to be credible or when 
a target is determined to stick to its policy because it values it more than bearing the 
potential costs of sanctions. In the latter case, the target is willing to self-select itself 
into sanctions. However, this option only potentially leads to sanctions, as the sender 
has now to choose between imposing sanctions (s) or backing down (~s). The latter case 
is likely to happen if S has miscalculated T’s willingness to resist and S is not willing to 
incur any costs that might derive from the imposition of sanctions. Nonetheless, if the 
sender is committed to address the target’s behaviour or wants to keep its threat 
credible, then the former case is more plausible and sanctions will be imposed. 
Under this circumstance, T will have to reassess the sender’s intentions and estimate 
whether it is able to withstand the cost of sanctions (Hovi et al., 2005). If T has 
misinterpreted the credibility of the threat, it will comply (c) and the game will end. 
Thus, even though sanctions are used, they will be short-lived as the target complies 
soon after their imposition. However, if T is unwilling to modify its behaviour and 
acquiesce with the sender’s demands, it will choose to resist (~c). In this scenario, S 
imposes sanctions but T does not comply. T thus self-select itself into sanctions and the 
sanctions episode is likely to last for a long period of time, as T has no incentives to 
alter its behaviour.
10 
                                                          
10
 The length of the sanctions episode will also depend on the value that the sender ascribes to 
maintaining this policy. For instance, a sender can obtain political gains by signalling its commitment to 
alter the target’s behaviour, even if sanctions are not expected to work (Barber, 1979) 
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As it can be observed from Graph 2.1, in this game sanctions are only imposed in two 
out of for scenarios: i) when a target miscalculates a sender’s willingness to impose 
sanctions; and ii) when a target prefers to stick to its policy and defy a sender. Most 
importantly however, Graph 2.1 evidences something of great relevance to the study of 
sanctions: it shows that the study of economic statecraft is very likely to be flawed by 
the presence of selection bias (Blake and Klemm, 2006; Drezner, 2003; Morgan and 
Miers, 1999; Nooruddin, 2002).  
Indeed, as the different outcomes of the “sanctions game” depicted in Graph 2.1 
evidence, some countries will be more likely to be targeted than others. Who gets 
punished and who does not will therefore not be determined exogenously, but will 
instead be the result of endogenous decision-making processes (Drury, 2005: 158; Jing 
et al., 2003). In other words, the imposition of sanctions will not be determined by 
externally measurable factors; it will be the result of the strategic choices made by the 
actors. This implies that sanctions will form part of a dispute, and not be the direct 
result of it.  
 
2.3. Addressing selection effects in the study of sanctions imposition 
If indeed selection bias is present in the study of sanctions, it becomes mandatory for 
researchers to find ways to account for it. However, only a few studies have taken the 
issue seriously – albeit mostly from a theoretical and not empirical perspective (Blake 
and Klemm, 2006; Drezner, 1999, 2003; Lacy and Niou, 2004; Nooruddin, 2002).
11
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 Most of these studies have developed theoretical games where two or more actors interact to show that 
selection effects are present in the study of sanctions imposition. Nooruddin (2002) and Blake and 
Klemm (2006) have also tested this argument empirically using the HSE data to show that selection bias 
42 
 
Selection bias tends to emerge when i) a subset of observations is systematically 
excluded from a sample due to a lack of available information, or ii) when a subset of 
observations is more likely to be part of a sample because it self-select itself into the 
sample. In the study of economic sanctions, this occurs in two different ways: ‘senders 
may pick out weak governments to target, or tough target governments may select 
themselves into sanctions’ (Marinov, 2005: 574).  
 
2.3.1. Sender selection effects 
The first case is often referred to as “sender selection effects”, since senders choose 
their targets selectively following strategic considerations. For example, a sender might 
decide to impose sanctions if it believes that they will be effective in altering the 
target’s behaviour (Baldwin, 1999/2000; Nooruddin, 2002) of if doing so does not 
seriously affect its interests and is therefore a cheap option. In his analysis of EU 
sanctions Brummer (2009) contends that the EU only imposes sanctions when it is 
cheap. He argues that the EU only targets weak and politically isolated countries like 
Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Moldova, or Belarus, while it shuns sanctioning powerful 
countries like China and Russia where it holds important economic interests.  
According to Marinov (2005: 574), this case of selection bias is not worrisome, as ‘any 
information the sender may have on the target’s stability is likely to be observable’ and 
‘measurable by the researcher’, being thus easily ‘incorporated into the analysis’. 
Sender selection effects are thus an issue of omitted variable bias that can be easily 
addressed by adding new variables into the researcher’s model. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is present in the study of sanctions effectiveness. However, these studies do not model the compliance 
stage prior to the actual imposition of sanctions.   
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Indeed, the motivations that might lead senders to impose sanctions can be controlled 
for by including additional covariates that provide objective information about the target 
state or its relationship to the sender. For instance, it is common in empirical analyses to 
control for factors such as a sender’s leverage vis-à-vis a target (Drury, 1998; Hufbauer 
et al., 2007), a target’s economic strength and political stability (Dashti-Gibson et al., 
1997), the existence of alliances (Drezner, 1999), the prevailing political, cultural, and 
economic linkages between a sender and a target (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 
Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008), a target’s reserves of oil and gas (Ross, 2001), or 
whether a target country is immersed in an international or intra-state conflict 
(Brummer, 2009; Escribà-Folch, 2010; Rogers, 1996; Strandow, 2006).  
All these factors certainly matter in a sender’s calculation to use economic statecraft 
when dealing with a renegade target. However, once a sender is determined to cross the 
red line between threatening and imposing sanctions, two factors are believed to weigh 
more in its decision: its leverage vis-à-vis the target and the latter’s political and 
economic stability (Drury, 1998; Hufbauer et al., 2007). When a sender’s leverage is 
high and when a target is undergoing a period of economic or political instability, 
sanctions can quickly translate into economic and political cost for a target and force it 
to make concessions to alleviate its precarious position (Galtung, 1967). As mainstream 
sanctions theory proclaims, senders should use economic statecraft under these 
circumstances to maximise its effectiveness.  
Following this “cost-effectiveness” argument, Soest and Wahman (2013a) assert that 
countries that share important economic and political links with a sender are more likely 
to be targeted. This claim is supported by Drury (1998) reassessment of the HSE 
dataset, which reveals that sanctions are more likely to be effective when the cost 
inflicted to the target is high. Similarly, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery argue that 
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‘when there is an asymmetry of market power between sender and target, sanctions 
become more likely’ (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2008: 118). In sum, 
conventional wisdom suggests that senders should be less likely to impose sanctions if 
they are economically dependent on a target; yet at the same time the reverse is also true 
and senders should be more likely to use economic statecraft if a target is economically 
dependent on them.  
In sum, modelling sender selection effects should be a relatively straightforward task, as 
all potential factors that might influence a sender’s cost-benefit calculation when 
selecting its targets are observable and easily measurable. However, the second case 
where selection bias might emerge and which is commonly referred to as “target 
selection effects” is much more problematic to deal with.  
 
2.3.2. Target selection effects 
As Marinov explains, ‘target governments are more likely to have private information 
on their prospects for surviving in office under pressure’ (Marinov, 2005: 574). Since 
‘such information will not be measurable’, it becomes difficult to control for this type of 
bias. Target selection effects normally appear when i) strong regimes who are aware of 
their strength prefer to be sanctioned than to comply with a sender (self-selection 
scenario); and when ii) weak regimes who are aware of their vulnerability decide to 
comply with the sender at the threat stage, avoiding in this way being sanctioned (threat 
scenario).  
This argument implies that cases where target countries self-select themselves into 
sanctions will be observed, whereas those cases where a target complies with the sender 
at the threat stage will be missing from the analysis because no sanctions will be 
45 
 
imposed (Drezner, 2003: 644). Moreover, in the unlikely case where threats are 
observed, it will still be problematic to trace the causal link between a threat being 
issued and a target’s compliance being observed. Due to domestic audience costs, actors 
involved in a bargaining situation will not have incentives to make concessions in 
public, as this can be interpreted as a sign of political weakness and lead to a loss of 
reputation at home (Fearon, 1994). Diplomatic negotiations between two actors thus 
tend to be protected from the public eye, as secrecy offers policy-makers the necessary 
margin of manoeuvre to accommodate antagonistic positions and make policy 
concessions whilst sparing them from domestic political costs (Putnam, 1988). 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the study of target selection effects has recently 
received new attention. For example, Daniela Donno’s (2012) study on the EU’s use of 
political conditionality to enforce human rights standards shows that selection effects 
are indeed operating at the target’s level. The author claims that ‘countries that are 
highly dependent on EU aid or trade’ and are subjected to the EU’s human rights clause 
are more likely to respect human rights, since they fear losing the benefits of EU aid or 
trade (Donno, 2012:19). Thus, the threat of seeing this income cut that is enshrined in 
the EU’s human rights clause is powerful enough to make dependent targets comply 
with human rights standards. In this regard, the threat of sanctions operates in a similar 
way to what the literature on EU conditionality has been arguing for some time: 
compliance depends largely on the credibility of the threat (Schimmelfennig, 2005; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005), which in the case of sanctions is contingent on 
the sender’s capacity to jeopardise the target’s position (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 
2010; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Marinov, 2005).   
Hence, Donno (2012: 11) points in the right direction when she claims that it is 
necessary to move from the question of whether human rights provisions matter to that 
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of for whom they actually do. This logic also applies to the study of sanctions: the 
relevant question is to understand for which regimes sanctions are more costly than 
compliance and for which ones they are not. Thus, the level of threat that a sender’s 
actions exert on a target will certainly be important to understand why some targets are 
induced to concede to the sender’s demands before sanctions are imposed or, 
conversely, why some autocratic regimes are likely to withstand the economic and 
political disruption imposed by sanctions. 
However, while Donno’s (2012) line of reasoning is compelling, some empirical 
evidence seems to defy it. For instance, the record of EU sanctions between 1989 and 
2015 shows that some economically vulnerable and dependent countries like Guinea, 
Togo, Myanmar, Fiji or Zimbabwe – to name a few – were targeted with sanctions. This 
is somewhat puzzling, since according to Donno’s (2012) claim one would expect the 
opposite to happen. Indeed, vulnerable as these countries are to external economic 
pressure, the fact that they were sanctioned contradicts the author’s argument. A quick 
glance at the empirical evidence thus seems to suggest that sender selection effects – 
and not target ones – operate in the EU’s imposition of sanctions.    
One way to interpret this contradictory result is to assume that these countries were 
sanctioned because doing so was cheap and likely to be effective, as the cost-
effectiveness approach contends. Indeed, these countries are amongst the least 
developed countries in the world, and many of them are prone to political and economic 
instability. As such, they constitute “easy” targets. Nevertheless, one factor that is 
common to all these cases seems to point in a different direction. As a second look at 
these sanctions episodes evidences, all these countries were sanctioned for long spells of 
time. This is extremely puzzling, as long sanctions episodes reflect the ineffectiveness 
of economic statecraft in attaining the sender’s goals. 
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Indeed, Guinea has endured the cost of sanctions for about five years, whereas Togo 
saw a much needed aid withheld by international donors like the EU for over 10 years. 
Furthermore, the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has survived in office even after being 
under the strain of EU and US sanctions for more than a decade (Giumelli, 2013a). 
Finally, the military regime in Myanmar resisted international sanctions for over 20 
years, whilst evidence seems to dismiss the idea that the undergoing liberalization of the 
political system might have been caused by the hardship generated by two decades of 
sanctions (Portela, 2014).  
According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), an average sanctions episode lasts about 6.6 years, 
which remains a shorter period of time as compared to some of the episodes cited 
above. However, Morgan et al. (2009) claim that Hufbauer et al. (2007) dataset 
‘severely underestimates the number of relatively short cases that are resolved within a 
couple of years’. Rather than 6.6 years, they argue that the average duration of an 
episode is closer to 2.7 years. If this is true, then the “cost-effectiveness” assumption 
that sanctions work best against economically weak and dependent countries fits very 
poorly with the empirical reality. 
Consequently, these examples raise serious doubts about the efficacy of sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool. But most importantly, they also question the accuracy of the 
predictions made by the “cost-effectiveness” approach, as the failure of sanctions to 
alter the behaviour of these targets suggests that senders systematically miscalculated 
the formers’ strength. Indeed, the resistance demonstrated by these countries is 
particularly puzzling since one would expect them to comply quickly with the sender 
after sanctions were imposed. Hence, this paradox calls into question why targets 
preferred to resist the sender’s pressure even when – according to logic of the cost-
effectiveness approach – they would have been better off by acquiescing with it (Lacy 
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and Niou, 2004). But also, this puzzle casts doubts upon the sender’s decision to impose 
and maintain ineffective sanctions regimes.  
Undoubtedly, an important element is missing in the calculations made by the “cost-
effectiveness” approach: the political costs intrinsically associated to a target’s 
compliance. As some analysts have pointed out, the assumption that the economic costs 
imposed on the target will automatically translate into political concessions is simply 
naïve (Galtung, 1967; Kirshner, 1997). Blanchard and Ripsman (1999: 220) contend 
that, ‘even if extreme, (economic pain) is unlikely to result in changes in (a target’s) 
behaviour if the right political conditions are not present’. Moreover, sanctions might 
not necessarily harm the perpetrators of the wrongdoing; rather, they might have 
negative externalities and affect the whole population instead. As Alastair Smith (1995: 
230) puts it, 
It is economically costly to be sanctioned. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is also 
politically costly. Sanctions have distributional effects. Sanctions lower the aggregate wealth of a 
nation. However, the economic effects of sanctions may fall disproportionately on political 
opposition rather than political leaders. Under these circumstances leaders may actually enjoy 
being sanctioned as it strengthens their position relative to domestic opposition. 
 
This quote summarizes quite well why some targets prefer to be sanctioned than to 
comply with a sender: sometimes, conceding can be politically costlier than resisting the 
economic harm that sanctions impose (Blanchard and Ripsman, 2013). Thus, 
understanding a target’s rationale to resist sanctions requires us to think beyond the 
naïve theory of sanctions and its assumption that economic pain automatically translates 
into political costs, and to pay attention instead to the strategic motivations or incentives 
that drive a target’s behaviour. 
Strategic motivations are highly likely to influence a target’s decision to withstand the 
pressure of sanctions. One the one hand, conceding to the sender’s pressure might 
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weaken a target’s government position vis-à-vis its domestic competitors and jeopardize 
its rule. Consequently, it might face incentives to resist the pressure and bear the cost of 
sanctions. On the other hand however, a target regime might be able to capitalize on the 
economic and political hardship generated by sanctions to reinforce its position. Since 
restrictive measures have distributional effects, regimes are often able to shield 
themselves from them and pass the cost to other segments of the population. Finally, the 
economic hardship and social stigma created by sanctions is often used by target 
governments to flare up nationalistic sentiments and generate a “rally-around-the-flag” 
effect (Galtung, 1967), leading to enhanced political support for the regime and 
increased willingness from the population to resist sanctions. 
If strategic considerations determine the likelihood that a target country is sanctioned, 
then they should be modelled and included in any study of sanctions imposition. 
However, the problem resides precisely in doing this. The formation of foreign policy 
preferences – in this case, to concede or to resist sanctions – is endogenous to the target 
leader’s likelihood to survive in power (Marinov, 2005). Thus, before we can explain 
how target countries are likely to respond to the threat and imposition of sanctions – and 
by extension, to determine whether they are more or less likely to be targeted -, we need 
to account for the factors that underpin policy formation in the target countries and to 
determine how this relates to a regime’s hold on power. 
 
2.3.3. Bringing domestic institutions back in 
One way to address this issue is by looking at the domestic institutions present in those 
countries. As neo-institutionalist approaches in the social sciences contend, policy 
formation and the subsequent behaviour of political actors is ‘endogenous and related to 
50 
 
the nature and type of domestic institutions’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999: footnote 
5; Smith and Vreeland, 2006). This implies that domestic institutions inform actors 
about their available policy choices and consequently shape policy outcomes (March 
and Olsen, 1996). Institutions in authoritarian regimes are thus much more than mere 
decorative façades. They are used by autocrats to pursue their own political agendas, but 
at the same time they constrain their available actions by the existence of rules and 
procedures and ‘by the goals and actions of others’ who operate within the same 
institutions (Gandhi, 2008: 180).  
Institutions in autocratic regimes vary considerably in their type, their functions and the 
purpose they serve (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 1999; 
Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). This variation is much more than a mere formality: 
differences between the institutions in military, one-party or multi-party regimes inform 
about varying power relationships between the ruling autocrat and its competitors. Most 
importantly, institutions play a central role in an autocrat’s probability to survive in 
power (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). They account to a large degree for a 
dictator’s response to internal and external threats, including the imposition of 
economic sanctions. By shaping and limiting her margin of manoeuvre, they affect her 
policy options to respond to and withstand external pressure. 
Consequently, institutions determine whether a target regime will choose to resist 
external pressure or not and thus, whether it will self-select itself into sanctions or 
whether it will yield to the sender’s pressure when coercive action is threatened. It is 
important to note that this assumption diverges considerably from that made by the cost-
effectiveness approach. Against the latter’s assumption that a target’s vulnerability can 
be measured in purely economic terms, I contend that political considerations and, in 
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particular, the autocrat’s strength vis-à-vis her domestic challengers accounts far better 
for a target’s regime vulnerability.          
Yet before we can generate a set of expectations and theoretically testable hypotheses 
about how autocrats are likely to respond to sanctions, it is necessary to understand why 
institutions are set up in autocratic regimes in the first place and how they restrict or 
enhance the autocrat’s position in power. Indeed, legislatures, juntas, political parties, 
politburos or committees play a fundamental role in an autocrat’s probability to survive 
in power. Military, one-party and multi-party regimes differ considerably in the extent 
to which each of these institutions is present. These differences suggest that the ways in 
which autocrats hold to power differ depending on the type of institutions that they rely 
on. Understanding the “logic of autocratic survival” thus becomes central to understand 
why some regimes will prefer to resist sanctions rather than comply with the sender.    
 
2.4. Unpacking the “autocratic black-box”: the logic of autocratic survival 
2.4.1. Political survival in autocratic regimes 
The ultimate goal of autocrats is to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
Unlike democratic leaders, dictators confront uncertain fates when they lose office: 
most of them face jail, execution or exile. Thus, autocrats rarely leave power 
voluntarily, but tend to be ousted from office through irregular and often violent means 
like assassinations or coups d’état (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Geddes, 2003; Goemans, 
2008). For example, Mubarak in Egypt ended his rule in house arrest after being 
deposed by a popular uprising, whilst others of the like of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya 
or President Viera in Guinea-Bissau were not as lucky and died as the result of armed 
attacks or assassination plots.  
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Dictators have therefore more reasons than democratic leaders to cling to power 
endlessly. To do so, they choose those policies that best guarantee their grip on power 
and avoid those that might jeopardise their position. Moreover, since autocratic leaders 
are not able to legitimise their rule through democratic means (Gandhi and Przeworski, 
2006), they have to rely on alternative methods instead. The “menu of manipulation” 
includes harassing and intimidating the opposition, media censorship, the clampdown of 
demonstrations and politically active groups, and fraudulent electoral practices 
(Schedler, 2002; Simpser, 2013). 
However, more often than not autocrats rely on a combination of repression and 
patronage to survive in power (Wintrobe, 1998). In fact, politically motivated violence 
is not a systematic habit of most autocracies (Davenport, 2007), but is generally used in 
a selective way against those who reject the regime’s co-optation efforts and opt to defy 
it. Patronage and co-optation practices on the other hand allow autocratic regimes to 
differentiate between supporters and dissidents, making the identification and targeting 
of the latter easier (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014).  
These practices normally entail the distribution of rents amongst a regime’s political 
challengers to sustain and legitimize its rule. For this reason, they are a more important 
mean for the survival and longevity of a regime. Given that most challenges to the 
leadership originate from the economic and political elites operating within the regime 
itself, autocrats employ different strategies to buy their loyalty and support. On the one 
hand, they use private payments and rewards such as positions in cabinet or in strategic 
sectors of the economy which bestow social prestige and political influence. On the 
other hand, they also grant public goods and distribute welfare to the population through 
the construction of hospitals, roads, schools and housing to avoid popular uprisings and 
demonstrations (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Magaloni, 2008).  
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In resource-rich countries, dictators keep the opposition at bay by directly distributing 
the rents and revenues generated by the exploitation of mineral resources or fossil fuels 
(Ross, 2001; Ulfelder, 2007; Wright, Frantz and Geddes, 2015). Authoritarian regimes 
are thereby able to justify the lack of political rights through the provision of economic 
and social goods to the population (Diamond, 2010: 98). However, most regimes lack 
such resources, and are consequently impelled to use alternative mechanisms to 
generate support and legitimacy for their rule. This is often achieved through the 
reliance on formal institutions like legislatures, political parties, committees or juntas, 
which fulfil patronage and co-optation functions by granting economic and political 
elites privileges and access to state resources (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi and 
Przeworski, 2006; Magaloni, 2006). In this way, autocrats are able to weaken and divide 
challengers, who have to decide whether to participate and benefit from the system, or 
to challenge it from outside.  
However, institutions also constrain the policy options of autocrats (Gandhi, 2008). Co-
optation efforts often give way to power-sharing deals where the opposition gains 
access to positions of influence (Magaloni, 2008). While these agreements are necessary 
for weak autocrats to remain in power, they also condition and influence their policy 
choices (Vreeland, 2008). Institutions like legislatures, elections or party-systems within 
autocratic regimes can thus be regarded as concessions made by autocrats to their 
opposition (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). The weaker 
the autocrat, the more power it will have to share with the opposition to remain in 
office. Conversely, if the opposition is weak and divided, an autocrat will not need to 
establish formal institutions to rule. 
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The literature on authoritarian regimes tends to distinguish between four types of 
autocratic regimes: monarchies, military, single-party and multi-party.
12
 Nominal 
differences between these regimes relate principally to the type of institutions they rely 
on. For instance, monarchies rely on the royal family, military regimes often govern 
through juntas or councils, one-party regimes rule through “the party” and electoral 
authoritarianisms build legislatures and allow political parties to compete in elections. 
Although this not a clear cut distinction, the differences are more than a matter of 
nuance. These institutions vary in size and form; but most importantly, they vary in the 
way decisions are taken and in the number of people who are able to take them 
(Cheibub et al., 2010). This group of people is what Bueno de Mesquita and his 
colleagues call the ‘winning coalition’ (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). 
In democracies, the number of people that participate in the selection of leaders – i.e. 
the “selectorate” - tends to be quite large, and so is the size of the winning coalition 
(W). The W is formed by a subset of individuals from the selectorate whose support is 
necessary for an incumbent to remain in office. If an incumbent loses the support of the 
W, she loses office and is replaced. Therefore, leaders try to satisfy the W through the 
transfer of private and public goods. Given that the W is large in democracies, 
incumbents are inclined to use public goods to satisfy and maintain it. Leaders in 
democratic polities have therefore to convince a sizeable part of their electorate to vote 
for them in order to form the necessary W to govern. 
                                                          
12
 This division follows Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius (2013) autocratic regime types classification, and 
is similar to Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) classification. Other typologies also refer to hybrid 
regimes, competitive authoritarianisms (Levitsky and Way, 2010), electoral authoritarianisms, personalist 
regimes (Geddes et al. 2014), civilian dictatorships (Cheibub et al., 2010) As I discuss in more detail in 
Chapter 3, this classification suits better the research design of this thesis due to its focus on the 
institutional settings present in autocratic regimes. 
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In autocratic regimes however, the W is generally small. Although in some cases the 
selectorate can be relatively large – as, for instance, in competitive or electoral 
autocracies where large groups of people are allowed to vote in elections
13
 (Levitsky 
and Way, 2010; Schedler, 2006) -, the W in authoritarian regimes is composed by the 
political and economic elites of the country. Indeed, dictators rely on a very small group 
of people to rule and thus use private goods to co-opt these elites and hold their W 
together. However, the relevance of the latter in the process of selecting and sustaining a 
leader in office varies between autocratic regimes. Consequently, the sizes of the 
selectorate and the W differ depending on the type of autocratic regime. For instance, 
‘in monarchies and military juntas’ both the selectorate and the W tend to be small, 
whereas in autocratic multi-party regimes the selectorate is often large, but the W small 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999: 793). 
 
2.4.2. Coalition size and autocratic regimes 
The relevance of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) theory of the selectorate resides in its 
assumption that an actor’s political behaviour is endogenous and related to its country’s 
domestic institutions. But most importantly, it resides in its claim that the real difference 
between policy outcomes depends ultimately on the size and configuration of forces that 
hold the regime together. The differences in the composition of these forces – or W – do 
not only account for the stability and strength of a regime; they also account for a wide 
variety of policy outcomes. 
                                                          
13
 These elections are not necessarily free and fair. On the contrary, elections in autocratic regimes serve 
many different purposes. For an overview of the functions that elections fulfil in these regimes, see 
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). 
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It is often claimed that military regimes have the smallest W of all autocratic regimes 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Wright, 2009). The degree of societal support that 
military regimes require to rule is often limited, as they can recur to the use of force to 
guarantee political order and stability (Davenport, 2007). Moreover, their degree of 
institutionalization tends to be relatively low, generally consisting of military juntas or 
councils to take decisions (Geddes, 1999). Occasionally however, they allow the 
existence of legislatures, but hold them under firm control as in Myanmar or Algeria. 
Alternatively, military officers accede to power in civilian clothes but are backed all 
along by the military, as the Egyptian case reflects.  
Although military regimes have become an anomaly since the end of the Cold War, 
militaries around the world occasionally intervene in politics to overturn unpopular 
governments. Military regimes are then installed in power for a short period of time, 
until stability and order has been reinstated in the country. Sometimes though, military 
leaders remain in power for extended periods of time, as occurred in Algeria, Chile or 
Myanmar. Still, even when military leaders step down, they often compete in national 
elections as civilians, as the Egyptian case with Nasser first, Mubarak afterwards and 
now el-Sisi evidences. In sum, military regimes show a very high level of cohesiveness 
and rely on a very small W to rule, which allows them to remain relatively isolated from 
external or internal pressures.   
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Graph 2.2. Size of the Winning Coalition by regime type 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data for winning coalition from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003); 
data for regime type from Wahman et al. (2013). 
One-party regimes on the contrary ‘tend to have large distributional coalitions because 
they frequently build large patronage parties’ (Wright, 2009: 557). The level of 
institutionalization in these regimes is relatively high and vast resources are used to co-
opt potential competitors and integrate them into the political system (Magaloni, 2006). 
However, while the selectorate of single-party regimes is relatively broad, W tends to be 
much smaller, encompassing only the most important figures of the party. Single-party 
regimes tend to generate ad hoc bodies such as political committees or politburos to 
take the most important decisions – and, amongst them, the decision on the continuity 
of the leader (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007).  
The clearest examples of one-party regimes are those with a Communist past like Cuba 
or China, although the PRI’s rule in Mexico up to 2000 feats as another prominent case. 
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In these countries the selectorate is relatively large and has often the right to vote in 
local or national elections to elect the representatives of the party.
14
 The party 
encompasses broad sectors of the society, including the military and the state 
bureaucracy. Most importantly, it acts as a platform to distribute the spoils of power and 
serves as a channel to promote the careers of potential challengers to the incumbent. In 
this way, the regime generates stability and reduces the potential of violent leadership 
change by offering peaceful means of succession in power (Magaloni and Kricheli, 
2010). The degree of unity displayed by one-party regimes thus allows them to respond 
in a consistent way against threats to their stability. 
Finally, the largest W are found in multi-party systems. These political systems differ 
from the former regime type categories in their allowance of ‘at least a minimal level’ 
of political participation and competition (Wahman et al., 2013). Definitions to capture 
the qualities of these regimes abound,
15
 yet the most extended ones conceive of these 
regimes as “electoral” (Schedler, 2006) or “competitive” authoritarianisms (Levitsky 
and Way, 2010). Although the degree of competition and political participation varies 
enormously amongst multi-party regimes, elections are far away from being free and 
fair as in democratic regimes. Nevertheless, some level of political competition is 
present which poses a real threat to the survival of the dictator and her regime. 
Elections in autocratic regimes can be seen as way to foster elite competition (Gandhi 
and Lust-Okar, 2009), or as a mean to divide the opposition by forcing it to choose 
                                                          
14
 This does not mean that elections are competitive though. For instance, in Mexico the President has 
been traditionally elected in a national presidential election, but up to 2000 these elections were a pure 
democratic façade. In China, people are allowed to vote in local elections with certain degree of freedom 
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). 
15  
For instance, scholars have talked of semi-democracies, pseudo-democracies, weak democracies, 
façade-democracies, competitive authoritarianisms, hybrid regimes, electoral authoritarianism etc. See 
Collier and Levitsky (1997), Diamond (2002) and Carothers (2002) for an overview. 
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between participating from the system – and eventually influencing politics – or 
combating it from outside (Magaloni, 2008). Still, the existence of legislatures and 
political parties is often regarded as a concession to the opposition or as a sign of the 
regime’s incapacity to rule uncontested. As Kim (2012:10) argues, ‘embracing 
multiparty elections runs the risk of creating opportunities for periodic challenges, even 
though electoral rules are usually rigged and electoral outcomes are manipulated’. 
Moreover, elections can also lead to surprising defeats of the incumbent when external 
observers are present and the opposition manages to organise a strong alternative 
(Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Levitsky and Way, 2010), leading occasionally to a 
country’s democratization (Donno, 2013; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). 
In sum, the need for autocrats in multi-party regimes to form larger W to remain in 
office leaves them relatively exposed to external shocks. Given that autocrats in 
competitive environments require as much support as possible to rule the country, they 
face more difficulties to co-ordinate a unified and coherent position when their rule is 
challenged.  
 
2.5. Autocratic institutions and constrained response to economic sanctions 
The constraints that institutions impose on autocratic leaders affect the ways in which 
they respond to the imposition of economic sanctions. Autocratic regimes are more 
likely to be sanctioned than democracies (Cox and Drury, 2006; Lektzian and Souva, 
2003), yet at the same time sanctions are likely to be ineffective against these regimes 
(Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Marinov, 2005). The low success of sanctions against 
autocracies is often attributed to the latter’s ability to shield themselves from sanctions 
by transferring the costs to the rest of the population (Weiss, Cortright, Lopez and 
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Minear, 1997). Moreover, sanctions ‘are counterproductive in authoritarian states in that 
they serve to strengthen constituencies allied with the regime, while weakening the 
middle class’ (Brooks, 2002: 49). Lastly, sanctions can also flare up nationalistic 
feelings amongst the target’s population, leading to rally-around-the-flag effects and 
increased support for dictators (Galtung, 1967).  
While the use of economic statecraft deprives targets from the availability of public 
goods, it also generates rents by fostering the development of monopolies, black 
markets and illegal smuggling activities which end up benefiting non-democratic 
leaders (Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; Lektzian and 
Souva, 2007). Moreover, since sanctions can also empower oppositional forces, 
autocrats are more likely to increase the level of repression to keep their grip on power 
(Davenport, 2007; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Peksen, 2009; Peksen and Drury, 
2009; Wood, 2008). Repression ‘is likely to be less costly and more readily available to 
authoritarian leaders than it is to democratic leaders’ (Brooks, 2002: 17).  
In sum, dictators are often portrayed as having a large margin of manoeuvre to react to 
economic pressure, being able to enact countermeasures and avoid the costs of sanctions 
without facing high audience costs. As Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000: 246) concisely 
note,  
target states characterized by institutionalized and competitive political processes are less likely to 
resist sanction pressure, thus sanctions applied against these targets are likely to be of shorter 
duration. An entrenched electoral process along with viable opposition impinges on the 
leadership’s commitment to resist sanction pressure. Underlying this assertion is the notion that 
active political competition, regulated political processes and other constraints detract from the 
leadership’s authority over and ownership of a resistance agenda. These institutions diffuse the 
leadership’s ability to develop effective and expedient countermeasures. Instead, accountability to 
a competitive constituency weakens the leadership’s course of action. 
 
Notwithstanding this argument, the empirical record of sanctions against autocratic 
regimes suggests that substantial differences in the targeting of these regimes exist, both 
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in the frequency with which they are targeted and in the length that sanctions regimes 
last. This might be indicative of the fact that the impact of sanctions varies depending 
on the type of autocratic regime against which they are imposed, but it also suggests 
that different types of autocratic regimes respond differently to the threat and imposition 
of sanctions. 
Allen (2008b) has attributed this variation to the constraints that domestic institutions 
impose on autocrats. According to the author, less constrained autocrats send noisier 
signals about their intentions and are able to resist the pressure of sanctions for a longer 
period of time. Conversely, those autocrats that are constrained by their domestic 
institutions are less capable of resisting external pressure and will thus be more 
vulnerable to sanctions.  
Indeed, not all autocrats are able to shield themselves easily from sanctions or the threat 
thereof. Economic statecraft threatens dictators’ grip on power by disrupting the 
availability of rents and resources used to feed their networks of patronage and co-
optation (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010). In this way, senders undermine the sources 
of support and legitimacy of autocrats, forcing them to make policy concessions. 
The level of threat that sanctions pose on authoritarian regimes varies as a function of 
an autocrat’s group of supporters. Autocratic regimes differ in the size of their core 
support group or winning coalition (Allen, 2008b; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003): the 
smaller the W, the freer are autocrats to deal with external pressure and to resist 
sanctions for longer. Conversely, the bigger the group of supporters that an autocrat 
needs to rule a country is, the more rents, privileges, and favours the autocrat will have 
to grant in order to remain unchallenged.  
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The need for broader political support turns autocrats with large W into relatively 
vulnerable leaders when faced with external shocks (Hankla and Kuthy, 2013). 
Sanctions are likely to reduce an autocrat’s availability of public goods, and former 
supporters might consider defecting from the autocrat’s W and building an alternative 
coalition to seize power themselves (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Magaloni, 2008). As a 
consequence, relatively more open and competitive autocratic regimes are more likely 
to be destabilised by economic statecraft, as they will find it harder to keep their 
coalition together (Bolks and Al-Sowayel, 2000; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; 
Marinov, 2005). 
Thus, I expect multi-party regimes to be more vulnerable to sanctions, followed by 
single-party and military regimes. Multi-party regimes however should anticipate their 
vulnerability and face incentives to comply with the sender at the threat stage, avoiding 
in this way bearing the cost of sanctions. 
 
H1: Target regimes with large winning coalitions (multi-party regimes) should be more 
likely to comply with the sender at the threat stage.  
 
Moreover, regimes with small winning coalitions face higher incentives to disdain EU 
demands and are therefore more likely to ignore the sanctions threat. In so doing, they 
will be more likely to self-select themselves into sanctions.
16
 Conversely, multi-party 
regimes will be less likely to resist the cost of sanctions.  
                                                          
16
 I exclude monarchies from my analysis due to a lack of variation in the data. As such, this category 
automatically drops from the statistical analysis. For more details see Chapter 3. Escribà-Folch and 
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H2: Target regimes with large winning coalitions (multi-party regimes) are less likely 
to be sanctioned than regimes with small winning coalitions (military and one-party 
regimes). 
 
2.6. Complementary hypotheses 
So far I have claimed that target selection effects are likely to be present in the study of 
sanctions imposition, and that they will be mediated by the leader’s capacity to survive 
in power. Moreover, I have argued that her ability to remain in office will be determined 
to a large extent by the political institutions present in her country, which enhance or 
constrain her margin of manoeuvre. This reasoning leads to the expectation that 
countries with larger W are more likely to concede to a sender’s demands – and avoid 
sanctions – while countries with smaller W will prefer to resist the sender’s pressure 
and, consequently, self-select themselves into sanctions. 
It is important to note though that this equilibrium only represents one of various 
possible scenarios of a sanctions game, as depicted in Graph 2.1. Indeed, as it stands my 
argument does not account for other potential outcomes of the sanctions game which 
also depend on the target’s strategic behaviour. For instance, it is possible that a target 
regime misinterprets a sender’s sanctions threat and hence chooses to stick to its policy 
and not to acquiesce with the sender (Hovi et al., 2005). In this circumstance, we should 
expect vulnerable regimes (those with a large W) to be worse off under sanctions than 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Wright (2010) claim that monarchies - which they group together with personalist regimes - are more 
likely to be destabilised by sanctions.  
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strong regimes (those with a small W), as economic statecraft would jeopardise their 
stability. Therefore, once sanctions are imposed and the target becomes aware of its 
miscalculation, we should expect it to comply soon afterwards with the sender’s 
demands.  
An illustrative case of this situation is Honduras. When the opposition and the military 
ousted President Zelaya from office in a bloodless coup in June 2009, the US and the 
EU did not hesitate to impose sanctions and freeze all their aid programmes with the 
country.  However, after an interim government had taken office for only seven months, 
elections were held and the democratic order was restored. The lifting of sanctions 
followed soon afterwards. 
 
H3: Target regimes with large winning coalitions (multi-party regimes) will be targeted 
for shorter periods of time than regimes with small winning coalitions (military and 
one-party regimes). 
  
Finally, if hypothesis 1 is correct and regimes with larger W are more vulnerable to 
sanctions than regimes with smaller W (Allen, 2008b; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; 
Marinov, 2005), we should also expect sanctions to be more likely to destabilise the 
former. As McGillivray and Stam’s (2004) study shows, the replacement of leaders in 
authoritarian regimes is correlated with shorter sanctions episodes. This suggests that 
senders are more likely to end sanctions whenever these affect the tenure of autocrats 
(Krustev and Morgan, 2011; Marinov, 2005).  
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However, elites in autocratic regimes only face incentives to defect and create their own 
winning coalition if an autocrat is no longer able to hold her coalition together (Boix 
and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Magaloni, 2008). Since 
defection is more likely to occur when the size of the winning coalition is large (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al., 2003), multi-party regimes that are targeted with sanctions should 
have a higher probability of being destabilised by sanctions, whilst one-party and 
military regimes should be more likely to remain in office.  
 
H4: Target regimes with large winning coalitions (multi-party regimes) are more likely 
to be destabilised by sanctions than regimes with small winning coalitions (military and 
one-party regimes). 
 
2.7. Alternative explanations 
Four other approaches can be enumerated as alternative or competing explanations to 
the imposition of sanctions. The first three derive from mainstream sanctions theory and 
focus on the sender’s rationale for using economic statecraft. The fourth however 
focuses on the type and salience of the violation perpetrated as a trigger for the 
imposition of sanctions.  
 
2.7.1. The sender’s economic leverage 
A first competing explanation contends that, for sanctions to be more successful, an 
economic asymmetry needs to exist between a sender and a target (Hufbauer et al., 
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2007; Krustev, 2007; McLean and Whang, 2010). Indeed, senders should be more likely 
to impose sanctions if a target regime is economically dependent on it, since a target’s 
reliance on a sender’s trade or development assistance makes it extremely vulnerable to 
the interruption of economic and financial flows by the sender (Cox and Drury, 2006; 
Crawford, 2013). This approach assumes that sanctions against economically targets are 
likely to have a higher on the target’s finances by generating a large economic hardship 
that the target country will not be able to resist for long. Moreover, since higher levels 
of economic hardship correlate with sanctions’ success (Allen, 2008b; Bapat et al., 
2013; Lektzian and Souva, 2007), dependent countries should constitute easy targets for 
senders, as the latter should be able to impose their will easily without incurring into 
high economic costs (Soest and Wahman, 2013a). 
 
Hleverage: Sanctions are more likely to be imposed if the target is economically 
dependent on the sender. 
 
2.7.2. The cost of sanctions to the sender 
The second approach assumes that sender states undertake a cost-benefit calculation 
prior to using economic statecraft and only impose sanctions if the cost of doing so is 
low. By disrupting the normal economic and political activity between the sender and 
the target, sanctions generate a disutility for both sides (Drezner, 1999). Thus, scholars 
often assume that senders are unwilling to use economic statecraft if this will affect 
important economic interests. For instance, (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992) well 
known public choice model posits that domestic organisations influence sender 
governments when their interests are at stake. These organisations – which mostly 
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represent lobbies from important economic sectors – are thought to lobby policy-makers 
in the sender states not to use sanctions, as these might harm their activities with the 
target country.  
Indeed, many analysts have claimed that the EU’s imposition of sanctions is guided by 
its member states’ geostrategic and economic interests (Brummer, 2009; Hyde-Price, 
2006; Warkotsch, 2008, 2010; Youngs, 2004). A recent example of such a behaviour 
could be observed in Germany’s reluctance to proceed to the so called “tier three 
sanctions” against Russia during the Ukrainian crisis after the Committee on Eastern 
European Economic Relations, a German lobby that promotes economic relations with 
the former Soviet bloc had consistently warned about the negative economic effect these 
measures would have on the German economy. Consequently, this approach argues that 
sanctions will only be imposed when the cost to the sender is low or negligent. This 
leads to a second competing hypothesis: 
 
Hcost: Sanctions are more likely to be imposed if the cost to the sender is low.  
 
2.7.3. Target instability 
The third approach claims that sanctions are more likely to be imposed when the 
probability that these measures are effective is higher (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Soest and 
Wahman, 2013a). According to this view, senders undertake a pre-assessment on the 
likelihood that sanctions will succeed in altering a target’s behaviour. If the assessment 
is positive, senders will be keen to use sanctions; conversely, they will refrain thereof if 
the prospects that sanctions contribute to change the target’s behaviour are bleak. 
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Central to this claim is the assumption that sanctions are more likely to be effective 
when a target regime is undergoing a period of political unrest or economic instability. 
In these circumstances, sanctions can contribute to deteriorate a regime’s delicate 
situation and destabilise it, thus pushing it to surrender to the sender’s pressure. 
Consequently, scholars have talked about a target’s level of ‘distress’ (Hufbauer et al., 
2007) or internal conflict (Brummer, 2009) as an important factor in determining the 
effectiveness of sanctions. Moreover, others have claimed that political protests and 
quickly changing economic conditions generate a ‘conducive environment’ (Warkotsch, 
2010) where sanctions can play an important role in fostering political change.  
 
Hinstability: Sanctions are more likely to be imposed if a target regime is undergoing a 
period of political and economic instability.  
 
2.7.4. The salience of the target’s violation 
However, a fourth competing approach exists that might help to explain why sanctions 
are imposed. This explanation focuses on the type and salience of the violation and 
argues that senders are more likely to impose sanctions in cases where gross human 
rights violations have occurred or where breaches of the democratic process are clearly 
visible. According to argument, some violations send noisier signals than others 
(Laakso, Kivimäki and Seppänen, 2006; Saltnes, 2013; Soest and Wahman, 2015). For 
instance, coups d’état constitute clear and visible interruptions of the democratic 
process. Thus, they send the noisiest of signals and senders face high pressure to impose 
sanctions when coups take place.  
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Flawed elections may also send a noisy signal about an autocrat’s wrongdoing, yet this 
is likely to be conditional on the presence of international observers (Donno, 2010; 
Soest and Wahman, 2015). Finally, human rights violations are the least likely to trigger 
sanctions, as it becomes more difficult to identify and define when such a violation has 
taken place and to determine whether the authorities of a target state are directly 
responsible for it (Portela and Orbie, 2014). Summing up, this approach expects that 
noisier – or more salient violations – are more likely to be sanctioned than less salient 
ones. 
 
Hsalience: The EU is more likely to impose sanctions the more salient a violation is. 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of this thesis. Using a game 
theoretical approach to the imposition of sanctions, I have argued that the employment 
of economic statecraft can best be regarded as a strategic bargaining game between two 
actors with divergent interests. As such, sanctions constitute part of a negotiation 
process, and are viewed as one amongst many possible outcomes or equilibria. 
I have also contended that the imposition of sanctions responds to a large extent to the 
target’s cost-benefit calculations. Following the game tree of what I have dubbed a 
“sanctions game” (Graph 2.1), I show that whether sanctions are imposed or not 
depends largely on the actions of the target state. Indeed, I claim that it is in a target’s 
hands to decide whether it prefers to resist the sender’s pressure – and thereby self-
select itself into sanctions – or whether it prefers to yield and acquiesce with the sender. 
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The target’s decision will ultimately depend on its vulnerability and its capacity to resist 
the pressure of sanctions. 
Most importantly, I diverge from mainstream sanctions theory in its assumption that a 
target’s vulnerability can be measured in purely economic terms. Contrary to this 
approach, I argue that a target’s vulnerability is mediated by an autocrat’s capacity to 
survive in office, which is dependent on her ability to co-opt potential challengers and 
keep her coalition of supporters together. Moreover, I have claimed that institutions 
reflect quite accurately the existing power relationships in a country and determine the 
policy options that an autocrat can choose from. Consequently, different institutional 
settings should serve as a reliable proxy to measure a target’s vulnerability vis-à-vis 
sanctions. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODS 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I have advanced my analytical framework and developed a set of 
four hypotheses that guide this thesis. The present chapter introduces the research 
design of the thesis and discusses the methodological choices made to conduct the 
empirical analysis. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section I expose 
the reasons that have led me to generate a new dataset on EU sanctions, and present the 
decisions that I have taken in this regard. First of all, I discuss how I operationalise and 
code the dependent variable SANCTION that I employ in the main models of Chapter 
4. As I explain below, I use a broad definition of sanctions to encompass the wide range 
of economic and political instruments that the EU commonly wields to punish countries 
that violate human rights and democratic principles. Moreover, I describe the rules 
employed to code the dependent variable and disclose the primary and secondary 
sources used for this purpose.  
Moreover, this section also introduces the main independent variable of my model, the 
domestic institutions of a target country. I examine different indicators that are 
commonly employed in the literature to measure the type and quality of institutions in a 
target regime, and explain my preference to use an adapted version of Wahman et al. 
(2013) autocratic regime types’ classification as a proxy of domestic institutions. In 
addition, I present the other independent variables of my main regression models – the 
level of respect for human rights and the sudden change in the level of democracy in a 
target regime –, and a set of control variables that are thought to matter in the sanctions 
literature. 
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The second part of this chapter moves on to discuss the econometric strategy of the 
thesis. First, I describe the scope of my dataset, including the range of years covered and 
the number of observations included in my sample. I also expose the main reasons that 
induce me to use the country-year as the unit of analysis of my dataset, and explain why 
other sampling strategies are less appropriated for the purpose of this study since they 
risk incurring into selection bias. Lastly, I address certain methodological issues that 
arise with the employment of panel data and elucidate on the solutions that I adopt to 
tackle them. 
Finally, the third section of this chapter advocates the use of a mixed-methods approach 
that combines the statistical analysis with qualitative case studies of EU sanctions 
episodes (Coppedge, 1999). Whilst the statistical analysis permits me to compare the 
validity of my approach across a large sample of autocratic regimes, the case studies 
provide a more nuanced or thick account of the underlying mechanisms that trigger the 
imposition of EU sanctions. Thus, I analyse qualitatively five episodes where the EU 
imposed sanctions against autocratic regimes to address violations of human rights or 
the deterioration of democracy. These cases are selected following the expectations of 
my theoretical approach and with the help of my statistical results. Three of these cases 
are “typical cases” that my theoretical model predicts correctly and that allow me to 
trace the causal mechanisms that trigger the imposition of sanctions in more detail. The 
remaining case studies examine the sanctions episodes imposed against Belarus and 
Zimbabwe – two outliers to my theoretical model. I show that the presence of “black 
knights” helps to account for the resilience of these “weak regimes” to the threat and 
imposition of sanctions.  
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3.2. Data 
To explore the determinants of EU sanctions imposition I have built an original dataset 
on EU sanctions between 1989 and 2010. The need to do this arises from a lack of 
publicly available data on EU sanctions, as the two most comprehensive datasets on 
economic sanctions to date – the HSE and the TIES datasets – fail to include most of the 
measures imposed by the EU. In fact, about 80% of the sanctions recorded in the HSE 
dataset concern the US,
17
 while the more recent TIES dataset only includes six episodes 
of democratic sanctions where the EU was the main or the secondary sender. Most 
worryingly however is the fact that some of the cases included in the TIES dataset are 
not corroborated by any other source consulted to determine whether EU sanctions were 
imposed.
18
    
The lack of coverage of those sanctions imposed by the EU in the two most 
comprehensive datasets on economic sanctions is surprising. Particularly so, because 
the EU’s activity in this area has increased substantially in the last two decades, to the 
extent that the EU has now become one of the most important senders of international 
sanctions (De Vries and Hazelzet, 2005; Hufbauer and Oegg, 2003). For this reason, I 
have opted to construct an original dataset on EU sanctions that seeks to fill in this gap. 
In the next section, I discuss the data gathering process, the rules employed to code the 
dependent variable of this thesis, and the sources used to operationalise it.  
 
                                                          
17
 The HSE dataset records 21 sanctions episodes imposed by the EU since 1988. 
18
 For instance, the TIES records a sanctions episode against the Maldives between 2004 and 2005. 
However, although the European Parliament urged the Commission to impose sanctions (European 
Parliament, 2004), to my knowledge no sanctions were levied. In fact, no official or academic record 
exists on the imposition of sanctions against Maldives.  
74 
 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable of this study SANCTION measures whether the EU 
imposed sanctions against an autocratic regime to address the latter’s abuses of human 
rights or democratic principles. Sanctions are commonly defined in the literature as a 
sender’s use of economic means to achieve political goals (Baldwin, 1985; Doxey, 
1971; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Nincic and Wallensteen, 1983). This includes measures as 
varied as comprehensive or partial trade embargoes, assets freezes, the withdrawal or 
withholding of development assistance, imports and exports controls or the withdrawal 
of trade preferences. Importantly, this definition excludes those measures of economic 
nature that are imposed for purely economic goals, such as trade warfare or anti-
dumping measures.
19
  
Still, political tools are also frequently employed by the EU to exert pressure on targeted 
regimes. Certain instruments like travel bans or visa restrictions, the suspension of 
technical, cultural, administrative or military cooperation, the cancellation of bilateral 
meetings, the withdrawal of diplomatic support, or the withdrawal of ambassadors are 
frequently used to punish a third country for its misbehaviour. Thus, like throughout this 
thesis I employ a broad definition of sanctions that encompasses a comprehensive range 
of political, economic, financial and military instruments that are commonly used by the 
EU to alter a target’s behaviour. 
A broad definition of sanctions is also helpful to ensure that no instrument that might 
qualify as such is left out because of the actor that initiates the sanctioning process,
20
 the 
                                                          
19
 The exclusion of those economic measures imposed to achieve economic goals is in line with most 
sanctions research. To my knowledge, only Morgan et al. (2009) and Baldwin (1985) include economic 
measures to achieve economic goals in their definition of sanctions. 
20
 Commonly, the TIES and the HSE databases distinguish between primary and secondary sender of 
sanctions. For the purpose of my thesis, this distinction is not relevant inasmuch as it affects the EU’s 
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instrument’s name, its form, or the procedure in which it is adopted. This is relevant if 
one considers the different types of sanctions that are imposed by the EU, but also the 
origins of these acts, and the different actors – i.e. the United Nations, the European 
Institutions, and EU member states – that initiate and participate in the decision-making 
process. 
Broadly speaking, there are three different types of sanctions imposed or enforced by 
the EU: i) those measures that implement resolutions adopted at the UNSC; ii) those 
measures enhancing UN sanctions; and lastly iii) those measures that are imposed by 
the EU autonomously in absence of a UN resolution (Biersteker and Portela, 2015). 
Whereas resolutions agreed upon in the UNSC are international law and, as such, the 
EU and its member states are obliged to implement and enforce them, autonomous EU 
sanctions are generally imposed when the UNSC has not discussed imposing sanctions 
or has been incapable of reaching an agreement between its members.
21
  
Moreover, an additional distinction can be made within the third category – i.e. the 
autonomous sanctions imposed by the EU. Indeed, the EU regularly employs measures 
that, despite their similarity, are referred to with different names in EU jargon. For 
instance, depending on the legal clause invoked to use certain instruments, the EU 
differentiates between “appropriate” and “restrictive” measures. This difference does 
not only underline a different legal basis for the use of sanctions; it also highlights 
distinct categories of instruments (Jünemann and Knodt, 2007; Knodt and Jünemann, 
2007; Kotzian, Knodt and Urdze, 2011). Finally, the formal procedure to adopt 
sanctions also varies depending on the measure to be adopted, and depends largely on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
imposition of sanction. For instance, I do not distinguish between EU and UN sanctions, as the EU is 
legally bound to enforce UNSC resolutions. In these cases, the EU generally develops its own legislation 
in line with the UNSC resolution. 
21
 Prominent cases where sanctions were discussed but never imposed include Zimbabwe and Belarus, as 
I will discuss in the respective case studies below.  
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which European institution or body is responsible for taking and implementing the 
decision.
22
  
However, the use of a broad definition of sanctions is not unanimously shared in the 
literature. In fact, many scholars conceive of EU sanctions in a minimalist way, 
referring only to those measures that are imposed under the CFSP’s umbrella as 
sanctions (Eriksson, 2011; Giumelli, 2011, 2013b). This minimalist definition leaves 
aside many instruments that the EU regularly employs to obtain a target country’s 
compliance. Although these tools are referred to in different ways like “appropriate 
measures”, “suspension” or “temporary withdrawal” in EU jargon, their punitive nature 
fits into my definition of sanctions. Moreover, sometimes these measures are also used 
in support of CFSP sanctions, as the GSP+ withdrawal in the cases of Belarus or 
Myanmar (Portela and Orbie, 2014), and the suspension of aid under Article 96 
Cotonou in the case of Zimbabwe evidence (Bartels, 2008; Hazelzet, 2005; Portela, 
2007a; Saltnes, 2013). Thus, I follow Hazelzet (2001) and Portela (2010) and employ a 
broad definition of sanctions to make sure that no instrument that qualifies as such is 
left aside. Table 3.1 below provides an overview of the measures commonly employed 
by the EU that fall within my definition of sanctions.  
                                                          
22
 For an overview on how different measures are adopted, voted upon and implemented by the EU, see 
Portela (2010). 
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Table 3.1. List of sanctions commonly employed by the EU 
   
Economic and financial measures Military measures Political measures 
Freezing of funds, assets, and other economic resources Suspension of military cooperation 
Suspension of scientific, cultural and sportive 
cooperation 
Comprehensive or sectoral trade embargoes Arms embargo Suspension of bilateral meetings 
Imports and exports restrictions (i.e. on dual use goods) 
Expulsion of military personnel attached to diplomatic 
offices 
Withdrawal of political support (i.e. support for 
nominations to international organizations) 
Suspension of development assistance (i.e. budget 
support) 
Ban on exports of dual-use goods Suspension of political agreements 
Freezing and redirection of aid  
Freezing or refusal to ratify political or economic 
agreements 
Ban on the export of technology  Travel ban 
Prohibition on granting of financial assistance   Visa restrictions 
Prohibition to insure or  reinsure cargos and vessels 
 
Limitations on diplomatic and other exchanges 
Ban on the import of strategic resources like oil and gas 
or conflict minerals 
   
Suspension of most favoured nation status/General 
Scheme of Preferences   
Ban on the export of spare parts     
Ban on the provision of grants, loans and other forms of 
financial assistance 
    
Source: Own elaboration. This table displays a list of measures that are commonly employed by the EU to achieve a target’s compliance and that fit into my definition of 
sanctions. The use of these measures has been employed to operationalise and code the dependent variable of the thesis. 
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3.2.2. Operationalisation & coding of the dependent variable 
The previous section has provided a definition of the dependent variable SANCTION 
and identified several measures that fall within this definition and that are commonly 
employed by the EU to punish a third country’s wrongdoing (see table 3.1.). This 
section goes one step further and develops an operational measure fit for the 
multivariate regression analyses that I undertake in Chapter 4 to test my hypotheses. In 
addition, this section also outlines the rules that I employ to code the dependent variable 
SANCTION.  
As I have argued above, my definition of SANCTION is broad enough to encompass a 
wide range of economic, financial and political instruments that the EU employs on a 
regular basis to punish autocratic regimes. However, while finding a definition of the 
dependent variable that encapsulates all the relevant coercive measures is relatively 
straightforward, developing a measure that captures this definition with accuracy and 
that, at the same time, can be usefully employed for the purposes of the statistical 
analyses, is somewhat more complicated. The challenges to operationalise the 
dependent variable SANCTION are manifold. 
First, as can be seen in table 3.1., the nature of the measures employed by the EU are 
different in their nature. Whilst some measures like travel bans or the cancellation of 
cooperation in areas such as culture, science or sports are political, others like imports 
or exports restrictions, the freezing of assets, or the ban on loans, grants and on 
providing third entities with financial assistance are economical and financial in nature. 
The problem with these categories or types of sanctions is more theoretical than 
methodological. Indeed, whilst it would be possible to employ categorical models like 
the multinomial logit regression models to distinguish between the different categories 
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of measures (see, for instance, Hazelzet 2001), this solution is ultimately artificial, since 
these tools are not necessarily exclusive and, in practice, measures like arms embargoes, 
visa bans and assets freezes are often employed by the EU at the same time. Thus, and 
even though operationalising the dependent variable in such a way would be 
methodologically feasible, constructing a categorical dependent variable that may take 
many different and exclusive values does not make sense in theoretical terms. 
Second, sanctions do not only vary in terms of their economic, financial or political 
nature, but also in their scope and coerciveness. Indeed, the scope of sanctions ranges 
from comprehensive trade embargoes that do not discriminate between wrongdoers and 
innocent civilians to targeted or “smart” sanctions that seek to target only those 
individuals and entities that are responsible for the wrongdoing or that, through their 
actions, are directly or indirectly contributing to the wrongdoing. In fact, senders like 
the EU have refrained from using comprehensive sanctions like trade embargoes since 
the UN imposed a full commodities embargo against Iraq in the 1990s, and now only 
impose targeted sanctions. The move away from comprehensive to smart sanctions 
came after the grave humanitarian consequences of the UN sanctions regime in Iraq, 
which contributed to the spread of diseases, the lack of humanitarian goods and, 
ultimately, to the death of tens of thousands of civilians (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). 
Targeted sanctions vary enormously in their scope and effects. While some sanctions 
like visa freezes and travel bans prohibit individuals to travel to EU territory, others 
have more far-reaching effects. For instance, financial sanctions that ban the provision 
of loans, bonds and grants, or any sort of financial assistance to targeted entities in a 
third country might have huge consequences. This is especially the case when banks in 
sanctioned countries are not allowed to borrow money or make payments or financial 
transactions, as sanctions undermine economic activity in the country by disrupting the 
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normal running of businesses, as businesses are unable to pay for their imports or 
receive payment for their exports. As a result, companies might run out of business, 
which, in turn, has indirect effects on the living standards of the population by reducing 
the availability of goods. 
Different types of targeted sanctions are more comprehensive and discriminate less than 
others. As Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho and Hudáková (2013) have noted, sanctions can 
be classified in a spectrum according to their degree of targetedness, where those 
sanctions that are more targeted and therefore more discriminating are placed on the one 
end, and comprehensive trade embargoes that do not discriminate between wrongdoers 
and innocent civilians are placed on the other end. However, while conceiving sanctions 
in a linear or ordinal way according to their level of targetedness – or their level of 
coerciveness – is a possible solution to overcome the problem of mutually exclusive 
categories outlined above – i.e. as in the case of a dependent variable with various 
different and mutually exclusive outcome values, generating such a measure is more 
problematic.  
One practical issue that arises is how to determine the number of categories or levels of 
coerciveness/targetedness that the dependent variable should have and, more 
importantly, how the different instruments should be assigned to each of these 
categories respectively. Indeed, while it might be relatively easy do determine that a full 
trade embargo is much more coercive and less targeted than a travel ban, this distinction 
is less clear-cut for other tools like aid suspensions or assets freezes. Moreover, the 
degree to which these measures are more or less targeted – or more or less coercive – 
often depends on how vulnerable or exposed a targeted regime is to different types of 
sanctions. Thus, distinguishing between categories and degrees of targetedness or 
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coerciveness is often left to the choice of the researcher, and not necessarily to 
objectively defined criteria.  
If determining different categories of the scale and how to distribute the measures is 
already difficult, generating a scale indicator also poses a methodological problem due 
to the low number of cases where sanctions were imposed. Indeed, the low number of 
sanctions in the sample (n=247) makes it in appropriate to develop a measure with 
many categories, as some of these would be almost empty. Moreover, the added value 
of such an approach is also questionable, as the distinction between categories would 
not mean much in substantive terms.  
Considering these challenges, it is not surprising that most studies in the sanctions 
literature employ a binomial indicator to measure the occurrence of sanctions. 
Admittedly, this choice implies making some trade-offs. For instance, a dichotomous 
variable does not distinguish between the different levels of coerciveness of the 
instruments, nor does it whether sanctions are more or less targeted. This is certainly a 
limitation if the researcher seeks to understand whether a sender increases the pressure 
on a target by broadening the sanctions regime or, alternatively, if the researcher wants 
to know whether a sender rewards the target for its compliance by lifting some of the 
provisions of the sanctions regime.  
However, as I have argued above, developing a scale indicator that is both useful and 
meaningful to undertake empirical analyses on a large-n dataset is theoretically and 
methodologically difficult. Moreover, while such issues are certainly relevant to 
understand whether sanctions are more or less likely to be effective, these issues are not 
so determinant to address the main goal of this thesis, which is to understand the 
circumstances under which autocratic regimes are more or less likely to be sanctioned 
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by the EU. Thus, in line with the literature, this thesis employs a dichotomous 
dependent variable to measure the occurrence of a sanctions event. However, to 
compensate for the lack of nuance on the type of sanctions employed or the specific 
impact that these measures had, I undertake an in-depth qualitative analysis in the case 
studies of Chapters 5 and 6.  
In line with this reasoning, the dependent variable SANCTION is a binomial variable 
that takes the value 1 if the EU imposed sanctions against countryi in yeart and the value 
0 if no sanctions were imposed. The following rules have been applied in the coding of 
SANCTION: 
1) SANCTION is coded 1 if the reasons to impose sanctions were at least partly 
justified by the EU on human rights concerns or due to the deterioration of 
democracy in a target country; otherwise, SANCTION is coded 0. Examples 
where the dependent variable is coded 1 include instances of, inter alia: 
 grave and systematic violations of human rights, including torture, 
political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings and disappearances;  
 quick deterioration of democracy or the rule of law, including 
Presidential empowerment, the deposition of judges, or constitutional 
amendments that undermine the system of checks and balances;  
 electoral manipulation and/or electoral violence; 
 harassment and intimidation of the political opposition; 
 restrictions of political rights, including media and association 
freedoms; 
 and coups d’état.  
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2) Moreover, SANCTION is coded 1 irrespective of whether sanctions were 
initiated by the UN and then transposed into EU legislation or, alternatively, if 
EU measures were imposed first and were superseded by a UNSC resolution 
afterwards.  
 
3) Similar to Portela and von Soest (2012), I code SANCTION 0 when: 
a) Sanctions were imposed for other reasons than those outlined in section 
1) above. 
b) The targets of sanctions are non-state entities like terrorist or armed 
groups that exert no formal or internationally recognised control over a 
land or territory. Examples of cases where this rule applies include the 
UN sanctions against the UNITA organization in 1993 or the UN, and 
EU sanctions against the Al-Qaida terrorist organization.  
c) The goals of sanctions have been fully/partially fulfilled and cooperation 
with the target government has been resumed (i.e. when the target regime 
has met the EU’s demands or when it has reached an agreement that has 
satisfied the EU).  
d) Sanctions expire or are not renewed.  
e) Most sanctions are lifted by the EU except some measures targeting 
certain non-government related individuals and entities. Examples of this 
often include arms embargos, assets freezes or travel bans against 
individuals, businesses, rebel groups, or terrorist organizations 
responsible for the reprehensible behaviour (i.e. the violation of human 
rights).  
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f) No information regarding the continuation of the sanctions regime is 
available. This rule applies to particular cases like Equatorial Guinea, 
where no political relationship between the EU and the regime exists.  
 
Table 3.2 below provides a list of the countries that were targeted by the EU and the 
period in which they were sanctioned. A total of 39 countries were sanctioned, with 
some countries like Belarus, Burundi, Fiji, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Niger, Peru, Russia and 
Togo being sanctioned on more than one occasion.   
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Table 3.2. EU sanctions episodes by country 
Country Period 
Algeria 1992-94 
Belarus (I) 1997-99 
Belarus (II) 2004-ongoing 
Burundi (I) 1993-94 
Burundi (II) 1997-99 
Central African Republic 2003-05 
China 1989-ongoing 
Comoros 1999-2000 
Cuba 2003-05 
Democratic Republic of Congo 1992-2002 
Equatorial Guinea 1992-2002 
Fiji 2001-03 
Fiji (II) 2007-2014 
Gambia 1994-97 
Guatemala 1993 
Guinea 2009-2014 
Guinea-Bissau 2010-2014 
Haiti (I) 1991-94 
Haiti (II) 2001-05 
Honduras 2009 
Indonesia 1999 
Ivory Coast (I) 2000-02 
Ivory Coast (II) 2004-2011 
Kenya 1990-98 
Liberia 1990-2006 
Madagascar 2009-2014 
Malawi 1992-93 
Mauritania 2008-09 
Myanmar 1991-ongoing 
Niger (I) 1996 
Niger (II) 2009-10 
Nigeria 1993-99 
Pakistan 1999-2001 
Peru (I) 1992-93 
Peru (II) 2000-01 
Russia (I) 1995 
Russia (II) 1999-2001 
Rwanda 1994-96 
Serbia and Montenegro 1998-2001 
Sierra Leone 1997-2002 
South Africa 1977-1994 
Sri Lanka 2010 
Sudan 1990-ongoing 
Togo (I) 1992-95 
Togo (II) 1998-2007 
Turkey 1980-1995 
Uzbekistan 2005-09 
Zimbabwe 2002-ongoing 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.2.3. Sources 
To determine when sanctions were imposed by the EU to address human rights and 
democratic concerns – and for how long they were maintained – I employed a vast 
variety of sources, including primary and secondary material. First and foremost, I used 
EU official documents like EU Council Decisions, Council Common Positions, Council 
Regulations, and Commission Regulations to collect data about whether sanctions had 
been imposed against a specific country, which measures had been adopted, and how 
long they had been in place. Importantly, I scrutinised these sources for references that 
justified the imposition of sanctions on grounds of the human rights or the democratic 
situation in a target country. In addition, I employed other relevant official documents, 
including the European External Action Service’s list of Restrictive measures in force 
(European Union, 2015b), the Conclusions of the General Affairs Council meetings, 
press releases and statements, and speeches of the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and other Commissioners.  
To search for most of the above-mentioned documents I have employed the EU’s legal 
search engine EUR-LEX (European Union, 2015a),  which provides access to European 
Union Law. I used different combinations of keyword searches, combining the name of 
every country in the dataset with words such as “restrictive measures”, “appropriate 
measures”, “aid freeze”, “aid suspension” or “sanction”. This strategy limited the 
number of results per country and yielded most of the relevant documents regarding the 
imposition of EU sanctions. For press releases, statements and speeches, I employed the 
European Commission’s Press Release Database (European Commission, 2015d). The 
documents obtained where then carefully analysed to extract all the relevant information 
regarding the imposition of sanctions, which was later used to code the dependent 
variable SANCTION.  
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Besides EUR-LEX, I also employed other search engines to find documents that were 
occasionally not available at the EU’s legal database. Examples of additional sources 
employed include the University of Pittsburgh’s Archive on European Integration 
(University of Pittsburgh, 2015) and the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Embargo database (SIPRI, 2015). 
These sources proved quite effective to find information about those measures imposed 
under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. However, they were less useful 
in finding data about other types of sanctions, like the EU’s suspension of development 
assistance under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement (or its predecessor, Article 366 
of the Lomé Convention), or informal and ad hoc measures imposed during the 1990s. 
To fill in the gaps left by the searches in EUR-LEX, I used a wide range of secondary 
sources, including academic literature, datasets on economic sanctions, reports by 
NGOs, think tanks and IGOs, and newspaper articles. 
Sources employed include Portela (2005, 2007a, 2010), Kreutz (2005), Hazelzet (2001), 
Brummer (2009), Warkotsch (2008, 2010), Crawford (1998, 2000), Smith (1998, 2008), 
Saltnes (2013), Del Biondo (2011) and Soest and Wahman (2011). Additionally, I used 
the two most comprehensive datasets on economic sanctions – Hufbauer et al’s (2007) 
prominent work ‘Economic Sanctions Reconsidered’ and Morgan et al.’s (2009) more 
recent the ‘Threat and Imposition of Sanctions Database’ (TIES). To identify instances 
of ad hoc sanctions during the 1990s, I employed the European University Institute’s 
annual publication, the European Union Foreign Policy Bulletin (1987, 1988a, b, c, 
1989a, b, c, d, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996). These bulletins collect discussions, 
statements and questions placed by European Members of Parliament to the European 
Commission about issues related to the EU’s external activities.  
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Second, this information was complemented with reports from think tanks, NGOs and 
intergovernmental organizations (IOs), including briefs and reports by Hazelzet (2005),  
Bradley (2005)  and Mbangu (2005) for the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM); books and policy briefs on the EU’s democracy promotion for 
the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) and FRIDE (Youngs, 2001, 2006, 2008b, 
2010); annual yearbooks (for instance, Anthony (2002) on the SIPRI annual yearbook); 
reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and reports by the European 
Institutions regarding the imposition of “restrictive” and “appropriate” measures 
(Laakso et al., 2006; Portela, 2007b). 
Finally, I also employed newspapers and online news agencies like Reuters, BBC, the 
New York Times and others to find data on EU sanctions. Most importantly perhaps, 
the information obtained through different secondary sources was cross-checked to 
verify the quality and veracity of the data collected. A list of the sources employed for 
the construction of the dependent variable can be seen in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3. Sources employed for the coding of the dependent variable 
Official documents 
Council Decisions, Council Common Positions, Council 
Regulations, Commission Regulations, Communications 
from the Commission to the Council (various years) 
Academic references 
Brummer (2009), Portela (2005, 2007a, 2010); Portela and 
Orbie (2014), Crawford (1998, 2000), Del Biondo (2011), 
Eriksson (2011), European University Institute (1987, 
1988a, b, c, 1989a, b, c, d, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996), 
Giumelli (2011), Kreutz (2005), Hazelzet (2001), Smith 
(1998, 2008), Saltnes (2013), Soest and Wahman (2013b; 
2014), Warkotsch (2008, 2010)  
Think tanks and other 
reports 
Hazelzet (2005), Bradley (2005), Mbangu (2005), Anthony 
(2002), Laakso et al. (2006), Youngs (2001, 2006, 2008b, 
2010)   
Databases 
Morgan et al. (2009), Hufbauer et al. (2007), SIPRI (2015), 
University of Pittsburgh (2015), European Union (2015a) 
EUR-Lex, European Commission (2015d) 
Newspapers Reuters, BBC, New York Times, El Pais (various years) 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.2.4. Main independent variable 
3.2.4.1. Domestic institutions of a target regime 
The main independent variable (IV) of this thesis is the domestic institutions (or regime 
type) of a target country. I distinguish between two main types of authoritarian regimes: 
those that rely on a broad coalition to rule (i.e. weak regimes like competitive or “multi-
party” regimes) and those that rule with the support of smaller and cohesive coalitions 
(i.e. strong regimes like “military” and “one-party” regimes). Institutions are commonly 
defined in the literature as the rules of the game in a society. They devise ‘constrains 
that shape human interaction […] and structure incentives in human exchange, whether 
political, social, or economic’ (March and Olsen, 1996; North, 1990: 3). Institutions 
influence an autocrat’s survival in power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Gandhi 
and Przeworski, 2007; Pepinsky, 2014; Wright, 2008; Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012) 
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and shape her response to external shocks like sanctions (Allen, 2008b; Escribà-Folch 
and Wright, 2010; McGillivray and Stam, 2004).  
Empirical studies in comparative politics and international relations have commonly 
relied on the Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014) and the Freedom House 
(Freedom House, 2014) scales as proxies for a country’s domestic institutions. 23 
However, these scales measure a country’s freedom, and are therefore not accurate 
reflections of a country’s domestic institutions (Beetham, Carvalho, Landman and Weir, 
2008; Landman and Häusermann, 2003; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). In recent years, 
new datasets have proliferated that classify countries according to their type of regime. 
Although these measures still correlate highly with the Freedom House and the Polity 
Scales and are therefore likely to be tapping into the same phenomenon (Collier and 
Adcock, 1999; Collier and Levitsky, 1997), the narrower focus of these new typologies 
allows us to develop more refined and empirically testable hypotheses on how domestic 
institutions shape political outcomes in different regimes.     
Amongst the newly released datasets on autocratic regimes, Wahman et al.’s (2013) 
classification stands out due to the central role that the authors attribute to the domestic 
institutions in maintain regimes in power. As they summarise it, ‘our approach […] is to 
determine regime type not so much in terms of the characteristics or social origins of the 
elites in question, but instead based on the institutions on which these elites rely in order 
to regulate the access to and maintenance of public authority’ (Wahman et al., 2013: 
                                                          
23
 Using different thresholds of these scales, countries are often classified into three different categories as 
democratic, transitional or autocratic regimes in the Polity IV scale, and as free, partly free, or not free in 
the Freedom House scale. 
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21). In addition, a few other reasons make this classification appealing for my research 
project.
24
  
First, compared to the Freedom House or the Polity Scales, Wahman et al.’s. (2013) 
autocratic regime type classification provides a much more nuanced and refined 
categorisation of regime types, distinguishing between multi-party, monarchic, one-
party, no-party and military regimes.
25
 Second, underlying this categorisation is an 
important theoretical consideration about the different historical modes in which 
autocrats access and maintain political power. These can be described as ‘1) hereditary 
succession, or lineage, 2) the actual or threatened use of military force and 3) popular 
elections’ (Wahman et al., 2013: 20). Finally, this typology also captures the electoral 
dimension of the so-called competitive or hybrid regimes that appeared at the end of the 
Cold War, something which is overlooked by the other datasets on autocratic regimes.
26
 
Using Wahman et al.’s (2013) measure of autocratic regimes, I create six dummy 
variables to classify autocratic regimes as 1) multi-party, 2) military, 3) one-party, 4) 
other, 5) no-party, or 6) monarchy. The remaining regimes are classified as 
democracies.  
However, even though Wahman et al. (2013) point to the right direction in trying to 
account for the new electoral or competitive dimension of autocratic regimes, their 
typology remains slightly vague and imprecise. In particular, the category “multi-party 
                                                          
24
 Since relatively similar measures might lead to substantive different results, some scholars advise to 
choose the measures according to the specific theoretical needs of the project (Cheibub et al., 2010; 
Collier and Adcock, 1999). 
25
 It also includes a residual category “other” and a category for “democratic” regimes. 
26
 For instance, Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s (2012) dichotomous measure differentiates between 
democratic and autocratic regimes, Cheibub et al. (2010) classifies democracies as presidential, semi-
presidential and parliamentarian, and dictatorships as civilian, military and royal dictatorships, and 
Geddes et al. differentiate between military, single-party, monarchic, and personalist regimes. However, 
none of these classifications captures the electoral dimension of “competitive” or “hybrid” 
authoritarianisms. 
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regimes” encompasses a great variety of countries (n=1046) that differ in many respects 
but one: the existence of more than one party that compete in the elections. This 
minimalist definition is problematic though, as very dissimilar regimes are included in 
the same category.  
In fact, the existence of multiple parties does not necessarily imply that these constitute 
or even attempt to be an effective or organised opposition to the regime (Gandhi and 
Lust-Okar, 2009). On the contrary, it might even be the case that the regime itself 
creates and uses proxy political parties to fragment the opposition vote. Consider, for 
instance, the case of Belarus, where in the 1990s Alexander Lukashenka revived the old 
Communist party in to split the opposition. After the election, this party would not play 
any role in the legislature, but its members would benefit from the patronage of the 
regime (Wilson, 2011).  
The existence of multiple parties within a political system tells us little about the actual 
distribution of power in the political system. In fact, some autocrats within the multi-
party category might face less domestic constrains than others, even though they are 
indeed challenged to some extent. To account for this possibility, I use Henisz Political 
Constraint Index (Henisz, 2002) to create two new categories out of the “multi-party” 
regime category. This index measures the number of political constraints that a regime 
faces domestically (i.e. the number of veto players). I code a country as “dominant” if 
the index is 0, whereas I code it “multi-party” if the political constraint index is above 0. 
This threshold is chosen to make sure that the category “dominant” regime encompasses 
those countries that face no constraints at home.
27
    
                                                          
27
 However, I have also run models with different thresholds and the results remain the same. Moreover, I 
have also employed Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh’s (2001) database on veto players to generate 
two different categories of multi-party regimes, and the results are similar. 
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Finally, I also create a new category called “strong”, which combines “military” and 
“one-party” regimes into a single category. Since my theoretical expectation is that 
multi-party regimes should be less likely to be sanctioned than military or one-party 
regimes (i.e. “strong”), I use this category as the baseline category in all my models (see 
Chapter 4).  Table 3.4 below compares the type and number of autocratic regimes of 
Wahman et al.’s (2013) typology with that of Geddes et al. (2014) and my adapted 
version of Wahman et al.’s (2013) classification. 
 
Table 3.4. Typologies of autocratic regimes 
Dataset Regime type Frequency Percentage 
Wahman et al. (2013) Democracy 1,652 44.02 
  Military 365 9.73 
  Monarchy 273 7.27 
  Multi-party 1,046 27.87 
  No-party 17 0.45 
  One-party 243 6.47 
  Other 157 4.18 
Wahman et al. (adapted) Democracy 1,652 44.09 
  Multi-party 680 18.15 
  Dominant 360 9.61 
  Strong 608 16.23 
  Monarchy 273 7.29 
  Other 157 4.19 
  No-party 17 0.45 
Geddes et al. (2014) Democracy 2,263 59.44 
  Party-based  707 18.57 
  Personalist 530 13.92 
  Military 138 3.62 
  Monarchy 169 4.44 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Geddes et al. (2014) and Wahman et al (2013). 
  
Admittedly, these categories are an analytical simplification that does not capture the 
entire variation that exists within each of these regimes or within each of the different 
94 
 
categories respectively. For instance, military or one-party regimes might vary 
according to their economic and political support base, political factionalism or ethnic 
and religious lines. Notwithstanding the limitation of my approach to capture this 
potential variation, my classification is useful for the purpose of this thesis in several 
respects.  
First, the categories that I provide allow me to assess whether variation exists in the 
ways in which different types of autocratic regimes respond to the threat and imposition 
of EU sanctions. And to be able to do so in a meaningful way, grouping countries 
according to their type of regime seems a logical way to proceed. Although it is true that 
similar types of regimes might differ in many possible ways, I am interested in 
determining whether the domestic constraints that autocrats face determines whether 
they are more or less likely to be sanctioned. In this line, I have argued in Chapter 2 a 
key element that differentiates autocratic regimes is the size of their winning coalition, 
and I have shown that this is smallest in military regimes, followed by one-party, 
monarchic, and multi-party regimes respectively (see Graph 2.2). 
Second, the suitability of these categories is not only a theoretical issue, but also an 
empirical one. Indeed, while I have argued that my regime type classification makes 
sense considering the institutional setup of the different regimes – i.e. whether it is ruled 
by the military, a single party, or by multiple parties –, ultimately the usefulness of 
these categories should be determined by whether the empirical evidence provides 
support to my argument or not. Indeed, if my empirical analyses do not identify any 
pattern that support my theoretical claim, then a different approach to understand why 
some regimes are sanctions whilst others are not might be necessary. 
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Finally, although my categorisation of regime types might not be able to capture all of 
the variance that takes place within each category of regime type – and sometimes 
countries within a specific category might vary in many respects –, I employ other 
mechanisms and methodological techniques to control for this. For instance, and as I 
explain in more detail below, I include a set of control variables in the regression 
models and employ techniques such as clustering the error terms on countries to account 
for this variation.  
 
3.2.5. Controls 
To make sure that other factors are not driving the imposition of EU sanctions, I include 
a battery of control variables to account for omitted variable bias or spurious 
correlation. 
 
3.2.5.1. Human rights 
A country’s violation of human rights is likely to trigger EU sanctions (Hazelzet, 2001). 
To measure the level of respect of human rights displayed by third countries I use 
Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Peter and Arnon (2015) Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS 
is based on the annual reports on the state of human rights in the world of the United 
States’ State Department Human Rights yearbook, and Amnesty International’s annual 
report and consists of 5 categories, where 1 stands for the highest respect for human 
rights, and 5 represents countries where human rights violations are systematic and 
affect broad sectors of the population. The PTS captures violations of physical integrity 
rights, including torture, political imprisonment, disappearances and extrajudicial 
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killings. For ease of interpretation, I invert the five-point scale and create a variable 
called PTSINV.
28
  
 
3.2.5.2. Change in democracy 
In addition to the respect of human rights, another factor that might trigger the 
imposition of EU sanctions is the quick deterioration of democracy and the rule of law 
in a target country. Moreover, it is also possible that the EU lifts sanctions if an 
improvement in the level of democracy in a target country has occurred. To control for 
these possibilities, I include an indicator that captures the change in the level of 
democracy between yeart and yeart-1 (DEMCHANGE). This indicator is constructed 
using Wahman et al.’s (2013) measure “ifhpol”, which imputes the well-known scales 
of Polity IV and Freedom House to create a continuous variable of democracy that 
ranges from 0 (low level of democracy) to 10 (high level of democracy).
29
  
 
3.2.5.3. Economic leverage 
An assumption often made in the sanctions literature is that, for sanctions to be 
effective, a sender needs to be able to exert some sort of leverage over the target regime 
(McLean and Whang, 2010). Thus, it is commonly accepted that the sender’s leverage 
over the target is largest the more asymmetric the commercial relationship between the 
                                                          
28
 In addition to this variable, I also employ the “physical integrity rights scale” (PHYSINT) of the CIRI 
Human Rights project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010) as a robustness check. However, since PTSINV 
has less missing values than the PHYSINT scale, I primarily rely on the variable PTSINV for the main 
regression models and use PHYSINT as a robustness measure. The results are similar and are available 
from the author on request. 
29
 I have also employed Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton’s (2010) Unified Democracy Score as a 
robustness measure and the results are similar. 
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two actors is, as the cost of defiance increases exponentially for the target (Morgan and 
Schwebach, 1997). To measure the extent to which a target country is vulnerable to the 
disruption or interruption of trade flows with the sender, it is common to employ the 
ratio of the trade between the sender and the target’s Gross Domestic Product. 
Following this practice, I construct three different variables that measure a target state’s 
vulnerability to the disruption of trade with the sender.  I create a measure that captures 
the overall trade-dependence (TRADERGDP) of a target regime from the EU, its 
dependence on imports (IMPRGDP) from the EU, and its reliance on exports 
(EXPRGDP) to the EU. Trade data are borrowed from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics (IMF, 2014) while GDP data are borrowed from (Gleditsch, 2002). 
In addition to the EU’s economic leverage regarding trade, I employ a second indicator 
that captures the target regime’s reliance on EU aid. Together with its member states, 
the EU is the largest aid donor in the world (Carbone, 2011a) and, as a consequence, it 
is able to exert a large leverage over a target country. Similarly to the trade-dependence 
variables, I divide the level of EU aid that is allocated to a target by the latter’s GDP 
(AID/GDP). All data on aid are borrowed from the OECD’s statistical database (OECD, 
2014).  
 
3.2.5.4. Political instability 
Another factor that might be driving the imposition of sanctions is political instability in 
a target country. I employ several indicators to measure whether a country is undergoing 
a period of political turmoil. First of all, I construct a variable that measures the number 
of riots, anti-government demonstrations and strikes that are taking place in a country 
(DEMONSTRATION) by adding the indicators “domestic 2”, “domestic 6” and 
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“domestic 8” from the Banks and Wilson (2014) Cross-National Time-Series Data 
Archive. In addition, I use Powell and Thyne (2011) dataset on coups d’état to measure 
whether a putsch has taken place in countryi at timet. I construct two binomial variables 
that measure 1) whether a coup has taken place (COUP) and 2) whether it has been 
successful (COUPSUCC). I also assess whether a country’s is undergoing a process of 
democratization. Since democratization processes tend to extend over long periods of 
time, I generate an indicator that captures the moving average in the level of democracy 
in the years comprised between yeart and yeart-5.   
Moreover, I use the “National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy” (NELDA) 
dataset (Hyde and Marinov, 2011) to measure political instability during electoral 
periods. Some scholars have argued that sanctions are more likely to be imposed if 
elections are contested and flawed (Laakso et al., 2006). Donno (2010), for instance, has 
claimed that sanctions are more likely to be used if Western monitors were present 
during an election and, especially, if elections were deemed flawed by these monitors. 
To account for this possibility, I generate a dummy variable that is coded 1 if 
international monitors were present during the holding of elections (N45). I also create a 
second dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if allegations of electoral fraud were made 
by Western monitors after the holding of elections (N47).  
Finally, I also include a variable to measure the tenure of the incumbent regime in order 
to account for the regime’s strength and stability (TENURE). This measure counts the 
number of years that a regime has been in power under the existing institutional settings 
– i.e. it measures the number of years that a particular type of regime has been in place.  
Thus, if the institutions that underpin the regime have changed, the count is set back to 
1. This adjustment is important because it underlines the role played by political 
institutions in constraining the autocrat’s possibilities.  
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3.2.5.5. Target economic performance 
Another frequent claim in the literature concerns a country’s economic performance. 
According to Hufbauer et al. (2007), sanctions are more likely to be effective against 
countries that are undergoing a period of “distress”. To measure a country’s economic 
performance I employ three different indicators. First, I estimate the overall 
performance of a country through its economic growth, measured as the variation of the 
country’s GDP between year t and year t-1 (GROWTH). I also use the country’s yearly 
inflation (INFLATION) as an indicator of the health of its economy. Finally, I take the 
ratio between the stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the country’s GDP to 
measure a country’s capability to attract foreign capital (FDI/GDP). Data for GDP 
growth, inflation and FDI are obtained from the World Bank Indicators (World Bank, 
2014b).  
 
3.2.5.6. Additional controls 
Finally, I include a battery of commonly employed control variables to account for 
possible confounding effects. These include a country’s GDP (or its population) to 
control for the size and strength of a country’s economy, a country’s GDP per capita to 
account for its level of development, and the distance between the EU and a target 
country to capture other types of linkages (Head, Mayer and Ries, 2010; Mayer and 
Zignago, 2011). Data for these variables is obtained from Gleditsch (2002), and the 
World Bank Indicators (World Bank, 2014b). Lastly, I also include a dichotomous 
variable to control for the existence of a human rights clause in the EU’s agreements 
with third countries. Since this clause establishes legal commitments to respect human 
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rights and democracy, a target country might face sanctions if it breaches them (Donno, 
2012; Hazelzet, 2005; Portela, 2007b; Zimelis, 2011). Data for this variable is extracted 
from Bartels (2005, 2008). Table 3.6 provides a list of the independent variables 
employed in this thesis and their data sources, whilst table 3.7 below presents 
descriptive statistics of all the variables used. 
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Table 3.6. List of independent variables 
Indicator Variable Description Source 
    
Multi-party regime mpweak Weak multi-party regime. This variable is coded 1 if the variable regime1ny in Wahman et et al. (2013) is coded 
“multi-party” and if the Henisz (2002) Index on Political Constraints is >0. 
Wahman et al. (2013) 
Dominant regime mpdom Dominant multi-party regime. This variable is coded 1 if the variable regime1ny in Wahman et et al. (2013) is coded 
“multi-party” and if the Henisz (2002) Index on Political Constraints is =0. 
Wahman et al. (2013) 
Democratic regime dem Democratic regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Military regime mil Military regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
One-party regime op One-party regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Strong regime strong Combines the categories “one-party” and “military” regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Other regimes other Residual category for regimes that do not fit any of the other categories. Wahman et al. (2013) 
No-party regime np No party-regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Monarchic regime mon Monarchic regimes. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Human rights ptsinv Measures a country’s respect of human rights, where 1 stands for widespread abuses of human rights and 5 for no 
violations. 
Gibney et al. (year) 
Change in democracy demchange Change in the level of a country’s democracy. This measure calculates the difference between a country’s level of 
democracy in yeart from its level of democracy in the previous year. I use Wahman et al.’s measure “ifhpol” to 
calculate the difference. 
Wahman et al. (2013) 
Level of democracy ifhpol Imputed measure of democracy ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for completely autocratic regime and 10 stands 
for completely democratic regime. 
Wahman et al. (2013) 
Trade/GDP tradergdp A target country’s level of trade with the EU ($) divided by its GDP. IMF (2014), Gleditsch (2002) 
Imports/GDP imprgdp A target country’s level of imports from the EU ($) divided by its GDP. IMF (2014), Gleditsch (2002) 
Exports/GDP exprgdp A target country’s level of exports to the EU ($) divided by its GDP. IMF (2014), Gleditsch (2002) 
Aid/GDP aidrgdp EU Institutions + EU member states official development assistance ($) divided by GDP OECD (2014), Gleditsch (2002) 
Demonstration demonstration  Banks and Wilson (2014) 
Democratization democ2 Measures the moving average of a country’s changes in the level of a country’s between yeart and yeart-5 Wahman et al. (2013) 
Tenure tenure5 This variable measures the years that a given type of regime has been in power. Wahman et al. (2013) 
Coup coup This variable measures whether a coup d’état has been staged.  
Successful coup cousucc Similar to coup, this variable measures whether a coup has been successful.  
Monitors n45 This variable captures whether international monitors were deployed to observe an election. Hyde and Marinov (2011)  
Voter fraud n47 This variable is coded 1 if Western observers alleged massive vote fraud in elections. Hyde and Marinov (2011)  
FDI/GDP fdirgdp FDI divided by GDP. World Bank (2014), Gleditsch (2002) 
GDP growth growth Measures a country’s inter-annual GDP growth. World Bank (2014) 
Inflation inflation Annual inflation. World Bank (2014) 
Oil oil Oil production in metric tons. Ross (2011) 
Gas gas Gas production. Marketed Natural Gas, million barrels oil equivalent.  Ross (2011) 
Human rights clause hrc3 This variable is coded 1 if the EU and the target country are bound by a human rights clause. Bartels (2005, 2008) 
GDP rgdp Measures a country’s annual GDP in real US$  Gleditsch (2002) 
GDP/cap rgdpcap Measures a country’s annual GDP per capita in real US$  Gleditsch (2002) 
Population population Measures a country’s population World Bank (2014) 
Distance dist Measures the distance between the capital of a target regime and Brussels in km. Head et al. (2010), Mayer and Zignago (2011) 
Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 3.7. Descriptive statistics of the main variables 
VARIABLES N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Sanction 3666 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Multi-party 3654 0.186 0.389 0 1 
Dominant 3654 0.099 0.298 0 1 
Democracy 3753 0.440 0.496 0 1 
Military 3753 0.097 0.296 0 1 
One-party 3753 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Strong 3753 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Other 3753 0.042 0.200 0 1 
No-party 3753 0.005 0.067 0 1 
Monarchy 3753 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Human rights 3566 3.256 1.179 1 5 
Change in democracy 4635 0.076 0.688 -7.5 6.833333 
Level of democracy 4818 5.548 3.347 0 10 
Political constraints 3817 0.243 0.211 0 0.688 
Trade/GDP 3663 0.126 0.264 0.000105 8.62348 
Imports/GDP 3662 0.069 0.158 8.77E-05 5.484334 
Exports/GDP 3662 0.056 0.115 1.37E-05 2.79045 
Aid/GDP 3464 0.014 0.027 -0.02171 0.471883 
Demonstration 3799 0.803 2.152 0 37 
Democratization 5138 0.405 0.783 -1 1 
Coup 3806 0.025 0.157 0 1 
Monitors 3806 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Vote fraud 3806 0.031 0.173 0 1 
FDI/GDP 3596 0.027 0.117 -0.50286 3.827586 
GDP growth (%) 3572 3.757 6.748 -51.0309 106.2798 
Inflation 3160 43.821 497.865 -16.1173 23773.13 
Oil  3392 21500000 61900000 0 4.83E+08 
Gas 3392 111.671 470.013 0 5013.133 
Human rights clause 3806 0.470 0.499 0 1 
GDP ($US) 3804 2.26E+11 9.98E+11 2.30E+07 1.30E+13 
GDP/cap ($US) 3804 7665.296 10699.720 132.82 102805 
Distance (km) 3748 6749.999 3622.583 487.4555 19011.83 
Tenure 3615 7.837 6.009 1 23 
Population 3742 33900000 130000000 8949 1.34E+09 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.3. Econometric strategy 
3.3.1. Unit of analysis 
To test my argument empirically, I create a dataset that uses the country-year as the unit 
of analysis. My choice for the country-year as the unit of analysis is driven by several 
considerations, most notably the need to avoid potential selection effects. If my 
argument that selection bias is present in the sanctions literature is true (see Chapter 2), 
then I need to make sure that the way in which I select my sample allows me to i) test 
this argument empirically; and ii) avoid oversampling observations of regimes that self-
select themselves into sanctions and thereby bias my estimates.  
However, the main problem to generate a robust sample to test my argument 
empirically arises with the difficulty to identify and measure events where sanctions 
were threatened. Indeed, collecting observations on threats of sanctions is a task barred 
by serious practical challenges. As a matter of fact, threats of sanctions are rarely public 
and are often made behind closed doors (Drezner 1999). Moreover, although scholars 
like Morgan et al. (2009) have manged to collect some cases where sanctions were 
threatened in their Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset, these cases tend to relate 
to trade disputes and not to high-policy issues like security concerns or the deterioration 
of human rights and democracy in a country, where negotiations are generally 
undertaken in the most secretive circumstances. 
The problem to identify and collect data regarding threats of sanctions highlights the 
need for an alternative approach to generate a sample. A commonly employed solution 
by scholars is to use a number of indicators to identify cases that could be interesting for 
their studies. The potential problem with these solution however, is that it risks 
oversampling cases of countries that self-select themselves into sanctions – and hence, 
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cases where the threat of sanctions was ineffective. Although the practice of selecting 
cases according to specific indicators is not necessarily flawed in itself, in the sanctions 
literature this has led to dubious samples were the cases analysed are “hard” cases (i.e. 
strong regimes) that have self-selected themselves into sanctions.  
For instance, some scholars have constructed their samples by selecting some 
observations on the dependent variable – i.e. by sampling those countries that were 
sanctioned – and by complementing these cases with other cases that were selected 
according to some specific criteria or threshold of an independent variable – for 
example, according to a specific value of the Polity IV scale (Brummer, 2009; 
Warkotsch, 2008, 2010).  
While the strategy of selecting cases on the dependent variable is not necessarily wrong, 
it is not suitable if the purpose of the study is to show the circumstances under which 
sanctions are imposed or when they are more effective, as weak regimes are likely to 
comply with the sender at the threat stage. This can lead to a situation where the cases 
where sanctions were successful are left out of the sample, thus leading to biased 
estimations. Unfortunately, this situation often takes place, and scholars make strong 
generalisations from biased samples.  
This does not mean that only selecting cases where sanctions have been imposed might 
not be useful or interesting. For instance, Eriksson (2011) and (Biersteker et al., 2013) 
work has greatly advanced our understanding of how sanctions work by focusing 
specifically on cases where sanctions were imposed by the EU and the UN. In contrast 
to most of the sanctions literature, their approach employs the sanctions episode as the 
unit of analysis, which presents some very strong advantages over other approaches.  
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First of all, by focusing on episodes where sanctions were imposed, extended, upgraded, 
suspended, or lifted, the authors are able to collect a sizeable number of observations. 
Indeed, instead of one single observation – i.e. a sanctions regime –, the authors are able 
to multiply the number of observations within one single sanctions regime by 
identifying different stages that take place throughout the duration of the sanctions 
regime. For instance, in comparison to the country-year, their unit of analysis allows 
them to track the evolution of the sanctions regime, and to capture changes such as the 
expansion of sanctions, their lifting, or the renewal of the measures in place.   
Second, this approach also allows the authors to trace the impact of sanctions between 
different stages that take place within a sanctions regime. Notably, the different 
episodes allow to trace the changes in the behaviour of the target regime, and to assess 
more precisely whether changes in the sanctions regime – i.e. the addition of more 
coercive sanctions – might have played in driving this change of attitude in the target 
regime.  
Finally, compared to the country-year, the sanctions-episode provides much more 
nuance and flexibility. Indeed, rather than being a unit that is exogenously determined, 
the sanctions-episode is determined by the events that take place. Thus, it lasts as long 
as there is no alteration in the sanctions regime, or in the behaviour of the target or the 
sender which might lead, in turn, to a review of the sanctions regime. In this way, the 
sanctions-episode provides much valuable information that can shed more light into the 
processes of how sanctions work and the circumstances under which they have a 
specific impact on the target’s behaviour. 
However, despite the evident strengths displayed by the sanctions-episode as the unit of 
analysis, it too cannot solve some of the abovementioned problems either.  First, by 
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choosing the observations according to values of the dependent variable – i.e. cases that 
were sanctioned –, this approach automatically neglects cases where the mere threat of 
sanctions might have succeeded in influencing the target’s behaviour. Thus, if anything, 
this approach further exacerbates the problem of oversampling regimes that self-select 
themselves into sanctions. 
Second, using the sanctions-episode as the unit of analysis does not alter the problem of 
identifying threats of sanctions in the first place. Moreover, while such an approach 
might be suitable to gather more observations in small-n qualitative studies, using this 
approach for a large dataset would entail manually dividing each sanctions regime into 
potentially hundreds or thousands of new observations. Needless to say, this goes well 
beyond the scope, resources, and time constraints of this thesis. 
Finally, the sanctions-episode approach might lead to a situation where potentially 
many observations are substantively meaningless. Indeed, some of the observations 
generated by this data-generation process might not provide new analytical information, 
but simply describe situations where sanctions are simply rolled-over or extended even 
though nothing substantially has changed in the behaviour of the target or the sender. 
Thus, occasionally, the sample might simply be collecting redundant observations rather 
than capturing dynamics triggered by the strategic interaction between the sender and 
the target (i.e. portraying a target’s move towards compliance).  
Similarly, other sampling strategies such as selecting cases on an independent variable 
like the respect for human rights or the level of democracy is also problematic for 
identical reasons, as the degree to which a country violates human rights and democratic 
principles is likely to be endogenous to the repressive nature of the autocratic regime – 
i.e. more autocratic regimes are likely to commit worse atrocities than less autocratic 
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ones (Bueno de Mesquita, Cherif, Downs and Smith, 2005; Davenport, 2007; Davenport 
and Armstrong, 2004; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). Thus, by 
selecting on specific values of independent variables like the Freedom House or Polity 
scales, researchers might actually be oversampling cases that, according to my 
theoretical argument, would self-select themselves into sanctions.  
Other approaches that have sampled observations according to events of violations 
reported in the news or in parliamentary debates might also face similar problems (see 
for instance, Hazelzet (2001). Although such events-based approaches are generally 
considered the best option to trace the causal link between the occurrence of a violation 
and the event of interest (Landman, 2004), these approaches are also frequently affected 
by selection effects. Indeed, different studies have shown that Western media coverage 
of human rights abuses tends to be biased towards those countries that display higher 
levels of authoritarianism (Ramos, Ron and Thoms, 2007; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 
2005; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2006). This means that countries that are particularly 
sensitive to the Western public opinion are likely to be overrepresented in the news, 
whilst other countries with similar or worse records of abuses will be left out of the 
picture.  
Since I am particularly interested in testing the presence of selection effects during the 
imposition of EU sanctions, it is paramount to avoid sampling bias. For this reason, I 
rely on the country-year as the unit of analysis, as it allows me to include all countries 
in the world, including those that have never been sanctioned and those that have been 
sanctioned - or might have been sanctioned but preferred to comply before it was too 
late.  Although, admittedly, my choice for the country-year as the unit of analysis entails 
making some trade-offs, using other sampling strategies is less appropriate, as they 
might actually make the problem of selection bias worse (Collier, 1995; Collier and 
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Mahoney, 1996; Geddes, 1990). Finally, and as I explain in more detail below and in 
Chapter 4, I also employ a two-stage selection model in my main analysis to account for 
selection effects from the dependent variable SANCTION. 
 
3.3.2. Scope of the dataset 
Using the country-year as the unit of analysis, I generate a dataset that includes all 
observations of autocratic regimes in the world between 1989 and 2010. First of all, the 
inclusion of all autocratic regimes in my dataset is driven by the need not to lose 
observations of autocratic regimes that might have been threatened with sanctions and 
that, due to their weakness, complied with the sender before sanctions were imposed. 
Although an events-based approach that collects all episodes where sanctions were 
threatened and/or imposed would be ideal to test my hypotheses, the difficulties to do 
this require an alternative sampling strategy that allows me to account for those 
instances where a threat might have been issued.  
Thus, by including all autocratic regimes between 1989 and 2010 I ensure that no cases 
that might be important for my theory are left aside. Although this choice might collect 
observations of a number of autocratic regimes that might never have been threatened 
with sanctions, including them in my sample is relevant precisely to avoid oversampling 
regimes that, due to their domestic structure, might self-select themselves into 
sanctions. Given the practical limitations of measuring threats of sanctions and my 
thesis’ goal to test the existence of selection effects in the imposition of EU sanctions, 
using a sample of all autocratic regimes allows me to avoid selection bias arising from 
other sampling strategies like selecting cases according to values on the dependent or an 
independent variable.  
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Second, since my thesis seeks to understand why and when EU sanctions are imposed to 
address human rights violations and democratic wrongdoing in autocratic regimes, all 
countries that are coded as a democracy in Wahman et al.’s (2013) dataset in timet are 
dropped. Also, small countries with a population of less than half a million are also 
excluded from the database due missing data in most of the independent variables. This 
leaves me with a sample of 2006 observations
30
 of autocratic regimes that correspond to 
126 countries over a period of 22 years (1989-2010).  
The selection of this time period followed two considerations. First of all, the year 1989 
has been chosen as the lower limit due to the effect that the end of the Cold War had on 
the EU as an international sender of sanctions. Indeed, the end of the political stalemate 
and the irruption of the third wave of democracy opened a window of opportunity for 
the promotion of liberal values like democracy and human rights (Huntington, 1993). 
Most importantly, the EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy in the 1990s had 
a clear negative dimension to it, as the EU became increasingly willing to use sanctions 
against those regimes that did not respect human rights and democratic principles. 
Consequently, the end of the Cold War paved the way for the EU to become one of the 
most important senders of international sanctions to promote human rights and 
democracy worldwide (De Vries and Hazelzet, 2005; Taylor, 2010). Second, the choice 
for 2010 as the upper limit of the dataset is motivated by a lack of available data on the 
main independent variable, regime type. This time limit is unfortunate, as the EU has 
been very active imposing a new wave of sanctions since the unfolding of the Arab 
Spring in 2011.
31
 
                                                          
30
 The differences in n between Table 3.7 and this figure are due to the exclusion of democratic regimes 
in the latter. 
31
 By the time of writing, all datasets on autocratic regimes only covered all autocratic regimes up to 
2010. 
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3.3.3. Methodological issues  
A few methodological issues need to be addressed to avoid certain problems that 
commonly arise with panel data. First of all, it is likely that my dataset is affected by 
serial correlation, as the residuals of one period (εt) are likely to be correlated with the 
residuals in previous periods (εt-1, εt-2, etc.) (Baltagi, 2001; Beck, 2001; Beck, Katz 
and Tucker, 1998; Wooldridge, 2002). To address serial correlation, I follow Carter and 
Signorino (2010) and include cubic polynomials to control for the time passed since the 
last event (sanctions) occurred.  
Secondly, the countries included in the dataset are likely to be very heterogeneous and 
likely to vary in many respects that I cannot control for with the inclusion of additional 
control variables. A common solution to this issue is to include country fixed effects. 
However, given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable SANCTION, this 
strategy is problematic. Many countries in my sample are never sanctioned (i.e. they 
never fail) and, as a consequence, drop from the analysis. This results into a huge loss of 
observations (about 71 countries and 952 observations). To overcome this limitation, I 
use region fixed effects instead. Data for world regions are borrowed from the 
Correlates of War project (2014). Similarly, certain regime types like “monarchies” and 
“no-party” regimes are never sanctioned during the period of observation. Thus, these 
cases drop automatically due to no variation of the dependent variable.
32
  
In addition to countries being heterogeneous, a third issue that needs to be addressed is 
potential selection effects arising from the dependent variable. Recall that my 
                                                          
32
 This decision affects 281 observations and 14 countries. No-party regimes dropped are only the 
Maldives, whereas the monarchic regimes dropped are Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Nepal, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland Tonga and the United Arab Emirates.  
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theoretical argument suggests that some types of regimes will face incentives not to 
comply with the EU’s demands. If this is true, then these regimes will also be willing to 
resist the economic burden that sanctions might impose on them, thereby self-selecting 
themselves into sanctions. To address selection effects emanating from the dependent 
variable, I employ a two-stage Heckman selection process (Heckman, 1976, 1979), 
where the first or selection stage models the likelihood that a target regime complies 
with the EU’s threat and the second or outcome stage models the likelihood that a target 
regime is sanctioned (I develop this point further in Section 4.3.1. of Chapter 4).  
Finally, I also need to address potential heterogeneity problems in the key independent 
variable, domestic institutions. Since weak regimes (treated units) and strong regimes 
(control units) are likely to differ in many characteristics, I try to balance these possible 
factors out with the use of matching methods. Matching methods are useful to control 
for the pre-existing differences between the groups to ‘replicate, as closely as possible, 
the ideal of randomized experiments when using experimental data’ in order to ‘obtain 
approximately unbiased estimates of the effects of interest’ (Ho, Imai, King and Stuart, 
2007: 155; Stuart and Rubin, 2008). The strength of matching techniques derives from 
the fact that they do not impose any type of function or restriction on the data. On the 
contrary, ‘inferences are based entirely on data [and] none of the results flow from 
arcane functional form assumptions or implausible arguments about valid instruments’ 
(Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008:90). 
Although different software programs for matching exist, yet the most well-known 
packages are Coarsened Exact Matching (Blackwell, Iacus, King and Porro, 2009; 
Iacus, King and Porro, 2011) and Propensity Score Matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). These techniques are very sensitive to the addition of controls though, and 
observations that are not matched are lost or dropped. For a small dataset like mine, this 
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is problematic, as I lose many observations.
33
 To avoid this, I use Jens Hainmueller’s 
entropy balancing technique (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller and Xu, 2013).
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Compared to ‘other preprocessing methods such as nearest neighbor matching [or 
coarsened exact matching] where units are either discarded or matched (weights of zero 
or one)’, entropy balancing is much more flexible, since it ‘reweights units 
appropriately to achieve balance, but at the same time keeps the weights as close as 
possible to the base weights to prevent loss of information and thereby retains efficiency 
for the subsequent analysis’ (Hainmueller, 2012: 26).  
In sum, this technique allows me to balance the covariates of the treated and the control 
groups without losing observations of the sample. The treatment for the balancing is my 
main independent variable, multi-party (mpweak). To choose the variables that need to 
be balanced, I first undertake t-tests between the different variables used in the 
regression models and the treatment. If the t-test is statistically significant for a given 
variable, I balance it so that entropy weights are added and the balance between groups 
is achieved. Table 3.8 below displays the results before and after the use of entropy 
balancing.  
  
                                                          
33
 In fact, the actual number of matched units tends to be quite small with both the Coarsened Exact 
Matching and the Propensity Score Matching techniques.  
34
 As the author notes, ‘entropy balancing a reweighting scheme that directly incorporates covariate 
balance into the weight function that is applied to the sample units. The researcher begins by imposing a 
potentially large set of balance constraints, which imply that the covariate distributions of the treatment 
and control group in the preprocessed data match exactly on all prespecified moments. After the 
researcher has prespecified her desired level of covariate balance, entropy balancing searches for the set 
of weights that satisfies the balance constraints but remains as close as possible (in an entropy sense) to a 
set of uniform base weights to retain information. This recalibration of the unit weights effectively adjusts 
for systematic and random inequalities in representation’. 
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Table 3.8. Results of entropy balancing 
Treated units: 647     total of weights: 647 
     Control units: 2426    total of weights: 647 
     
        Before: without weighting 
      
        
 
  Treat   
 
  Control   
Variable Mean Variance Skewness   Mean Variance Skewness 
       Demonstration 1.255 7.930 5.316 
 
0.849 4.674 4.480 
GDP/cap (log) 7.881 1.063 0.212 
 
8.251 1.473 0.004 
Tenure 6.604 26.430 1.016 
 
8.343 38.370 0.652 
Monitors 0.209 0.165 1.434 
 
0.162 0.136 1.831 
Vote fraud 0.059 0.055 3.753 
 
0.033 0.032 5.267 
Human rights 2.807 0.868 -0.056 
 
3.232 1.444 -0.197 
GDP (log) 24.280 2.912 0.139 
 
24.160 4.107 0.431 
Human rights clause 0.592 0.242 -0.374   0.443 0.247 0.229 
        
        After:  _webal as the weighting variable 
     
        
 
  Treat   
 
  Control   
  Mean Variance Skewness   Mean Variance Skewness 
        Demonstration 1.255 7.930 5.316 
 
1.255 7.691 3.656 
GDP/cap (log) 7.881 1.063 0.212 
 
7.881 1.274 0.138 
Tenure 6.604 26.430 1.016 
 
6.605 28.600 1.004 
Monitors 0.209 0.165 1.434 
 
0.209 0.165 1.434 
Vote fraud 0.059 0.055 3.753 
 
0.059 0.055 3.754 
Human rights 2.807 0.868 -0.056 
 
2.807 1.307 0.078 
GDP (log) 24.280 2.912 0.139 
 
24.280 4.011 0.396 
Human rights clause 0.592 0.242 -0.374   0.592 0.242 -0.374 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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3.4. Case studies selection 
Finally, my statistical analyses are complemented by two chapters that analyse in depth 
several case studies of EU sanctions regimes. The selection of these case studies is done 
following my theoretical approach and the results of my statistical analyses. Chapter 5 
focuses on three cases that my model predicts well, Fiji I (2001-2003), Fiji II (2006-
2014), and Myanmar (1991-ongoing). In turn, Chapter 6 discusses the case studies of 
Belarus (2004-ongoing) and Zimbabwe (2002-ongoing), which my model fails to 
predict correctly. These cases constitute clear outliers to my theoretical approach, since 
they are weak regimes that self-select themselves into sanctions and remain in office 
despite continued sanctions over more than ten years.  
The reason to include these case studies is driven by two main considerations. First, by 
tracing the strategic moves made by the EU and its targets during the sanctioning 
process, I am able to identify the causal mechanisms that take place at the target state 
level and which lead to the threatening and imposition of sanctions by the EU. Thus, the 
case studies allow me to assess the influence of the domestic institutional constraints 
faced by a target regime on its policy choices, and observe how these effectively affect 
the likelihood that the EU imposes sanctions. Put differently, the case studies allow me 
to 1) observe how the domestic institutional setting of a target regime is influenced by 
the threat and imposition of sanctions; and 2) how domestic institutions determine the 
outcome of the negotiation and the effects of sanctions. 
Second, the case studies also allow me to control for a variable that is very difficult to 
measure quantitatively: the presence of black knights or sanctions busters. Indeed, the 
existence of third actors that provide assistance to a sanctioned country is often regarded 
as an important element of why sanctions fail (Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer et al., 2007). 
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However, generating an indicator that captures the assistance provided by black knights 
to a sanctioned country is a challenging task. Indeed, although some scholars have 
sought to measure this assistance by analysing drastic changes in the trade relations 
between two countries during a sanctions episode (Early, 2009, 2011), other forms of 
support tend to predominate nowadays. Indeed, the help granted by black knights might 
be diplomatic (i.e. vetoing UN resolutions at the UNSC, like China’s veto against UN 
sanctions targeting Myanmar), military (i.e. by providing weapons to a sanctioned 
regime, like Russia’s deployment of arms to Bashar al-Assad’s regime), or financial 
(i.e. through the provision of aid, soft loans, and grants). 
Finally, these activities are frequently undertaken with discretion, and hence no data are 
available to assess the extent to which black knights allow autocratic regimes to 
circumvent sanctions. An illustration of this secrecy is reflected in China’s 
unwillingness to disclose the amount of aid it provided to the military regime in Fiji 
between 2006 and 2014 (Interview, 2015b). As a consequence of these difficulties, I 
employ the case studies to look inductively at the two outliers to my model – Belarus 
and Zimbabwe – to determine whether the assistance provided by black knights can 
explain the formers’ resilience to sanctions.  
 
3.5. Interview sampling strategy 
In order to complement the statistical analyses and provide more nuance to the 
qualitative case studies, I undertook 21 semi-structured elite interviews with officials 
from the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and EU 
member states. Given that the imposition of sanctions often follows secretive decision-
116 
 
making procedures due to the sensitivity of the information that officials work with,
35
 
the interviews allowed me to obtain first-hand information about the process that led to 
the imposition of sanctions and about the negotiations and deliberations that took place 
between EU institutions, and between the EU and the sanctioned country. In addition, 
the interviews provided me with additional information and details of the challenges 
and obstacles that were found by decision-makers in the process of imposing, 
extending, and lifting sanctions. 
The sampling rationale followed was guided by two main criteria: i) that the 
interviewees were officials involved in the design and implementation of sanctions at 
the European level; or, alternatively, ii) that the officials had worked or were working in 
relevant countries and regions where EU sanctions regimes had been imposed or were 
still in place. To identify potential interviewees, I employed several sampling strategies. 
First of all, I searched the web for references of EEAS officials working in the 
organizations’ sanctions unit. Given the recent popularity of sanctions, it was relatively 
easy to track some of these officials, since they had participated in public events 
organised by think tanks and private foundations in Brussels. In addition, I also widened 
the scope of search to concepts such as “exports restrictions” to identify officials 
working on trade-related elements of those sanctions being implemented by the 
European Commission.  
Second, I also employed a snowballing technique to obtain the contact details of other 
potential interviewees. Thus, after every interview, I kindly asked my interviewees for 
the contacting details of other officials who could provide additional and valuable 
                                                          
35
 Since the information about potential targets of sanctions is often obtained by the intelligence services 
of EU member states, the latter are reluctant to share information that could risk the situation of their 
informants. 
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information for my research. In this way, I managed to arrange interviews with EU 
officials working in the geographical areas that I was covering in my case studies. A list 
of the interviewees and their positions can be seen below. The names of the 
interviewees are not disclosed due to confidentiality reasons.  
 
Table 3.9. List of interviewees 
Position Institution 
Member state diplomat, Maghreb and Mashreq 
(MaMa) Working Group 
Council of the European Union 
Deputy head of unit, Sanctions Unit EEAS 
Policy officer, Sanctions Unit EEAS 
Desk officer, Ukraine EEAS 
Desk officer, Fiji (formerly) EEAS 
Desk officer, Fiji   EEAS 
Policy officer, EaP-bilateral: Ukraine, Moldova, 
Belarus and South Caucasus 
EEAS 
Desk officer, Myanmar EEAS 
Desk officer, Madagascar and Comoros 
(formerly Zimbabwe) 
EEAS 
Policy officer, Conflict Prevention and 
Mediation Instruments Division 
EEAS 
Desk officer, Syria EEAS 
Desk officer, Zimbabwe EEAS 
Desk officer, Guinea Conakry EEAS 
Policy officer, Foreign Policy Instrument II European Commission 
Desk officer, Belarus European Commission 
Desk officer, Fiji European Commission 
Desk officer, Myanmar European Commission 
Export Control Officer, (formerly sanctions 
coordinator) 
European Commission 
Desk officer, Syria European Commission 
Policy Officer, EU Delegation to Syria European Commission 
EU sanctions coordinator (formerly) European Commission 
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3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid down the research design and methods employed in this thesis. I 
have explained the reasons to generate an original dataset on EU sanctions, arguing that 
the two most comprehensive databases on sanctions underrepresent the measures 
imposed by the EU since the 1990s. I have also laid down the strategy followed during 
the data gathering process, and disclosed the primary and secondary sources employed 
for this purpose. Moreover, this chapter has also addressed the methodological choices 
taken to operationalise and codify the dependent variable SANCTION, as well as the 
main independent variable domestic institutions (i.e. autocratic regime type), and the 
remaining control variables used in this study. In addition, I have discussed certain 
methodological issues that might arise with the use of panel data, and explained the 
solutions that I have employed to tackle them. Finally, this chapter has raised the need 
to use a mixed-methods approach to gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding of 
the mechanisms that trigger the imposition of sanctions. Thus, I complement the 
statistical analysis with in depth case studies of EU sanctions episodes. I have selected a 
set of five case studies following the expectations of my theoretical approach, picking 
three typical cases that my model predicts well and two outliers that deviate from my 
predictions. In the next chapter I present the empirical results of my statistical analyses, 
discussing their implications for sanctions theory and research.  
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Introduction 
My theoretical argument (see Chapter 2) highlights the role of domestic institutions in 
determining the likelihood that a target regime is sanctioned. I argue that institutional 
settings at the target’s level – and specifically, the size of the regime’s W – provide 
ruling elites in different autocratic regimes with varying incentives to comply or defy a 
sender’s threat of sanctions. Regimes that rely on smaller W to rule have a larger margin 
of manoeuvre to resist the threat and imposition of sanctions, as they are accountable to 
few people and face limited domestic challenges to their rule. By the same token, I 
claim that regimes with large W face many domestic constraints to resist the pressure of 
sanctions, and are therefore more inclined to find a negotiated settlement with a sender 
and comply. In brief, I expect that autocratic regimes with smaller W will be more 
inclined to resist the sender’s threat and thus be sanctioned, whereas regimes with a 
larger W will be more likely to comply with the sender and avoid being sanctioned.  
This chapter tests my argument empirically through the use of several regression 
analyses. The first section looks at the EU’s imposition of democratic sanctions between 
1989 and 2010 in a descriptive way. The second section presents the main models of the 
study, which address the two main hypotheses of the thesis. Specifically, I assess 
hypothesis 1 regarding the likelihood that weak regimes comply with the sender early, 
and then proceed to test hypothesis 2 regarding the probability that strong regimes are 
sanctioned more often than weaker regimes. The third section goes on to analyse the 
additional hypotheses of Chapter 2. First, it examines hypothesis 3 on the likelihood that 
countries with large W are more likely to face shorter spells of sanctions, since they 
should comply early with the sender. And second, it tests hypothesis 4 on the 
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probability that multi-party regimes are more prone to be destabilized by sanctions than 
strong regimes. Finally, the last section concludes by discussing the findings of the 
statistical analyses and the implications that they have on the selection of the case 
studies that I analyse in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.2. A descriptive look at the imposition of EU democratic sanctions 
The evolution of the EU as a sender of democratic sanctions has increased dramatically 
since the end of the Cold War (Jones, 2007). While prior to 1989 only one sanction 
regime had been imposed to address human rights and democratic concerns against the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa, the 1990s witnessed a quick and substantial increase 
in the use of democratic sanctions, reaching a peak of 17 sanctions regimes in place in 
1993 (see Graph 4.1).  
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Graph 4.1. Number of EU democratic sanctions 
 
Source: Own elaboration. The line represents the cumulative number of EU democratic 
sanctions regimes in place at any given year.  
 
Although the 1990s opened a window of opportunity for the promotion of democracy 
and human rights (Burnell, 2000; Burnell and Calvert, 2005; Carothers, 1999; 
Huntington, 1993), the EU’s sanctioning practice has not stopped with the new 
millennium. Rather, the EU has increasingly imposed sanctions autonomously in the 
absence of UN Security Council Resolutions (De Vries and Hazelzet, 2005). While a 
downward trend reaching a minimum of 9 sanctions regimes in force can be observed 
after 2005, the number of regimes in place has remained relatively stable during the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century. In fact, the EU’s imposition of sanctions has increased again 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and, especially, since the 
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irruption of the Arab Spring in 2011.
36
 Nowadays, the EU stands as one of the most 
active senders of sanctions alongside the US, as restrictive measures have become one 
of the most prominent instruments in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit (Gebert, 2013; 
Lehne, 2012; Smith, 2008). 
During the period 1989-2010, the EU imposed democratic sanctions on 39 different 
countries (see Table 3.2). This figure represents a total of 247 observations or 12.3% of 
the sample. However, the imposition of sanctions over the period under study also 
shows considerable variation across regions.
37
 As Graph 4.2 illustrates, Sub-Saharan 
Africa stands out as the most sanctioned region, with 128 sanctions/years. This region 
alone accounts for half of the sample’s sanctioned regimes (51.82%), followed in the 
distance by the Middle East & Northern Africa and the Far East (27 sanctions/years or 
10.93% of the sanctioned observations in the sample respectively), South Asia (24 
sanctions/years or 9.72%), and Central and Eastern Europe (17 sanctions/years or 
6.88% of the sanctioned regimes). Finally, North America has been targeted 12 times 
(4.86%), Oceania 8 times (3.24%) and South America only 4 times (1.62% of the 
observations in the sample).  
                                                          
36
Although not shown in the graph, since 2011 the EU has imposed democratic sanctions against Libya, 
Syria, Iran, Ukraine, Indonesia, Guinea Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, and South 
Sudan.   
37
 I use the categories provided by the Correlates of War (2014).  
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Graph 4.2. Sanctions by region 
 
Source: Own elaboration. The graph employs the regions identified by the Correlates of War 
(2014). 
 
A closer look at the sanctions regimes imposed in the period under study shows that 
sanctions have been applied unevenly amongst autocratic regimes. Graph 4.3 presents 
some descriptive figures on the number of sanctions imposed according to the type of 
autocratic regime. The left column of the graph displays frequencies of the number of 
sanctions imposed and shows that the EU has targeted "strong" regimes the most (134 
times), followed in the distance by “dominant" (53 times) and "multi-party” regimes (39 
times). Countries within the residual category “other” regimes were sanctioned a total of 
21 times.
38
  
 
                                                          
38
 Note that “other” regimes is a residual category that groups together very different regime types like 
Iran, Libya, Somalia, or Angola. Unfortunately, these regimes are not easily classifiable within the other 
regime type categories. 
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Graph 4.3. Sanctions by regime type 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Red bars represent regimes that were sanctioned, whilst blue bars 
represent non-sanctioned regimes.  
 
The right hand side of the graph however provides a more revealing account. It shows 
the number of times that different regime types were targeted with sanctions as a 
percentage of the total number of countries within each regime type category 
respectively. The differences between the two sides of Graph 4.3 are revealing: as the 
right-hand side column evidences, less than 6% of the countries within the multi-party 
regime category were targeted with sanctions, being thus the least sanctioned regime 
type in relative terms. This contrasts with the category of strong regimes, as almost 25% 
of the observations within this category were sanctioned. Dominant regimes were 
targeted about 15% of the times, slightly more than countries within the residual 
category other regime types (13.82%).   
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This first descriptive evidence is in line with my expectations that regimes with a small 
W (i.e. strong regimes like military and one-party regimes) should be more likely to be 
sanctioned than regimes with a larger W (i.e. weak regimes like multi-party or dominant 
regimes). Nevertheless, while the evidence so far points to the right direction and 
constitutes a promising starting point to corroborate my hypotheses, descriptive 
statistics are not sufficient to confirm whether the difference in the EU’s sanctioning 
behaviour is effectively due to different incentives generated by a target’s domestic 
institutions. To control for the possibility that other factors might be driving the EU’s 
response, I undertake more thorough multivariate analyses in the next sections.  
 
4.3. Model specification 
In Chapter 2 I have developed a game-theoretic approach to the imposition of sanctions 
where two players, a sender and a target, interact. As shown in the “sanctions tree” 
(Graph 2.1), this interaction can lead to a variety of results where sanctions might 
eventually be imposed. Whether this outcome occurs or not depends fundamentally on 
the target’s decision to comply with the sender (c) or not (~c). This is the first stage of 
the sanctions tree. If the target stands firm (~c), the sanctions tree proceeds to the 
second stage, where the sender has to decide whether to impose sanctions (s) or not 
(~s). Finally, if sanctions are imposed (s), the target has to re-assess its position in view 
of the new circumstances and decide whether it wants to redress its behaviour and 
comply (c) or not (~c). This is the third stage of the sanctions tree. 
The differentiation between these stages is not trivial. Although the main focus of my 
study lies on the imposition of sanctions (stage 2), stages 1 and 2 are necessarily related, 
as the sender’s decision to impose sanctions (s) is a function of the target’s decision to 
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comply or resist. This suggests that strong autocratic regimes should have more 
incentives than their weaker counterparts to ignore the sender’s threat and, as a 
consequence, should have a higher probability of being sanctioned than weak regimes. 
If this is true, target selection effects will be present, which will need to be modelled 
and incorporated into the model. 
 
4.3.1. A two-stage Heckman selection model 
To address the possibility that target selection effects might be present in the EU’s 
decision to impose sanctions I employ a two-stage Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1976, 1979; Reed, 2000). This model controls for the likelihood that the two 
stages of the game tree – the compliance (selection) equation and the sanction 
(outcome) equation – are not independent from each other. More technically, the 
Heckman model assumes that the error terms of the selection and the outcome equations 
might be correlated, in which case they will bias the estimation of the outcome 
equation. The basic idea behind this model is that whilst the selection equation is 
completely observed – i.e. whether countries comply or not with the EU’s threat –, we 
only have a selected or censored sample for the second equation – i.e. whether some 
regimes are sanctioned. This is because we only observe sanctions being imposed 
against those regimes that are willing to resist the sender’s threat in the first stage, 
whereas we do not observe instances of sanctions against regimes that choose to comply 
with the sender (Drezner, 2003; Morgan and Miers, 1999; Smith, 1995).
39
 
                                                          
39
 In these instances, the mere threat of sanctions might have been enough to achieve a target’s 
compliance.  
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The main focus of my thesis lies on the outcome equation of the two-stage Heckman 
selection model. This equation uses the imposition of sanctions as the dependent 
variable, where SANCTION is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if 
sanctions are imposed against a countryi in a given yeart, and the value 0 if no sanctions 
are imposed. While measuring SANCTION is relatively straightforward, a more 
problematic scenario arises with the operationalization of COMPLIANCE as the 
dependent variable of the selection equation.  
Measuring COMPLIANCE with a sender’s threat is methodologically and empirically 
challenging (Kingsbury, 1997; Raustiala and Slaughter, 2002). Firstly, since complying 
is associated with weakness and thus entails domestic political costs for an acquiescing 
target (Dorussen and Mo, 2001; Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008), it is 
generally difficult – if not impossible – to identify instances where a target regime 
openly backs down and agrees with the sender’s terms (Drezner, 2003; Morgan and 
Miers, 1999). Even when compliance occurs, agreements between the sender and the 
target are likely to take place behind closed doors and hence, neither side might publicly 
acknowledge the target’s compliance. Secondly, even in cases where a target publicly 
admits to have altered its behaviour, it remains complicated to track the causal link 
between a threat being made and a target’s compliance being observed. In fact, targets 
rarely have incentives to back down publicly and are therefore likely to justify the 
change of behaviour on different reasons other than acquiescing with the sender’s 
demands. Lastly, since the goals of sanctions are often multidimensional and might vary 
over time, it becomes difficult to confirm whether the original goals of sanctions have 
actually been achieved.  
Bearing these limitations in mind, I construct a binary indicator of COMPLIANCE 
using the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al., 2015; Wood and Gibney, 2010), a 5 level 
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scale that measures the level of political violence experienced in a country, where 1 
stands for no politically motivated violence and 5 stands for widespread violence and 
violations of human rights. For easiness of interpretation, I invert the PTS scale and 
code an observation 0 (non-compliance) if a country scored 1 in a given year. 
Alternatively, a country scoring 2 or more in the inverted PTS in a given year is coded 1 
(compliance).   
A few remarks regarding this measure of “compliance” are necessary. First of all, 
although a regime’s level of respect for human rights does not directly reflect whether a 
target is complying with a sender’s demand or with the latter’s threat of sanctions, my 
decision to use this indicator as a proxy of compliance is driven by the difficulty to trace 
whether a target’s respect for human rights and democratic principles is a direct 
response to a sender’s demands or threat of sanctions. Indeed, by the same token that it 
is very difficult to identify instances where a sender issues a threat of sanctions (see 
above), it is challenging to identify instances where a target complies with a sender and 
improves its respect for human rights and democratic principles.  
Thus, my choice to employ a country’s level of respect for human rights as a proxy of 
compliance is a partial – albeit imperfect – solution to address this empirical challenge. 
My decision to rely on the Political Terror Scale rather than on any other indicator is 
motivated by two considerations. First, as opposed to other indicators such as the 
Freedom House or the Polity IV Scale which measure a regime’s level of freedom or 
democracy, the Political Terror Scale is much more precise in its scope and in its 
accuracy, thereby reducing potential measurement error. Second, the latter two scales 
also correlate highly with the regime type dummies (the main independent variables of 
the thesis), thereby increasing the risk of multicollinearity in my analysis.  
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A second issue regarding my measure of compliance relates to the threshold that I 
choose to code a regime’s compliance. Although, admittedly, my coding implies that 
only the worst violators of human rights will qualify as non-compliant, this threshold is 
chosen to make sure that my indicator captures a very restrictive notion of non-
compliance that does not lump together cases that are very different from each other.
40
 
By only considering cases where target regimes show no respect for human rights, I can be sure 
that my measure divides countries between “clear violators” of human rights – and hence, non-
compliant –, and the “rest” of regimes, which are more or less compliant. This strict 
dichotomous operationalization mitigates the measurement error, which in turn leads to better 
estimates (i.e. lower standard errors). 
A third issue concerns the fact that my measure does not capture actual changes in the level of 
respect for human rights, but rather absolute levels of respect. Indeed, my measure does not 
capture whether a country has improved its respect of human rights with regard to the last year, 
which could arguably be seen as a sign of compliance. Although capturing the variation in a 
regime’s level of respect for human rights between two years might be an appealing choice, my 
decision to use the absolute level of respect for human rights follows two considerations. First, 
the Political Terror Scale does not show much variation in regimes’ respect of human rights 
between two years and, therefore, the cases that would qualify as compliant are relatively few in 
comparison to those that qualify as non-compliant. Using an alternative scale like the Physical 
Integrity Index does not solve this issue either, as it contains many missing observations 
that leads to a considerable loss of observations in my regression models.
41
 Second, 
using the change in the level of respect of human rights is also problematic for the 
                                                          
40
 I also test other thresholds coding COMPLIANCE 1 if a country scores above 2 in the PTS in a given 
year. The sensitivity of my measure is discussed in the Table 4.7 of the annex. Finally, I also employ the 
Physical Integrity Index (Cingranelli and Richards, 2010) as a robustness test, and the results are similar. 
The results are available from the author on request. 
41
 Considering the relatively small size of my sample, this loss of observations can have an important 
effect on the results and bias my estimates.  
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models that I employ, as the iterations of my logarithmic models are not concave. It is 
for these reasons that I decide to rely on the absolute level of human rights respect.  
In sum, my variable compliance is an imperfect but useful approximation to capture 
potential selection effects of targets that comply with the sender in the threat stage of 
my model. Although, admittedly, this option is suboptimal in several respects, and 
despite the practical and methodological problems that it faces, my approach is the first 
attempt in the literature to use a two-stage model to capture selection effects in the 
imposition of sanctions. Indeed, although the main concern of this thesis is to identify 
whether variation in the imposition of sanctions exists (i.e. in the second stage), I also 
make an effort to at least capture some of the variation that takes place in the first (or 
threat) stage of the sanctions game. 
Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables of the two equations, I 
employ a heckprobit regression model (Agresti, 2013; Long and Freese 2014), where 
the selection stage models a target’s “compliance” with the EU’s threat and the outcome 
stage models the EU’s “imposition of sanctions”. Following conventional practice in the 
sanctions literature, I lag the independent variables by one year to reduce endogeneity 
problems. All models use entropy weights and robust standard errors clustered on 
country. Finally, to model time dependence I include cubic polynomials of the time 
elapsed since the last “compliance” or “sanctions” event occurred in the selection and 
the outcome equations respectively (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Formally, the first 
stage or selection equation can be written as 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝐿𝐼𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 − 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑋1 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑗 + 𝑡 + 𝑡
2
+ 𝑡3 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡 
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where COMPLIANCE is a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the values 0 or 1, 
𝛼0  is the intercept, 𝛽1 − 𝛽3  are the regression coefficients of the main independent 
variables, 𝛽4 𝑋1 𝑖𝑡  are the coefficients of a group of covariates that appear in the 
selection equation but not in the outcome equation, 𝜔𝑗 are region fixed effects, 𝑡 − 𝑡
3 
are time polynomials to account for time dependence, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
The specification of the second stage or outcome equation of the Heckprobit model is 
 
𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼1 + 𝛾1𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖 − 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝑋2 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜔𝑗 + 𝑡 + 𝑡
2 + 𝑡3
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where SANCTION is a dichotomous dependent variable that takes the values 0 and 1, 
𝛼1 is the intercept, γ1-γ3 are the regression coefficients of the main independent 
variables, 𝛾4 𝑋2 𝑖𝑡  are the coefficients of a group of independent variables that only 
appear in the second stage of the model, 𝜔𝑗  are region fixed effects, 𝑡 − 𝑡
3  are time 
polynomials to account for time dependence, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
 
4.4. Empirical results 
The results of different specifications of the Heckman selection model are presented in 
Table 4.1. The table is divided into odd-numbered and even-numbered columns, where 
the former display the coefficients of the selection stage and the latter present those of 
the outcome stage. The main independent variable is “multi-party” regimes, while 
“strong” regimes are chosen as the baseline category. Columns 1 and 2 introduce the 
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most basic formulation of my model, where I test the likelihood that different types of 
regimes are sanctioned by the EU. I then compare the fit of my model with other 
explanations of the literature. First, I control for the sender’s economic leverage vis-à-
vis a target (model 2); then I account for the salience of the target regime’s violation 
(model 3); the fourth model controls for the target’s instability; the fifth model controls 
for the sender’s costs; and, finally, the last model presents the full model with all the 
controls. As can be read from the p-values at the bottom the table, the selection and 
outcome equations are correlated at statistically significant levels in all models, thus 
confirming that the use of a Heckman two-stage selection model is indeed appropriate.
42
 
 
4.4.1. Compliance 
The results of the first stage of the Heckman selection model provide strong support for 
hypothesis 1 and confirm that weak autocratic regimes with large W are more likely to 
comply with the threat of sanctions than their stronger counterparts. As can be seen in 
the odd-numbered columns of Table 4.1, the coefficient for multi-party regimes is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level and shows that multi-party regimes 
have a higher probability than strong regimes to acquiesce with the EU. This result 
confirms my expectation that multi-party regimes face incentives to reach a negotiated 
settlement with the sender during the threat stage in order to avoid being sanctioned.  
The coefficient for dominant regimes is also positive, suggesting that these regimes are 
also more likely to comply with the EU than strong regimes. However, compared to 
multi-party regimes, the coefficient only reaches marginal statistical significance at the 
                                                          
42
 I address the sensitivity of my results with regard to the measure of compliance in the robustness tests 
that I present in the annex. 
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10% level in the last model, even though it is close to statistical significance in all other 
models (p≈0.14). Thus, this relationship provides some – albeit limited – evidence that 
these regimes are also more likely to comply with the EU at the threat stage. 
Finally, other regimes are also positively related to COMPLIANCE, yet the coefficients 
never reach statistical significance in the different model specifications. Consequently, 
the evidence cannot confirm that other types of regimes are more likely to comply with 
the EU’s threat than strong regimes.  
Another noteworthy result is the positive coefficient of the variable Exports/GDP in the 
COMPLIANCE stages of all models, since the positive sign of the coefficient supports 
the game theoretic expectation that weak regimes that are highly dependent on the EU’s 
common market are more likely to comply with the EU before sanctions are imposed. 
However, there is no empirical evidence to support this argument is weak, as the 
coefficient is never statistically significant,
43
 although it comes close to statistical 
significance in some models (p≈0.12). Nevertheless, this result indicates that a vague 
relationship between a target’s exports-dependence from the EU and its COMPLIANCE 
exists. Substantially, this implies that commercially dependent countries are likely to 
calibrate their response to the EU’s threat accordingly and that, as a consequence, they 
will be less likely to be sanctioned by the EU. Methodologically, this result shows the 
relevance of modelling selection bias and supports the use of a two-stage Heckman 
selection model.  
On a different note, the results show that multi-party and dominant regimes that have 
signed a human rights clause with the EU are, on average, more likely to comply with 
                                                          
43
 The results are similar if I use the variables Imports/GDP or Trade/GDP instead of Exports/GDP. The 
results also hold if I use alternative measures of COMPLIANCE (see Table 4.7 of the annex) or if I run 
the COMPLIANCE stage alone. 
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EU demands. The coefficient for this variable is statistically significant at conventional 
levels in all models. The result reflects the relevance of the legal elements enshrined in 
the human rights clause, which allow the EU to take ‘appropriate measures’ if the other 
part of the agreement fails to meet its commitment to respect human rights and 
democratic principles (Bartels, 2005). However, it also suggests that countries that are 
bound by the clause are fearful of the consequences that might be imposed on them if 
they do not respect these principles (Donno, 2012). In this sense, the political 
conditionality enshrined in the clause seems to exert a dissuasive effect on third 
countries.   
Finally, the coefficient for GDP per capita is also positive but not statistically 
significant, implying that more developed countries are less likely to comply with the 
EU’s threat. Also, the coefficient for population is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that larger countries – probably because of their strength – are less likely to 
comply with the EU.
44
 
  
                                                          
44
 Due to serious multicollinearity between the variables GDP/capita and GDP, I control for the size of a 
country as a proxy for its economic strength. 
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Table 4.1. Heckprobit selection model. Compliance and sanctions imposition 
 
  Base model  Sender leverage  Salience violation  Target instability  Sender costs  Full model 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
VARIABLES  Compliance Sanction  Compliance Sanction  Compliance Sanction  Compliance Sanction  Compliance Sanction  Compliance Sanction 
                   
Multi-party  0.465** -0.463*  0.477** -0.512*  0.466** -0.461*  0.464** -0.427+  0.500** -0.615*  0.502** -0.572** 
  (0.150) (0.220)  (0.153) (0.221)  (0.151) (0.210)  (0.154) (0.220)  (0.155) (0.239)  (0.158) (0.221) 
Dominant  0.293 -0.095  0.315 -0.208  0.293 -0.147  0.308 -0.125  0.329 -0.238  0.352+ -0.324 
  (0.202) (0.257)  (0.201) (0.252)  (0.201) (0.274)  (0.205) (0.260)  (0.207) (0.256)  (0.209) (0.266) 
Other  0.077 -0.252  0.090 -0.284  0.078 -0.249  0.057 -0.325  0.030 -0.345  0.058 -0.627 
  (0.212) (0.370)  (0.212) (0.344)  (0.211) (0.375)  (0.244) (0.571)  (0.225) (0.407)  (0.248) (0.641) 
Human rights   -0.561***   -0.595***   -0.552***   -0.568***   -0.615***   -0.628*** 
   (0.087)   (0.086)   (0.088)   (0.095)   (0.096)   (0.106) 
∆ Democracy   -0.201*   -0.216**   -0.190*   -0.234*   -0.198*   -0.209* 
   (0.081)   (0.079)   (0.096)   (0.094)   (0.082)   (0.102) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.075   0.066 0.081  0.075   0.079   0.095   0.093 0.054 
  (0.053)   (0.054) (0.066)  (0.053)   (0.055)   (0.059)   (0.059) (0.088) 
Aid/GDP (log)      -0.168**             
      (0.057)             
Coup d’état         0.220         0.267 
         (0.368)         (0.376) 
Monitors         0.152         0.203 
         (0.188)         (0.192) 
Vote fraud         0.050         -0.174 
         (0.289)         (0.291) 
Tenure            0.037      0.031 
            (0.028)      (0.027) 
Democratization            -0.122      -0.128 
            (0.088)      (0.089) 
Demonstration            0.083***      0.090*** 
            (0.019)      (0.022) 
GDP growth (log)            -0.252*      -0.278** 
            (0.107)      (0.100) 
Gas (log)               -0.091+   -0.078 
               (0.054)   (0.049) 
FDI/GDP (log)               0.004   0.074 
               (0.068)   (0.071) 
Trade volume (log)               0.136    
               (0.096)    
GDP (log)   0.012      0.016   -0.074       
   (0.053)      (0.053)   (0.063)       
Human rights clause  0.235*   0.233*   0.232*   0.258*   0.282**   0.304**  
  (0.105)   (0.110)   (0.105)   (0.109)   (0.107)   (0.112)  
GDP/cap (log)  0.108   0.079   0.108   0.126   0.124   0.144  
  (0.097)   (0.107)   (0.097)   (0.099)   (0.100)   (0.100)  
Population (log)  -0.109**   -0.111** -0.073  -0.109**   -0.097*   -0.098** -0.046  -0.086* -0.030 
  (0.039)   (0.040) (0.066)  (0.039)   (0.041)   (0.037) (0.095)  (0.039) (0.091) 
Constant  3.460** 2.150+  3.785** 4.131**  3.461** 1.977  3.123** 4.241**  2.973** 0.885  2.614* 2.945+ 
  (1.070) (1.282)  (1.174) (1.542)  (1.071) (1.290)  (1.173) (1.524)  (1.066) (1.677)  (1.155) (1.632) 
                   
Observations  1,604  1,584  1,604  1,558  1,519  1,481 
Countries  106  104  106  106  102  102 
Chi2  188.0  193.6  216.0  214.3  185.3  322.0 
Prob>chi2  0.0003  0.0006  0.0015  0.0017  0.0028  0.0393 
Log pseudolikelihood  -332.934  -326.976  -332.384  -317.714  -322.492  -307.337 
Time polynomials  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes. 
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4.4.2. Imposition of sanctions 
The findings become more interesting in the second stage of the Heckman model, which tests 
hypothesis 2 regarding the likelihood that regimes with small W are sanctioned more often 
than those with large W. The models of Table 4.1 test different assumptions made in the 
literature. First, I present the base model in column 2. This model regresses the dependent 
variable SANCTION on the main independent variable autocratic regime type, whilst 
controlling for the respect of human rights, the quick deterioration or improvement of 
democracy, and the GDP of the target country.  
The results of the outcome stage of the Heckman selection model provide strong support to 
my theoretical argument that multi-party regimes are less likely to be sanctioned than strong 
regimes. As I expect, the coefficient for multi-party regimes is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better in all models.
45
 Importantly, this result holds in all models 
regardless of the model specification, and even when I control for other possible explanations 
regarding the imposition of sanctions. Moreover, the strength of my results is corroborated by 
several robustness checks where I run different models and include additional controls.
46
 
Thus, this finding confirms my theoretical argument that selection effects are present at the 
target regime’s level and that these are mediated by its domestic institutional setting. Most 
importantly, the use of a two-stage Heckman selection model shows that an important 
variation in the EU’s sanctioning practice exists, and that weak regimes with large W like 
multi-party regimes are systematically less likely to be punished than their stronger 
counterparts with small W because the former comply with the EU during the threat stage, 
whereas the latter prefer to defy it.  
                                                          
45
 The only exception is model 4, where the coefficient is almost significant at the 5% level (p≈0.053). 
46
 The results remain similar if I run the sanctions imposition stage alone. In addition, I have also run models 
with country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and country random effects. The results remain identical and are 
displayed in Table 4.8 in the annex. Finally, I have also run rare events logistic regressions (King and Zeng, 
2001). The results are available from the author on request.  
137 
 
The results also show that dominant and other regimes are negatively related to SANCTION 
in all models, suggesting that they are also less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes. 
However, while the sign of the coefficients points to the predicted relationship, the 
coefficients of these regime type categories do not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance in any of the models. Therefore, not enough statistical evidence exists to 
corroborate that these regimes are also less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes.  
Besides the effect of regime type on the probability of being sanctioned, high levels of human 
rights are negatively and strongly related to the imposition of sanctions, reaching statistical 
significance at the 0.001 level in all models. Thus, countries that employ state-sponsored 
violence indiscriminately against their own population are sanctioned more often than 
regimes that do not violate human rights. The same is true for countries that have experienced 
a sudden change in the level of democracy. As the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient of ∆ Democracy evidences, countries that have improved their level of democracy 
in the last year are less likely to be sanctioned, whilst those where democracy has 
experienced a sudden deterioration are more likely to be targeted with EU sanctions.
47
 
Turning to the second model regarding the sender’s economic leverage, a target’s commercial 
dependence on the EU does not seem to matter in the EU’s decision to impose sanctions. 
Indeed, the coefficient for Exports/GDP is positive and not significant.
48
 However, it is 
possible that this result is tempered by the inclusion of Exports/GDP in the first stage of the 
                                                          
47
 To some extent, the statistically significant and strong relationship between SANCTION and Human rights 
and between SANCTION and ∆ Democracy could be anticipated, since my analysis focuses on those measures 
that the EU imposed to address human rights and democratic shortcomings in target countries. 
48
 The results become statistically significant if I employ a target’s imports (Imports/GDP) or overall trade 
dependence (Trade/GDP) on the EU. In those cases, the relationship is positive and significant, implying that 
countries that are commercially dependent on the EU are more likely to be sanctioned. However, the 
coefficients do not reach statistical significance when I drop Aid/GDP from the model, thus suggesting that the 
results might be driven by multicollinearity. The results are available from the author.  
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Heckman model and hence, that it is simply reflecting that commercially dependent targets 
are more prone to comply with the sender at the threat stage.  
Also interesting is the negative and statistically significant coefficient for Aid/GDP.
49
 This 
result shows that target regimes that are dependent on EU aid are less likely to be sanctioned. 
The finding is theoretically relevant, since the negative sign seems to suggest that EU 
leverage is indeed effective in achieving the compliance of autocratic regimes which are 
heavily dependent on its aid (Donno, 2012). However, this result does not hold if I include 
Aid/GDP in the compliance stage, as the coefficient is negative and not statistically 
significant.
50
 Thus, the statistically significance of the coefficient needs to be interpreted 
differently. One possible explanation is that EU aid is allocated strategically and that 
countries that receive large amounts of development assistance are allies of the EU or of its 
member states or are of strategic importance to them (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Carey, 2007; 
Crawford, 1997; Del Biondo, 2011; Neumeyer, 2003; Perkins and Neumayer, 2010). As a 
consequence, they are sanctioned less frequently than countries with which the sender has a 
hostile relation (Drezner, 1998, 1999; Nielsen, 2013). Unfortunately however, it is not 
possible to corroborate either of these arguments with my model, and additional research and 
data would be required to test this explanation. 
The next model (Column 6) displays the result of controlling for the salience of a target’s 
violation. As it can be seen, none of the variables reaches statistical significance. A surprising 
finding that contradicts other studies other studies which claim that Western countries are 
more likely to impose sanctions against salient violations like coups or flawed elections 
                                                          
49
 Since GDP is highly correlated with Aid/GDP (-0.61), I use the variable population to control for the size of a 
country instead. 
50
 The results are available from the author on request. 
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(Laakso et al., 2006; Saltnes, 2013) is that neither the staging of coups d’état,51 nor the 
rigging of elections seem to predict the imposition of EU sanctions. Although both 
coefficients are positively related to SANCTION, they do not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. This mismatch between my results and the findings of other studies 
might simply point precisely to the presence of selection bias in the study of sanctions 
imposition. Noteworthy, studies that find a correlation between the salience of a target’s 
violation and the EU’s imposition of sanctions tend to focus on cases where the outcome of 
the bargaining process led to the use of economic statecraft. Thus, it is likely that the cases 
analysed in these studies are strong regimes that self-select themselves into sanctions and that 
this correlation disappears when other control cases are included in the analysis. 
Finally, the model also shows that the presence of international monitors during the holding 
of elections is positively related to SANCTION, but the result is not statistically significant. 
The positive sign suggests that the presence of monitors does not exert a dissuasive effect on 
the behaviour of autocrats, but that monitors provide senders with reliable information about 
the situation on the ground and increase thereby the likelihood that sanctions are imposed. 
However, the lack of conclusive evidence to corroborate this claim might simply imply that 
the presence of international observers only affects the enforcement of sanctions under 
specific scenarios. As Donno (2010) suggests, enforcement might be more likely when the 
geopolitical relevance of a target regime is not high for a sender, or when the monitoring 
mission’s verdict about the quality of the elections is conclusive and provides overwhelming 
evidence about the target regime’s wrongdoing. In any case, the inclusion of these control 
variables does not alter my results.  
                                                          
51
 I also control for “successful coups d’état”, but the coefficient does not reach statistical significance either.  
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Model 4 (column 8) controls for a target’s domestic (in)stability. This model provides 
evidence that targets self-select themselves into sanctions, but also that senders pick their 
targets selectively. First, the model shows that regimes facing many anti-government 
demonstrations are more likely to be sanctioned. This finding can be interpreted in two 
different lights. One the one hand, senders might regard popular upheavals against a target 
regime as a sign of weakness and as an opportunity to push for regime change (Drury, 1998; 
Hufbauer et al., 2007; Soest and Wahman, 2015). For instance, some analysts have portrayed 
the imposition of sanctions against Viktor Yanukovich’s brutal repression of the Maidan 
demonstrators in Ukraine in this light (Satell, 2014). On the other hand however, it is also 
possible that senders impose sanctions to signal their disapproval of the target regime’s 
policies, and to increase the target’s regime cost of non-compliance. In this regard, the EU’s 
sanctions against Uzbekistan in 2005 following the regime’s crackdown of the 
demonstrations are a good example of such a scenario.  
The model also shows that countries that are growing economically are less likely to be 
sanctioned. Indeed, GDP growth is negatively related to SANCTION and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Although it is difficult to make sense of this result, it might imply 
that a target’s economic health dissuades the EU from initiating a coercion attempt. In this 
sense, the EU might regard the target’s economic performance as a sign of the latter’s 
strength, and therefore it might anticipate that the target will not yield even if sanctions are 
imposed.  
The negative but not statistically significant coefficient for democratization is also relevant, 
as it implies that a country’s long-term democratization process is unrelated to the EU’s 
decision to impose sanctions.
52
 Finally, the model also provides evidence that an autocratic 
                                                          
52
 Nevertheless, the result comes close to statistical significance at p=0.16. 
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regime’s tenure is positively related to SANCTION, but does not reach statistical significance 
(p≈0.12). Although it cannot be confirmed, this result points to the existence of selection bias, 
as leaders who have been in power for many years are likely to exert a tighter control of their 
domestic political institutions and be in a powerful position vis-à-vis its domestic challengers. 
Thus, autocrats who have been in office for prolonged periods of time are well aware of their 
strength and ability to withstand sanctions, being thereby more likely to self-select 
themselves into sanctions.  
Moving on to the fifth model (column 10) which controls for the costs to the sender, the 
results show that the existence of large reserves of gas is negatively related to SANCTION. 
The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level and provides some evidence that 
countries that possess large reserves of gas are less likely to be sanctioned. However, the 
weakness of this relation cannot fully corroborate the assumption that the EU is reluctant to 
use tough measures against countries it depends on for the import of fossil fuels (Warkotsch, 
2006, 2011; Youngs, 2008a). The coefficient of oil (not shown here due to multicollinearity 
problems with the variable gas) is positive, but does not come close to conventional levels of 
statistical significance.
53
  
Furthermore, large stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) are not correlated with the EU’s 
decision to impose sanction either, as the coefficient is positive but not even close to 
statistical significance. This result is somewhat counterintuitive as one would expect 
businesses to lobby against sanctions if these affect their interests (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 
1988, 1992). Nevertheless, it is possible to explain this result it in two ways. First, the 
                                                          
53
 This result is likely to be driven by missing observations, as most of the regimes in the Middle East who are 
important oil producers are monarchies and thus drop automatically from the models due to no variation of the 
dependent variable. 
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aggregate data employed
54
 makes it difficult to ascertain whether countries that are 
sanctioned are net recipients of large amounts of EU FDI, or whether FDI originates mainly 
from non-EU countries. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether EU businesses are 
being negatively affected by sanctions or not.
55
 Second, the positive effect might be 
explained by the behaviour of third countries in replacing the EU’s investment in a targeted 
country. As Lektzian and Biglaiser (2013) have noted, third countries’ investors behave 
opportunistically and are keen to replace the investment of sender countries quickly after 
sanctions have been imposed.  
Finally, the EU’s aggregate volume of trade with a target country is positively related to 
sanctions, but is not statistically significant. Thus, high levels of trade do not seem to matter 
in the EU’s decision to impose sanctions, and my model cannot corroborate the claim made 
in qualitative studies that the EU is less likely to sanction countries where it has important 
commercial interests (Brummer, 2009; Hyde-Price, 2006; Youngs, 2004). However, this 
result might only be disguising the fact that trade relations matter at the member states’ level, 
and not at the aggregate level. In other words, it is possible that commercial linkages count at 
the level of the EU’s member states, as EU countries diverge in their geographical and 
cultural trade linkages and preferences. However, since controlling how the individual 
member states’ commercial interests affects the EU’s decision to impose sanctions goes far 
beyond the possibilities of my models, I will pay attention to this issue in the qualitative case 
studies of Chapters 5 and 6.   
Finally, it is possible that sanctions imposed against one country might increase the 
probability that neighbouring countries will be sanctioned, too. As often occurs with 
                                                          
54
 My model employs World Bank data, which measure the net inflows of FDI in current $US in a country in a 
given year (World Bank, 2014b). Unfortunately, no reliable data on EU FDI in third countries was available at 
the time of writing. 
55
 A different way to interpret this could be to think that the EU is willing to sanction a third country to protect 
the investment of its businesses. 
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democratization processes (Huntington, 1993; Whitehead, 2001), it is feasible that instability 
in one country spills over to neighbouring countries, and that as a consequence, the latter end 
up being targeted with sanctions as well. Examples of such scenarios include the Arab 
Spring, the conflicts in West Africa or the war in the Former Yugoslavia. To control for 
spatial interdependence and for the possibility that sanctions may cluster by region, I have 
run a model with a variable that controls for the cumulative number of sanctions imposed in a 
particular region over time. The coefficient of this variable however is negative and not 
significant, meaning that sanctions do not cluster by region and do not influence the EU’s 
decision to employ sanctions.
56
  
 
4.4.3. Magnitude of the effect 
Table 4.2 shows the substantive effect of the independent variables on the imposition of 
sanctions. The results are obtained using Stata’s program Clarify (King, Tomz and 
Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003) and display the substantive effect of 
those independent variables that are statistically significant in the model and whose effect is 
also statistically significant. The second column of Table 4.2 shows the probability 
(percentage) of being sanctioned when moving from the minimum to the maximum value of 
each explanatory variable whilst holding all other variables of the model to their mean or 
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 These results are available from the author. Since this variable is skewed to the right, I have also run models 
with the natural log of the cumulative number of sanctions by region. The results do not change. I also test 
whether the distance between a target regime’s capital and Brussels matters in the EU’s imposition of sanctions 
using the CEPII’s dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). This indicator is often employed to capture other types of 
linkages that might influence the sender’s decision to impose sanctions (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008). 
However, the coefficient is negative and not statistically significant, implying that the distance between the EU 
and the target regime does not influence the EU’s decision to impose sanctions.  
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modal values. All categorical variables are set to their mode, whilst all continuous variables 
are fixed at their means.
57
 
 
Table 4.2. Magnitude of the effect on the imposition of sanctions 
Variable Effect Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Multi-party -25.34 0.092 -0.433 -0.075 
Demonstration 16.61 0.736 0.040 0.329 
Aid/GDP (log) -29.27 0.237 -0.714 0.194 
∆ Democracy -49.29 0.290 -0.880 0.202 
Human rights -58.05 0.125 -0.785 -0.304 
GDP growth (log) -27.39 0.182 -0.624 0.079 
Source: Own elaboration. Categorical variables set to their modal value, continuous variables to their 
mean. Changes measure the effect of moving from the minimum to the maximum value of the 
explanatory variables. These variables are statistically significant in at least one of the model 
specifications. The baseline category is strong regimes. 
 
First and foremost, the results show that multi-party regimes are 25% less likely to be 
sanctioned than strong regimes when holding all other variables at their mean/mode. This 
effect is substantive and shows the importance of domestic institutions in determining the 
likelihood that autocratic regimes are sanctioned. In addition, countries facing 6 or more anti-
government demonstrations a year have almost 34% more chances of being sanctioned than 
those countries without protests. Table 4.2 also shows that countries that are heavily 
dependent on EU aid are 29% less likely to be sanctioned than countries that are not aid 
dependent when holding all other variables constant. This strong effect suggests that selection 
effects are operating in the EU’s imposition of sanctions, as countries on which the EU exerts 
a big leverage are more likely to comply in the threat stage and therefore are less prone to be 
punished. Moreover, countries that are experiencing economic growth are 27% less likely to 
be sanctioned than those countries whose economy is contracting.   
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 The confidence intervals are relatively large as a consequence of the low number of observations of 
sanctioned countries in the dataset. 
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Finally, the results illustrate that countries that show higher respect for human rights are 58% 
less likely to be sanctioned than those regimes that systematically violate the rights of their 
citizens. Moreover, countries that have experienced a sudden improvement in the level of 
democracy are 49% less likely to be sanctioned than those countries where the level of 
democracy has deteriorated most.  
The effect of sudden changes in the level of democracy is relatively large and needs further 
clarification, as it might be pointing to the fact that regimes with large W are more likely to 
be on the way of democratization. As a consequence, it is possible that the EU refrains from 
sanctioning these regimes to avoid any disruption in the process. In fact, the EU might be 
aware that sanctions can have a negative effect on democratizing countries’ regimes and 
other instruments like positive conditionality, incentives and engagement might be a better 
strategy to foster political liberalization (Ethier, 2003; Levitsky and Way, 2005).  
Moreover, some scholars have claimed that the electoral competition present in multi-party 
regimes makes them more likely to democratize than other types of autocratic regimes 
(Brownlee, 2009; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Although ‘the assumption that hybrid regimes 
are (or should be) moving in a democratic direction lacks empirical foundation’ (Levitsky 
and Way, 2010: 4), I carry out an additional robustness test to rule out this possibility. Table 
4.3 below displays the bivariate correlation between one-year (∆ Democracy) and five-year 
average changes in the level of democracy (Democratization) and the size of the W and/or the 
autocratic regime type categories respectively. As it can be read from the table, regimes with 
large W are positively correlated with sudden changes in democracy (∆ Democracy) at 
statistically significant levels, even though the strength of the correlation is relatively weak 
(β=0.15). Furthermore, the correlation between ∆ Democracy and multi-party is also positive, 
but the strength of the coefficient is even weaker (β=0.01) and not statistically significant.  
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Table 4.3. Bivariate correlation between democratization, regime type, and W 
  ∆ Democracy Democratization W 
  
   W 0.148*** 0.02 1 
Multi-party 0.01 0.03 0.55*** 
Dominant 0.04 0.04 -0.13*** 
Strong -0.04 -0.07** -0.40*** 
Other 0.02 0.01 -0.09*** 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
 
Source: Own elaboration. ∆ Democracy measures sudden changes in the level of democracy between 
yeart and yeart-1, whereas Democratization measures the moving average of the level of democracy 
between yeart and yeart-5. 
 
To control whether some regimes are more likely to democratize, I run additional regressions 
that interact multi-party with ∆ Democracy (Multi-party*∆Democracy) and democratization 
(Multi-party*Democratization) respectively. If regimes with large W (i.e. multi-party 
regimes) are indeed more likely to be democratizing – and thus, less likely to be sanctioned –, 
we should expect the interaction terms to be negatively related to the imposition of sanctions 
at statistically significant levels. The results of these models
58
 however show that the 
interaction terms are negative but never close to statistical significance. Thus, the assumption 
that multi-party regimes are less likely to be sanctioned by the EU because they are more 
prone to democratize does not hold the empirical test.
59
  
Consequently, the large effect of ∆ Democracy needs to be explained differently. First, it is 
still feasible to believe that the EU might be reluctant to sanction democratizing countries, as 
sanctions may undermine rather than contribute to a target’s process of political liberalization 
(Peksen and Drury, 2010). If this is the case however, the EU’s decision will be unrelated to 
the type of autocratic regime. Second, the strong effect might also be the result of autocrats in 
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 The results are available from the author. 
59
 I have also run models that interact the size of the W with democratization, but the results are not statistically 
significant either. 
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democratizing countries being weak leaders who have to provide public goods to remain in 
power. In the absence of natural resources or large amounts of foreign aid, autocrats can only 
increase the provision of public goods by democratizing (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 
2009; Wright, 2009). In fact, democratization processes are often led by new office holders 
who undertake reforms in order to provide public goods to a larger W and strengthen their 
position at home in return (Baccini and Urpelainen, 2014a, b; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 
2006; Schimmelfennig, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).  
 
4.5. Additional evidence 
So far, my results have confirmed the expectations of the first and the second stage of the 
sanctions tree by empirically corroborating hypotheses 1 and 2. This section deals with the 
third stage of the game tree and tests the additional hypotheses 3 and 4, which focus on the 
effect of sanctions on autocratic regimes once negative measures have been imposed. 
 
4.5.1. Duration of sanctions 
Recall that Hypothesis 3 states that autocratic regimes with large W should be targeted for 
shorter periods of time. On the one hand, dictators with large W should recognize that they 
have misinterpreted the credibility of the EU’s threat and should, accordingly, rectify and 
acquiesce with the EU early after sanctions have been imposed. On the other hand, strong 
regimes with small W should be more likely to face longer spells of sanctions, as they are 
more willing to resist sanctions than to alter their behaviour and comply (Dorussen and Mo, 
2001; Hovi et al., 2005). In brief, I expect sanctions to last shorter when imposed against 
multi-party regimes than when used against strong regimes.  
148 
 
Graph 4.4 provides descriptive information about the duration of sanctions according to 
regime type. The blue bar of each regime type category (left) shows descriptive statistics 
about the duration of sanctions when non-sanctioned regimes are included, while the red bar 
(right) shows the duration of sanctions when the latter are excluded. As can be seen from the 
graph, the mean duration of sanctions is much lower for multi-party, dominant and other 
regime types when compared with strong regimes like military or one-party regimes.  
While weak autocratic regimes like multi-party and dominant regimes are on average 
sanctioned 2.05 and 3.39 years respectively, strong regimes like one-party and military 
regimes face an average sanctions spell of over 6.78 years.
60
 The differences between regime 
types are revealing. As Graph 4.4 neatly shows, the mean duration of sanctions is much 
higher for strong regimes than for any other regime type independently of whether non-
sanctioned regimes (“zero” cases) are included or not. Moreover, it is interesting to note that 
the duration of sanctions is also higher for dominant than for multi-party regimes. Although 
this seems to suggest that dominant regimes do indeed differ in their strength towards 
sanctions as compared to their multi-party counterparts, this difference is not statistically 
significant.     
 
  
                                                          
60
 It is difficult to make sense of the statistics for the category “other” regimes, as it encompasses regimes like 
Somalia, Libya, Iraq or Iran. These regimes are hardly similar in any respect and, as such, it is not possible to 
make inferences from this category.   
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Graph 4.4. Average duration of sanctions (mean) by regime type 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Further evidence showing that strong regimes face longer spells of sanctions is provided in 
Graph 4.5, which illustrates the duration of sanctions by regime type. As the left hand side of 
the graph shows, strong regimes are sanctioned for much longer spells than multi-party, 
dominant, or other regimes, with the longest case – China – being sanctioned for over 20 
years.
61
 The right hand-side of Graph 4.5 displays the duration of sanctions by regime type as 
a percentage of the number of regimes sanctioned within a regime type category. As can be 
clearly seen, most sanctions imposed against multi-party (46%) and dominant (almost 34%) 
regimes last only one year, whereas this percentage is much lower for strong regimes (18%). 
                                                          
61
 Graph 4.5 excludes all zeros to make the graph easy to read (i.e. it only includes cases of regimes that were 
actually sanctioned). 
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This difference suggests that strong regimes are, on average, less likely to comply with the 
sender early during a sanctions episode than multi-party or dominant regimes.  
 
Graph 4.5. Duration of sanctions by regime type  
 
Source: Own elaboration. Graphs only include cases where sanctions were imposed. 
 
To test hypothesis 3 I employ a zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression. Using this 
model instead of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression makes sense for three reasons. 
First, as shown in Graph 4.5, the dependent variable DURATION is a count that measures the 
number of years where sanctions are in place. Second, DURATION is also overdispersed and 
largely skewed to the right. And third, as Graph 4.8 (see annex) clearly evidences, the excess 
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of zeros in the variable DURATION can seriously bias the OLS estimate (Agresti, 2013; 
Long and Freese 2014).
62
 
The results of the ZINB regressions are displayed in table 4.4 below. The DURATION of 
sanctions is the dependent variable in the different model specifications. As explained above, 
DURATION is a count that measures the number of years that sanctions are in place. 
Importantly, if a change in the type of regime has occurred in a country, the count is set to 
one again. This adjustment is necessary to take into account the domestic constraints that 
dictators face under different institutional settings. Finally, the models include region fixed 
effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity within regions and a lagged dependent 
variable to control for time dependence.  
 
                                                          
62
 I have also run Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models with the natural log of DURATION as the 
dependent variable, but the log transformation does not help to normalize the variable. In addition, I have run 
models using negative binomial regressions to make sure that my results are not model dependent. The results 
hold regardless of the model specification (see Table 4.9 of the annex). Finally, I have also run models only with 
sanctioned observations. Overall, the results hold, although the models are very sensitive to the loss of 
observations. The results of these models can be seen in Table 4.10 of the annex. 
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Table 4.4. Duration of sanctions 
 Base model Sender leverage Salience Target instability Sender cost Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration 
       
Multi-party -0.679* -0.920** -0.684* -0.984** -0.870** -1.146*** 
 (0.276) (0.317) (0.281) (0.301) (0.310) (0.302) 
Dominant -0.236 -0.413 -0.277 -0.444+ -0.332 -0.677* 
 (0.282) (0.272) (0.297) (0.255) (0.306) (0.301) 
Other -0.776+ -0.908* -0.771+ -0.784* -0.878* -1.003*** 
 (0.412) (0.406) (0.410) (0.350) (0.387) (0.288) 
Human rights -0.535* -0.546** -0.556** -0.303 -0.444* -0.294 
 (0.235) (0.201) (0.214) (0.187) (0.225) (0.276) 
∆ Democracy -0.219** -0.237*** -0.178** -0.180* -0.208** -0.170+ 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.060) (0.085) (0.065) (0.088) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.134    0.175 
  (0.087)    (0.170) 
Aid/GDP (log)  -0.272**     
  (0.088)     
Coup d’état   0.446   -0.180 
   (0.334)   (0.416) 
Monitors   0.017   0.098 
   (0.249)   (0.242) 
Vote fraud   0.369   0.408+ 
   (0.304)   (0.236) 
Democratization    -0.279*  -0.281* 
    (0.124)  (0.112) 
Demonstration    0.026  0.019 
    (0.035)  (0.036) 
Tenure    -0.175***  -0.214*** 
    (0.052)  (0.054) 
GDP growth (log)    -0.043  -0.035 
    (0.107)  (0.108) 
Gas (log)     -0.109 -0.036 
     (0.085) (0.089) 
FDI/GDP (log)     -0.185 -0.106 
     (0.115) (0.106) 
Trade volume (log)     0.328* -0.014 
     (0.130) (0.268) 
Population (log)  -0.134+    -0.071 
  (0.081)    (0.287) 
GDP (log) -0.032  -0.027 -0.058 -0.278+  
 (0.076)  (0.077) (0.075) (0.149)  
LDV 0.518*** 0.448*** 0.526*** 0.525*** 0.484*** 0.533*** 
 (0.147) (0.122) (0.147) (0.124) (0.127) (0.129) 
Constant 1.072 3.344+ 0.940 2.483 0.942 1.416 
 (1.888) (1.795) (1.906) (1.792) (2.431) (2.282) 
       
 Inflate 
       
Human rights 1.855*** 1.900*** 1.867*** 1.752* 2.076*** 1.708+ 
 (0.518) (0.528) (0.505) (0.732) (0.609) (1.022) 
GDP (log) 0.141 0.173 0.171 0.014 0.162 0.018 
 (0.267) (0.167) (0.418) (0.234) (0.204) (0.297) 
Constant -11.908 -11.925* -13.256 -6.606 -12.332* -6.372 
 (9.795) (4.785) (17.442) (8.550) (6.170) (11.560) 
Observations 1,598 1,547 1,598 1,493 1,475 1,376 
Countries 115 108 115 111 106 103 
Chi2 69.20 110.7 77.02 209.3 102.3 463.8 
Log pseudolikelihood -947.89 -905.747 -945.845 -860.838 -910.278 -808.641 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: strong regimes. 
 
  
153 
 
The results provide strong support for my argument and confirm hypothesis 3. In all models, 
the coefficient for multi-party regimes is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
or higher, confirming that multi-party regimes are sanctioned for shorter spells than strong 
regimes. This finding supports my claim that multi-party regimes are likely to have 
miscalculated the sender’s willingness to impose sanctions and thus seek to comply with the 
latter soon after sanctions have been enacted. Moreover, dominant regimes are also 
negatively related to DURATION and statistically significant in models 4 and 6. The 
coefficients become more significant in all models if I drop Belarus and Zimbabwe from the 
analysis, as the results improve to become statistically significant in most models (see Table 
4.11 in the annex). Dropping these two countries from the analysis makes sense, since they 
have been targeted by EU sanctions for many years. In fact, what the improvement of my 
results seems to suggest is that both Belarus and Zimbabwe are clear outliers as, according to 
my theoretical approach, they should have been more likely to comply with the EU. 
Importantly, this finding suggests that, when these two outliers are excluded from the 
analysis, dominant regimes also face shorter spells of sanctions. In addition, the coefficient of 
“other” regime types is also negative and significant at the 10% level or better in all models, 
indicating that these regimes face shorter spells of sanctions than strong regimes.  
Also worth mentioning is the negative and statistically significant coefficient of human 
rights. The more respect governments show for human rights, the shorter sanctions will be.
63
 
Furthermore, countries that experience a sudden improvement in the level of democracy are 
less likely to face long sanctions spells, providing further evidence that the EU seems to be 
wary about undermining processes of political liberalization through the use of punitive 
measures.  
                                                          
63
 The coefficient is not statistically significant in models 4 and 6, although it is close to statistical significance 
in model 6 (p≈.105). The results are likely to be driven by the big loss of 222 observations or 12 countries. For 
the size of my dataset, this is a substantial loss of information.  
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Turning to model 2, the results show that countries that are heavily dependent on EU aid are 
less likely to face long spells of sanctions. This seems to indicate that countries that are 
highly dependent on EU aid are more willing to comply earlier when sanctions have been 
imposed, showing in this way that the EU might be able to exert some leverage with its 
allocation of aid (Donno, 2012; Holden, 2009). Moreover, although Exports/GDP is 
positively related to DURATION, this result is not statistically significant.  
Model 3 controls for the salience of the violation and its incidence on the duration of 
sanctions. The results evidence that coups d’état and vote rigging are positively related to the 
length of sanctions, but their coefficients are not statistically significant. The positive sign of 
these coefficients seems to imply that regimes that are willing to commit fraud or break with 
the rule of law are likely to self-select themselves into sanctions and resist them for 
prolonged periods of time. The same is for regimes that allow international monitors to be 
present during the holding of elections in autocratic regimes. This coefficient is also 
positively related to DURATION but not statistically significant. However, not enough 
empirical evidence is available to sustain these claims.  
More interesting, model 4 introduces control variables regarding the political and economic 
stability of a target regime. An autocratic regime’s tenure is negatively related to 
DURATION and is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. This result could be interpreted 
as the EU’s reluctance to enter into a protracted dispute with a politically stable government. 
In this regard, the EU might have miscalculated a target’s resilience and opted to back down 
shortly after sanctions have been imposed.
64
 However, this is an interesting result that 
deserves further empirical scrutiny. Similarly, the results show that countries that are growing 
economically are less likely to face long sanctions spells, even though the coefficient never 
                                                          
64
 In the sanctions tree of chapter 2, this would eventually be the EU’s move in a fourth stage following the 
target’s willingness to resist (not shown in the tree). 
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reaches statistical significance.
65
 Model 4 also provides evidence that countries that have 
been democratizing over the previous five years face shorter sanctions spells on average. 
Lastly, the number of anti-government demonstrations that a regime faces is positive but 
statistically unrelated to the length of sanctions.  
Finally, model 5 controls for the cost of sanctions to the sender and provides some interesting 
findings. First and somewhat surprising, the absolute level of trade between the EU and a 
target state is positively related to DURATION and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This result is somewhat counterintuitive, as it suggests that countries that have higher levels 
of trade with the EU are more likely to face longer sanction spells. However, this result seems 
to be driven by the loss of observations and by its high collinearity with GDP. In fact, the 
coefficient for Trade volume is negative and not significant in model 6, and it is also not 
significant if I control for this variable in other model specifications.
66
 Moreover, model 5 
shows that FDI/GDP is negatively related to DURATION, but not statistically significant. 
Thus, while this result suggests that economically important countries are sanctioned for 
shorter periods of time, the evidence available cannot support this claim empirically. 
Similarly, the coefficient of a target’s gas reserves is also negative but not statistically 
significant. The negative sign implies that countries with large reserves of natural resources 
like gas are sanctioned for short periods of time, as the EU might be wary of losing access to 
valuable energy resources. Yet again, there is not sufficient empirical evidence to validate 
this claim. 
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 In an empirical analysis, Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) find that a target’s economic health is negatively 
related to the duration of sanctions, yet their result is not statistically significant either. 
66
 I have controlled for Trade volume in the other models, but it never reaches statistical significance. This 
robustness check seems to confirm that the statistical significance of Trade volume in model 5 is driven by 
missing data (about 13% observations and 10 countries less than model 1). 
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4.5.2. Destabilization of autocratic regimes 
While the results of table 4.4 corroborate my expectations that regimes with large W are more 
likely to be sanctioned for shorter spells than regimes with small W, it is possible that this 
might be caused by a sender’s sanctions fatigue or because sanctions are seriously affecting 
the material or strategic interests of EU member states (Youngs, 2004). Consequently, the EU 
or some of its member states might be willing to lift sanctions to reduce the damage to their 
own businesses. Although all the evidence presented so far seems to suggest the opposite, I 
run a last analysis to cast away any remaining doubts. In this last section of the chapter I test 
hypothesis 4, which claims that sanctions should be more likely to destabilize autocratic 
regimes with large W than those with small W. 
Table 4.5 presents some descriptive statistics on the length of a dictator’s tenure67 according 
to regime type. As the data shows, autocrats in multi-party regimes stay in office slightly less 
time than their counterparts, with an average length of 5.84 years in office. The median value 
of tenure is also lower (4 years in office) for multi-party regimes.
68
 Dictators in strong 
regimes have the longest tenures (7.67 years in office), whilst autocrats in dominant regimes 
are lagging behind with an average of 6.15 years. Interestingly though, when no sanctions are 
in place the median is only one year higher for strong regimes than for multi-party and 
dominant regimes. At the same time, the mean of tenure increases for all regime types, whilst 
the median remains largely the same in all cases and increases slightly in all cases but 
dominant regimes. 
 
                                                          
67
 I would like to thank Kristian Gleditsch and Henk Goemans for sharing a beta version of their updated 
Archigos (2009) dataset with me. 
68
 The only exception to this case is the median for “other” regimes, which is 4 years. However, it is difficult to 
make sense of this difference, as “other” is a residual category that encompasses very different types of 
autocratic regimes. This caveat aside, the low median of “other” regime types when sanctions are in place might 
reflect the high political instability of these regimes, as the Somalian case exemplifies.  
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Table 4.5. Tenure by regime type 
Regime type Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
       Multi-party             
All 680 5.84 4 4.678 1 23 
No sanctions 625 6.14 5 4.731 1 23 
Under sanctions 39 2.97 2 1.940 1 8 
       
Dominant             
All 360 6.15 5 4.940 1 19 
No sanctions 305 6.43 5 5.075 1 19 
Under sanctions 53 4.75 4 3.797 1 15 
Excl. Belarus 43 3.70 3 2.651 1 10 
Excl. Equatorial Guinea 43 4.58 3 3.966 1 15 
       Strong             
All 608 7.67 5 6.337 1 23 
No sanctions 415 8.04 6 6.260 1 23 
Under sanctions 134 9.45 8.5 6.159 1 23 
       Other             
All 157 7.03 4 6.264 1 23 
No sanctions 131 7.95 6 6.427 1 23 
Under sanctions 21 2.71 2 1.821 1 7 
       
Source: Own elaboration. The first row displays the length of a regime’s tenure. The higher number of 
observations in the first row is due to missing data in the variable SANCTION for the year 1988 in 
rows two and three. 
 
Yet the most interesting results of table 4.5 are found in the third row of each regime type 
category, which displays the length of an autocrat’s tenure under sanctions. Shockingly, the 
mean decreases in all regime type categories but for on, namely strong regimes. The decrease 
is dramatic in the case of multi-party regimes, from 6.14 years when no sanctions are in place 
to 2.79 years when sanctions are imposed. The mean for dominant regimes also decreases 
substantially from 6.43 years when no sanctions are in place to 4.75 years when sanctions are 
imposed. Finally, the mean for the category of strong regimes increases from 8.04 years when 
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no sanctions are in place to 9.45 years when sanctions are imposed, whilst the median 
increases from 6 to 8.5 years. 
In other words, autocrats in strong regimes stay longer in power when sanctions are imposed 
than when no sanctions are enacted. This result is supportive of my argument, as it suggests 
that strong regimes are resilient and therefore likely to resist sanctions for longer periods of 
time than weaker ones like multi-party and dominant regimes. Indeed, the mean and median 
for multi-party and dominant regimes decrease when sanctions are in place. Thus, these 
results suggest that weak regimes are more often destabilized by sanctions than their strong 
counterparts. 
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Graph 4.6. Tenure by regime type under sanctions 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Graph 4.6 provides illustrative evidence on the length of a dictator’s tenure in different 
regime types when sanctions have been imposed. Clearly, the tenure of autocrats in multi-
party regimes is shorter than that of dictators in strong or dominant regimes. Moreover, the 
right hand-side of the graph illustrates nicely that a large percentage of autocrats in multi-
party, other and dominant regimes stay in office for very short periods of time when sanctions 
are in place. Indeed, slightly less than 30% of multi-party regimes stay in office after two 
years. This percentage is even higher for other regimes during the first year, allegedly due to 
armed conflicts in some of the countries that form part of this category. The percentage of 
strong regimes that lasts only a few years in power is quite small in comparison, with less 
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than 10% of strong regimes being destabilised by sanctions in the first two years that these 
measures are in place.     
Finally, whilst a high percentage of dominant regimes seem to be destabilised by sanctions in 
the first years, I find that a small numbers of autocrats in dominant regimes stay in office for 
much longer than their peers, openly resisting the pressure of sanctions and defying the EU..  
A closer look at the data reveals that two autocrats in dominant regimes have remained in 
power for very long spells even when facing EU sanctions for at least 10 years. Somewhat 
unsurprisingly, these dictators are Belarus’ Alexander Lukashenko and Equatorial Guinea’s 
Teodoro Obiang. When dropping Belarus, the mean for tenure in dominant regimes falls to 
3.7 years, while it decreases to 4.6 years if I drop Equatorial Guinea. Moreover, the median 
for tenure also falls by one year if either of these countries is dropped from the analysis. In 
fact, it is quite significant that, together, Belarus and Equatorial Guinea account for 20 out of 
53 sanctions in place against dominant regimes – that is, 38% of the sanctioned observations 
within the dominant category. Needless to say, this is a substantial drop. However, the 
important thing to keep in mind is that, together with Zimbabwe (see above), these cases are 
clear outliers to my theoretical argument. In fact, my different models work very well when 
these cases are dropped from the statistical analyses, thus suggesting that Belarus, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Zimbabwe are exceptional cases that require a separate analysis.   
Now, do EU sanctions destabilize autocrats in regimes with larger W? To test hypothesis 4 I 
use a poisson regression model (Agresti, 2013; Long and Freese 2014), where a regime’s 
TENURE is the dependent variable. This model takes into account the nature of the 
dependent variable TENURE as a count that measures the years an autocratic regime remains 
in office. As with “duration” in Table 4.4, TENURE is sensitive to changes in the type of 
regime. Hence, if a regime change occurs in a countryi and yeart, TENURE is set to 1 again. 
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In this way, I control for domestic constraints to the leader’s survival in office under different 
institutional settings. 
The relationship of interest in this analysis lies on the interaction term between multi-party 
regimes and sanctions, as hypothesis 4 expects that autocratic regimes with large W will be 
more likely destabilised by the pressure of sanctions than strong regimes with small W.
 
As in 
the duration models, I include region fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the independent variables are lagged one year and robust standard errors are 
clustered on country.
69
 The results of the poisson regression models are displayed in Table 
4.6. In addition, in Table 4.13 (see annex) I add an interaction term between dominant
70
 
regimes and sanctions to control for the possibility that dominant regimes might also be more 
likely to be destabilized by sanctions. 
 
 
  
                                                          
69
 I have also run models with a lagged dependent variable to account for temporal dependence between 
observations. However, the strength of the coefficient is weak (β=0.1) and the introduction of this variable 
affects the statistical significance of the other coefficients. For these reasons, I have opted to drop the lagged 
dependent variable.  
70
 Since additional interaction terms can introduce multicollinearity in the right hand side of the equation, I run 
two separate regressions. However, running the two interaction terms simultaneously makes the coefficients 
significant at higher levels. Finally, since the category “other” is simply a residual category that I do not address 
theoretically, I have not included a third interaction term.  
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Table 4.6. Poisson regression. Regime destabilization 
 Base model Sender leverage Salience violation Target instability Sender costs Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure 
       
Sanction -0.081 -0.112 -0.072 -0.004 -0.081 0.012 
 (0.104) (0.108) (0.097) (0.087) (0.127) (0.102) 
Multi-party -0.282** -0.257* -0.297** -0.257** -0.290** -0.257** 
 (0.094) (0.103) (0.092) (0.092) (0.106) (0.092) 
Sanction*Multi-party -0.529** -0.502* -0.503** -0.470** -0.470** -0.457** 
 (0.169) (0.208) (0.164) (0.161) (0.177) (0.163) 
Dominant -0.165 -0.163 -0.175 -0.148 -0.204+ -0.158 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.113) (0.114) (0.117) (0.115) 
Other -0.137 -0.225 -0.143 -0.277 -0.177 -0.321+ 
 (0.154) (0.147) (0.151) (0.207) (0.167) (0.189) 
∆ Democracy -0.023 -0.016 -0.049* -0.011 -0.010 -0.035 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
Human rights 0.016 -0.035 0.013 0.043 -0.044 0.025 
 (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.042) (0.045) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.033    0.097* 
  (0.040)    (0.039) 
Aid/GDP (log)  -0.091**     
  (0.029)     
Coup d’état   -0.603***   -0.549*** 
   (0.115)   (0.125) 
Monitors   -0.123+   -0.072 
   (0.063)   (0.061) 
Vote fraud   0.230+   0.207+ 
   (0.119)   (0.107) 
GDP growth (log)    0.088*  0.086+ 
    (0.042)  (0.045) 
Demonstration    -0.054**  -0.048** 
    (0.020)  (0.018) 
Democratization    -0.006  0.016 
    (0.038)  (0.036) 
Gas (log)     0.019  
     (0.025)  
Trade volume (log)     0.105**  
     (0.038)  
Population (log)  0.032   -0.028  
  (0.029)   (0.040)  
GDP (log) 0.118***  0.112*** 0.147***  0.139*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024) (0.026)  (0.026) 
Constant -0.790 1.940** -0.602 -1.587* 0.509 -1.997** 
 (0.728) (0.726) (0.707) (0.706) (0.676) (0.690) 
       
Observations 1,609 1,560 1,609 1,507 1,549 1,490 
Countries 112 106 112 109 105 107 
Chi2 120.4 172.8 151.2 180.3 133.2 247.2 
Log pseudolikelihood -5563.498 -5359.572 -5495.068 -5057.339 -5304.469 -4867.986 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes 
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Overall, the results of Table 4.6 provide strong support for my argument and confirm my 
hypothesis 4, since multi-party regimes that have been sanctioned are more likely to be 
destabilised than strong regimes. Indeed, the interaction term “Sanction*Multi-party” is 
negative and statistically significant in all models at the 5% level or higher, providing 
evidence that the tenure of autocrats in multi-party regimes are shorter. This result holds 
regardless of the model specification and of the control variables included in the models.
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Thus, this last additional test throws further support to my theoretical argument that selection 
bias is present in the imposition of EU sanctions, as it shows that multi-party regimes are 
systematically more vulnerable to the threat and imposition of sanctions than strong regimes. 
Dominant and other regime types are also less likely to have a long tenure, yet the 
coefficients of each regime type only reach statistical significance at the 10% level in models 
5 and 6 respectively.  
Furthermore, the second interaction term between dominant regimes and sanctions is negative 
but not significant in the first model of Table 4.13 (see annex). However, once Belarus and 
Equatorial Guinea are dropped from the models, the interaction term becomes statistically 
significant at conventional levels. While the result confirms that Belarus and Equatorial 
Guinea are clear outliers in the category of dominant regimes, this finding warrants an 
explanation of why these cases deviate from my model. In the case of Equatorial Guinea, the 
answer is relatively straightforward. Since the early 1990s, Teodoro Obiang has been able to 
capitalise the rents from the country’s large oil reserves. Given the small country’s 
population,
72
 Equatorial Guinea has one of the largest oil per capita reserves in the world, 
lagging just behind Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. However, most of the 
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 To make sure that my results are not model dependent, I run the same models using negative binomial and 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions. The results of these robustness tests are displayed in Table 4.12. The 
results are consistent with those of the poisson regressions in Table 4.6 and provide further support to 
Hypothesis 4.   
72
 In 2010, the population was estimated to be around 700.000 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2014b).  
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income from these revenues goes to Obiang’s winning coalition and patronage system, whilst 
the vast majority of the population is excluded from its benefits (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). Finally, the oil and gas wealth of the country has allowed Obiang to limit external 
criticism from Western powers like the US or the EU’s member states, who have become his 
customers since 1995 (Smoltczyk, 2006).  
The case of Belarus however is more complicated and puzzling. Indeed, compared with most 
of its neighbours, Belarus has neither integrated into the EU, nor sought a closer relation with 
it. Belarus is hardly a rich country and the existence of political competition and the holding 
of regular elections make it even more difficult to understand how Alexander Lukashenka has 
been able to remain in power despite being sanctioned by the EU for over 10 years. Since this 
case poses an interesting puzzle and a clear challenge to my theoretical account, I analyse it 
in depth in Chapter 6. 
On a different note, the level of respect of human rights does not seem to matter in explaining 
the destabilization of autocratic regimes. The sign of its coefficient changes depending on the 
model, yet it never reaches statistical significance. Moreover, sudden changes in democracy 
do not seem to affect a regime’s tenure either, as the coefficients are not significant in any of 
the models except in the case of model 3, where it is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Model 2 shows that the sender’s leverage is related to autocratic regimes’ tenure. Indeed, 
countries that are highly dependent on EU aid are negatively related to TENURE. This result 
is significant at the 1% level and indicates that aid-dependent countries are more likely to be 
destabilised by sanctions (Van de Walle, 2001; Wright, 2009).  
Furthermore, the results of model 3 show that coups d’état are negatively and strongly related 
to tenure at the 0.001 level, indicating that autocrats who face a putsch are less likely to 
remain in office. This results is self-explanatory, as successful coups d’état automatically 
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bring about a change of regime. The same is true for countries where international monitors 
are present during the holding of elections. Indeed, the coefficient for the variable monitors is 
negatively related to TENURE and statistically significant at the 10% level. This result 
suggests that the presence of international observers restricts the ability of autocrats to 
manipulate or rig elections and that, as a consequence, autocrats are more likely to be ousted 
from office if observers are present during the electoral contest. However, the opposite is the 
case when autocrats commit vote fraud. Rigging elections is positively related to TENURE at 
the 10% level, indicating that regimes that do not play by the rules are more likely to remain 
in office.  
Model 4 controls for a regime’s economic and political stability. Not surprisingly, countries 
that are growing economically are more likely to stay in power for longer periods of time. 
This result is in line with most of the literature in economic and comparative politics, as a 
healthy and expanding economy increases a leader’s tenure (Alesina, Özler, Roubini and 
Swagel, 1996; Burke, 2012). The same is true for countries that are economically strong, as 
shown by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of GDP. However, autocrats 
facing large anti-government protests are more likely to be ousted from power (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith, 2010), as the negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
demonstrations illustrates.  
Finally, model 5 shows that countries that have important commercial relations with the EU 
are more likely to stay in office for prolonged periods of time. This result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and suggests that commercial relations with the EU have an 
important effect on the survival of a target regime. Moreover, the possession of natural 
resources like gas or oil does not seem to be correlated with an autocrat’s tenure, although the 
sign of the coefficient is positive and suggests that regimes in resource-rich countries stay in 
office longer (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013; Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004; Wright et al., 2015). 
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Nevertheless, the relationship between TENURE and natural resources is likely to depend on 
the quality of a target’s domestic institutions (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006), as 
resources can also generate perverse political incentives – the so-called “resource curse” –, 
which render autocrats very vulnerable to external shocks like a fall in international 
commodity prices (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Ross, 1999, 
2011; Stevens, 2003).    
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The results of this chapter provide strong support to my theoretical argument about the 
presence of selection bias in the study of sanctions imposition. I have generated a vast 
amount of evidence that target selection effects take place, and that these are channelled 
through a target regime’s domestic institutions. Indeed, my results show that an important 
variation in the imposition of EU sanctions against autocratic regimes exists, since weak 
regimes with large W like multi-party regimes are systematically less likely to be sanctioned 
than strong regimes with small W. This finding has important implications to understand 
when sanctions are imposed, but also when they are more likely to work.  
My models have shown that selection bias needs to be modelled appropriately in the study of 
sanctions imposition. I have demonstrated that the different stages of a sanctions process are 
intertwined and have therefore to be analysed together. In this regard, I have argued and 
empirically proven that the use of a two-stage Heckman selection model is a methodological 
improvement that can help to address the problem of selection effects in empirical work.  
Second, the results of the Heckman selection model have confirmed that multi-party regimes 
are not only more likely to comply with the threat of EU sanctions than strong regimes; they 
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have also shown that they are less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes. Thus, my 
findings provide conclusive evidence that, when faced with the threat of sanctions, a target’s 
strategic calculation determines to a large extent the likelihood that sanctions are imposed. 
Most importantly, I have shown that these calculations are not necessarily of economic 
nature, but also that they are politically motivated.  
Third, the chapter has produced additional evidence for the presence of selection effects by 
modelling two additional stages of what I dubbed the “sanctions game” in Chapter 2. First of 
all, I have corroborated empirically that multi-party regimes face shorter spells of sanctions 
than strong regimes. I have demonstrated that weak regimes like multi-party regimes are 
more likely to comply early with the EU once sanctions have been imposed. Noteworthy, this 
result also holds for dominant regimes when two outliers – Belarus and Zimbabwe – are 
excluded from the analysis.  
Fourth, I have also provided evidence that weak regimes are more likely to be destabilised by 
sanctions than strong ones. This result is strong and consistent across models and provides 
further evidence that targets display different levels of resilience towards sanctions. 
Importantly, I also find that dominant regimes are more likely to be destabilised than strong 
regimes when the cases of Belarus and Equatorial Guinea are excluded from the analysis.  
Notably, the statistical analyses suggest that Belarus, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe are 
clear outliers to my theoretical argument, as they display a resilience towards sanctions that is 
unusual for their regime type category. Indeed, my models testing the additional Hypotheses 
3 and 4 perform very well when these three cases are dropped from the analyses. Importantly, 
my results hold regardless of the number of control variables added or the regression model 
employed, thus providing further evidence that these cases are very particular.  
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Paradoxically, the cases of Belarus, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe have received 
extensive media and academic attention, being frequently used to make inferences about the 
effectiveness of EU sanctions. These practices are very problematic because my analyses 
suggest that these three countries are clear outliers. Indeed, according to my theory, these 
countries should be vulnerable to sanctions and should therefore have complied early with the 
EU. Although I will devote more time to analyse the cases of Belarus and Zimbabwe in 
Chapter 6, it should be stressed clearly that they are poorly suited to make any generalizations 
about the effects of sanctions. 
In sum, this chapter has corroborated my theoretical argument through various statistical 
analyses that have addressed the issue of target selection effects from different angles. I have 
provided extensive evidence supporting my hypotheses, and I have run many additional 
robustness tests to rule out other plausible explanations that could be driving my results. 
Noteworthy, my results are robust to different model specifications and to the addition of a 
battery of control variables.  
The next two chapters go one step further to analyse in depth several episodes of EU 
sanctions. Chapter 5 discusses three cases that my model predicts well. These cases are Fiji I 
(2001-2003), Fiji II (2006-2014), and Myanmar (1990-ongoing). Chapter 6 then analyses the 
cases of Belarus (1997-ongoing) and Zimbabwe (2002-ongoing), which are clear outliers to 
my model. Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 also control for the presence of black knights, a variable 
that is difficult to measure quantitatively.   
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4.7. Annex to the Chapter and robustness tests 
This section presents the results of several robustness checks. Table 4.7 displays the results of 
the two stage Heckman selection model with my alternative measure of COMPLIANCE.  
This new measure codes COMPLIANCE 1 if a target’s level of respect of human rights was 
higher than 2, whereas COMPLIANCE is coded 0 if a country’s respect for human rights is 2 
or lower.
73
 A few points merit to be commented. First of all, the p-values at the bottom of the 
table (Prob>chi
2
) are not statistically significant. This implies that the two stages are not 
correlated at statistically significant levels and that the use of a two-stage Heckman selection 
model is not necessary.   
Nevertheless, the coefficients of multi-party regimes are positive and statistically significant 
in all models of the COMPLIANCE or selection equation, just as I expect in H1. In addition, 
the coefficients for multi-party regimes in the outcome or SANCTION equation are negative, 
implying that multi-party regimes are systematically less likely to be sanctioned than strong 
regimes. However, the coefficient for multi-party is not statistically significant in any of the 
models.  
Although the second measure of COMPLIANCE performs relatively well, the results seem to 
suggest that this second proxy of COMPLIANCE is somewhat weaker than the first measure 
employed in Table 4.2. Indeed, while measuring COMPLIANCE is a methodologically 
daunting task, the advantage of my first measure is that it makes sure that those countries that 
are 100% non-compliant are included in a single category, whereas those other countries that 
are somewhere in between are lumped together in another category. Although my proxy is 
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 Recall that “human rights” is a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 stands for no respect for human rights, and 
5 represents the highest respect of human rights.  
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not very accurate in predicting the degree of a target regime’s COMPLIANCE, it is a useful 
measure to differentiate between “no-compliance” vs. “some compliance”.  
 
  
171 
 
Table 4.7. Heckprobit selection model. Compliance and sanctions imposition  
 Base model Sender leverage Salience violation Target instability Sender cost Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Compliance Sanction Compliance Sanction Compliance Sanction Compliance Sanction Compliance Sanction Compliance Sanction 
             
Multi-party 0.429** -0.264 0.455*** -0.188 0.427** -0.268 0.413** -0.276 0.458** -0.419 0.442** -0.396 
 (0.134) (0.226) (0.137) (0.220) (0.134) (0.219) (0.132) (0.251) (0.141) (0.269) (0.140) (0.312) 
Dominant 0.297+ 0.077 0.319+ -0.000 0.296+ -0.046 0.308+ 0.009 0.321+ -0.118 0.339* -0.245 
 (0.165) (0.341) (0.165) (0.328) (0.165) (0.369) (0.166) (0.337) (0.168) (0.321) (0.170) (0.347) 
Other -0.084 0.137 -0.060 0.109 -0.086 0.163 -0.113 0.087 -0.108 -0.012 -0.111 0.034 
 (0.231) (0.483) (0.233) (0.544) (0.230) (0.530) (0.240) (0.527) (0.241) (0.538) (0.245) (0.583) 
Human rights  -0.417+  -0.429+  -0.409+  -0.517*  -0.487+  -0.620* 
  (0.216)  (0.252)  (0.224)  (0.214)  (0.253)  (0.264) 
∆ Democracy  -0.281**  -0.296**  -0.278**  -0.242*  -0.290**  -0.249* 
  (0.107)  (0.107)  (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.111)  (0.099) 
Exports/GDP (log) 0.090+  0.089+ 0.017 0.090+  0.088+  0.110*  0.100+ -0.027 
 (0.049)  (0.049) (0.073) (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.053)  (0.051) (0.085) 
Aid/GDP (log)    -0.124+         
    (0.072)         
Coup d’état      0.068      -0.055 
      (0.465)      (0.423) 
Monitors      0.358      0.330 
      (0.232)      (0.233) 
Vote fraud      0.160      -0.085 
      (0.319)      (0.282) 
Tenure        0.040    0.024 
        (0.039)    (0.041) 
Democratization        -0.059    -0.078 
        (0.098)    (0.096) 
Demonstration        0.085*    0.072+ 
        (0.039)    (0.037) 
GDP growth (log)        -0.296*    -0.299* 
        (0.151)    (0.135) 
Gas (log)          -0.118  -0.054 
          (0.085)  (0.074) 
FDI/GDP (log)          0.057  0.108 
          (0.095)  (0.103) 
Trade volume (log)          0.114   
          (0.119)   
GDP (log)  -0.160*    -0.147*  -0.215**     
  (0.069)    (0.070)  (0.076)     
Human rights clause -0.141  -0.141  -0.136  -0.102  -0.095  -0.047  
 (0.120)  (0.121)  (0.121)  (0.119)  (0.126)  (0.125)  
GDP/cap (log) 0.041  0.040  0.042  0.061  0.049  0.072  
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.073)  (0.075)  
Population (log) -0.306***  -0.306*** -0.251* -0.306***  -0.294***  -0.297*** -0.209 -0.283*** -0.183 
 (0.047)  (0.047) (0.098) (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.048) (0.147) (0.048) (0.117) 
Constant 5.868*** 5.567*** 5.871*** 6.377** 5.847*** 5.181** 5.377*** 7.539*** 5.454*** 3.256 4.918*** 5.917** 
 (1.005) (1.687) (1.000) (2.064) (1.000) (1.638) (1.073) (1.910) (1.044) (1.980) (1.098) (1.861) 
             
Observations 1,604 1,593 1,604 1,579 1,540 1,519 
Countries 106 104 106 106 104 104 
Chi2 2146 1330 2298 1168 1581 2240 
Prob>chi2 0.1964 0.3678 
-391.377 
0.1770 
-392.602 
0.2088 
-382.662 
0.2760 
-383.174 
0.3396 
-372.366 Log psuedolikelihood -393.66 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes. 
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Table 4.8. Models with fixed and random effects 
 Country FE Country and 
year FE 
Country RE Country RE Weights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES Sanction Sanction Sanction Sanction Sanction 
      
Multi-party -1.216** -2.002*** -0.973* -1.632*** -1.148** 
 (0.419) (0.535) (0.396) (0.468) (0.424) 
Dominant -0.459 -1.366** -0.497 -1.321** -0.456 
 (0.439) (0.511) (0.413) (0.476) (0.495) 
Other 0.792 -0.199 -0.070 -0.937 -1.140* 
 (0.769) (0.860) (0.628) (0.666) (0.571) 
Human rights -1.131*** -1.055*** -1.243*** -0.968*** -0.699*** 
 (0.198) (0.252) (0.182) (0.212) (0.149) 
∆ Democracy -0.272* -0.271* -0.258* -0.259* -0.264 
 (0.118) (0.135) (0.113) (0.124) (0.168) 
GDP (log) -0.346 -0.347 -0.072 -0.014 0.018 
 (0.287) (0.397) (0.146) (0.149) (0.090) 
Constant   4.113 -0.803 4.584* 
   (3.541) (3.741) (2.083) 
      
Observations 669 669 1,687 1,687 1,682 
Number of Countries 36 36 115 115 115 
Pseudo-R2 0.350 0.494 . . 0.516 
Chi2 191.4 270.1 141.2 172.4 506.9 
Time polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes No No No 
Weights No No No No Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: strong regimes. 
 
 
Table 4.8 presents controls for country and year fixed effects. First, models 1 and 2 run 
country fixed effects regressions to control for unobserved variation within countries. 
Although the test drops many observations from the regression due to a lack of variation in 
the dependent variable (many countries are never sanctioned), the results confirm my 
expectations, as multi-party regimes are systematically less likely to be sanctioned in 
comparison to strong regimes. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 
0.001 level and the relationship is strong (β=-1.22). The slope of the coefficient becomes 
even stronger (β=-2.00) when I include year FE to control for temporal shocks.    
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Columns 3 and 4 display the results of models with country random effects. Again, the results 
confirm hypothesis 2, as multi-party regimes are systematically less likely to be sanctioned 
than strong regimes. If anything, the slope is less steep than in the first two models (β=-0.97 
and β=-1.63 in models 3 and 4 respectively).  
Finally, model 5 runs a logistic regression using entropy weights and year fixed effects. As 
with the previous four models, the coefficient for multi-party regimes is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Also interesting is the fact that dominant regimes are 
also less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes at statistically significant levels when we 
control for year fixed effects.
74
 This is true for models 2 and 4, but not for model 5. In sum, 
overall the robustness checks provide additional support for hypothesis 2.    
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 The only exception is model 5.  
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Graph 4.8 Duration of sanctions 
 
Source: Own elaboration. This graph includes cases where no sanctions were imposed (i.e. it includes 
cases where the duration of sanctions in years was 0). 
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Table 4.9. Duration of sanctions. Negative binomial regression with zeros 
 Base model Sender leverage Salience violation Target instability Sender cost Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration 
       
Multi-party -0.694* -0.948** -0.694* -0.975*** -0.884** -1.170*** 
 (0.281) (0.316) (0.289) (0.268) (0.307) (0.315) 
Dominant -0.246 -0.433 -0.284 -0.418 -0.358 -0.700* 
 (0.273) (0.271) (0.287) (0.258) (0.291) (0.297) 
Other -0.806* -0.954* -0.789* -0.803* -0.944* -1.085*** 
 (0.398) (0.397) (0.398) (0.324) (0.383) (0.319) 
Human rights -0.594*** -0.658*** -0.591*** -0.546*** -0.573*** -0.588*** 
 (0.104) (0.110) (0.105) (0.096) (0.106) (0.097) 
∆ Democracy -0.224*** -0.248*** -0.180** -0.219*** -0.219*** -0.202** 
 (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.064) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.136    0.143 
  (0.087)    (0.165) 
Aid/GDP (log)  -0.259**     
  (0.088)     
Coup d’état   0.459   -0.043 
   (0.302)   (0.316) 
Monitors   0.022   0.142 
   (0.251)   (0.275) 
Vote fraud   0.373   0.457+ 
   (0.309)   (0.277) 
Democratization    -0.280*  -0.293* 
    (0.128)  (0.120) 
Demonstration    0.028  0.022 
    (0.032)  (0.032) 
Tenure    -0.164***  -0.203*** 
    (0.048)  (0.050) 
GDP growth (log)    -0.055  -0.057 
    (0.114)  (0.110) 
Gas (log)     -0.104 -0.044 
     (0.084) (0.085) 
FDI/GDP (log)     -0.172 -0.073 
     (0.113) (0.106) 
Trade volume (log)     0.327* 0.055 
     (0.129) (0.175) 
Population (log)  -0.121    -0.116 
  (0.081)    (0.181) 
GDP (log) -0.031  -0.026 -0.049 -0.279+  
 (0.078)  (0.078) (0.077) (0.153)  
LDV 0.529*** 0.471*** 0.532*** 0.567*** 0.504*** 0.570*** 
 (0.120) (0.106) (0.123) (0.095) (0.111) (0.085) 
Constant 1.151 3.221+ 0.988 2.617 1.206 1.492 
 (1.930) (1.786) (1.941) (1.798) (2.487) (2.170) 
       
Observations 1,598 1,547 1,598 1,493 1,475 1,376 
Countries 115 108 115 111 106 103 
Chi2 196.5 236.1 214.9 355.8 190.7 551.2 
Log pseudolikelihood -948.123 -906.817 -945.953 -865.173 -911.242 -814.251 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes. 
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Table 4.10. Negative binomial regression: Duration of sanctions (excluding zeros) 
 Base model Sender leverage Salience violation Target instability Sender cost Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration 
       
Multi-party -0.671* -0.627* -0.686** -0.155 -0.631* -0.065 
 (0.263) (0.274) (0.249) (0.235) (0.279) (0.242) 
Dominant 0.196 0.196 0.143 0.422** 0.027 0.511*** 
 (0.257) (0.195) (0.236) (0.143) (0.229) (0.137) 
Other -0.076 -0.194 -0.094 0.207 -0.120 0.194 
 (0.291) (0.247) (0.250) (0.172) (0.288) (0.164) 
Human rights -0.151 -0.174+ -0.151 -0.138* -0.185* -0.064 
 (0.102) (0.094) (0.093) (0.062) (0.094) (0.054) 
∆ Democracy 0.077 0.084 0.018 0.013 0.068+ -0.027 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.031    0.052 
  (0.073)    (0.067) 
Aid/GDP (log)  -0.068     
  (0.085)     
Coup d’état   -0.614**   -0.321+ 
   (0.217)   (0.194) 
Monitors   -0.245   -0.181 
   (0.187)   (0.184) 
Vote fraud   0.320   0.188 
   (0.213)   (0.210) 
Democratization    0.011  0.009 
    (0.052)  (0.040) 
Demonstration    -0.012  -0.008 
    (0.007)  (0.007) 
Tenure    0.105***  0.104*** 
    (0.012)  (0.010) 
GDP growth (log)    0.082  0.075 
    (0.061)  (0.058) 
Gas (log)     -0.053 -0.062 
     (0.063) (0.045) 
FDI/GDP (log)     0.230*** 0.042 
     (0.066) (0.033) 
Trade volume (log)     -0.037 -0.048 
     (0.087) (0.073) 
Population (log)  0.038    0.150+ 
  (0.096)    (0.085) 
GDP (log) 0.116+  0.105+ 0.066 0.233**  
 (0.064)  (0.063) (0.056) (0.072)  
Constant -1.585 0.772 -1.266 -1.683 -3.577** -1.367 
 (1.572) (2.020) (1.538) (1.476) (1.172) (1.117) 
       
Observations 240 232 240 233 236 225 
Countries 38 37 38 38 37 36 
Chi2 448.6 685.7 833.6 9786 . . 
Log pseudolikelihood -553.229 -539.737 -546.872 -445.990 -523.744 -421.948 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes. 
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Table 4.10 displays the results of the duration of sanctions when all the non-sanctioned 
countries are dropped. Overall, my results are consistent and robust in the different model 
specifications. The coefficient of multi-party regimes is negative in all models and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level or higher except in two models. The lack of statistical 
significance in models 4 and 6 seems to be driven by the loss of observations, as the model is 
very sensitive to the loss of information.  
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Table 4.11. Zero inflated negative binomial. Duration of sanctions (excluding Belarus 
and Zimbabwe) 
 Base model Sender 
leverage 
Salience 
violation 
Target 
instability 
Sender cost Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration Duration 
       
Multi-party -0.560* -0.810** -0.568* -0.943** -0.735* -0.951** 
 (0.263) (0.310) (0.270) (0.297) (0.307) (0.291) 
Dominant -0.539 -0.713* -0.579+ -0.797** -0.681+ -1.067** 
 (0.333) (0.324) (0.345) (0.298) (0.356) (0.394) 
Other -0.896* -0.981* -0.882* -1.060** -1.071* -1.282*** 
 (0.422) (0.408) (0.411) (0.390) (0.419) (0.312) 
Human rights -0.615** -0.589* -0.642*** -0.367+ -0.561* -0.378 
 (0.222) (0.230) (0.154) (0.215) (0.285) (0.325) 
∆ Democracy -0.207** -0.231*** -0.168** -0.146 -0.198** -0.156 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.059) (0.099) (0.068) (0.106) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.176+    0.250+ 
  (0.091)    (0.151) 
Aid/GDP (log)  -0.209*     
  (0.093)     
Coup d’état   0.469   -0.328 
   (0.330)   (0.545) 
Monitors   0.229   0.358 
   (0.251)   (0.227) 
Vote fraud   0.118   0.132 
   (0.365)   (0.279) 
Democratization    -0.203  -0.221+ 
    (0.129)  (0.114) 
Demonstration    0.033  0.023 
    (0.040)  (0.047) 
Tenure    -0.208**  -0.276*** 
    (0.072)  (0.075) 
GDP growth (log)    -0.003  -0.014 
    (0.135)  (0.146) 
Gas (log)     -0.036 0.110 
     (0.089) (0.087) 
FDI/GDP (log)     -0.157 -0.065 
     (0.117) (0.099) 
Trade volume (log)     0.364** -0.185 
     (0.133) (0.293) 
Population (log)  -0.135    -0.028 
  (0.087)    (0.333) 
GDP (log) -0.084  -0.077 -0.102 -0.407*  
 (0.083)  (0.085) (0.083) (0.162)  
LDV 0.511*** 0.447*** 0.521*** 0.526*** 0.488*** 0.566*** 
 (0.139) (0.124) (0.136) (0.128) (0.130) (0.148) 
Constant 2.490 2.854 2.318 3.871* 3.447 3.788+ 
 (2.028) (1.904) (2.059) (1.909) (2.754) (2.249) 
       
Inflate 
       
Human rights 1.865*** 1.919*** 2.008 1.663 2.016*** 1.412 
 (0.502) (0.530) (2.452) (1.043) (0.510) (1.198) 
GDP (log) 0.200 0.224 0.272 0.025 0.243 -0.001 
 (0.359) (0.176) (0.978) (0.306) (0.272) (0.359) 
Constant -13.857 -13.273* -17.280 -6.526 -14.591 -4.922 
 (15.538) (5.337) (42.802) (11.746) (9.757) (14.152) 
       
Observations 1,561 1,510 1,561 1,456 1,438 1,339 
Countries 113 106 113 109 104 101 
Chi2 61.09 110.5 91.68 201.2 104.6 427.9 
Log pseudolikelihood -880.474 -841.308 -878.255 -790.618 -845.787 -738.374 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes.  
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Table 4.12. Negative binomial and OLS regressions. Regime destabilisation 
 Base model Full model Base model Full model 
 Negative 
binomial 
Negative 
binomial 
OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tenure Tenure Tenure (log) Tenure (log) 
     
Sanction -0.100 -0.016 -0.025 0.065 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.111) (0.106) 
Multi-party -0.288** -0.241* -0.210+ -0.167 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.109) (0.103) 
Sanction*Multi-party -0.452** -0.380* -0.438* -0.350* 
 (0.170) (0.159) (0.184) (0.169) 
Dominant -0.153 -0.131 -0.166 -0.126 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.139) (0.134) 
Other -0.160 -0.408* -0.205 -0.461* 
 (0.164) (0.179) (0.187) (0.199) 
∆ Democracy -0.055+ -0.045 -0.049 -0.049 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) 
Human rights 0.030 0.032 0.020 0.029 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.048) (0.046) 
Exports/GDP (log)  0.087*  0.083* 
  (0.036)  (0.040) 
Coup d’état  -0.064  -0.095 
  (0.055)  (0.066) 
Monitors  0.176  0.181 
  (0.109)  (0.140) 
Vote fraud  -0.487***  -0.487*** 
  (0.105)  (0.112) 
GDP growth (log)  0.090*  0.112* 
  (0.044)  (0.048) 
Demonstration  -0.044***  -0.050*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Democratization  -0.007  -0.029 
  (0.035)  (0.036) 
GDP (log) 0.124*** 0.141*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant -1.022 -2.076** -1.275 -2.342** 
 (0.754) (0.700) (0.840) (0.795) 
     
Observations 1,609 1,490 1,609 1,490 
R-squared . . 0.137 0.206 
Countries 112 107 112 107 
Chi2 107.1 238.1 . . 
Log pseudolikelihood -4591.337 -4155.964 . . 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Baseline: Strong regimes. 
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Table 4.13. Poisson regression. Regime destabilization (excluding Belarus and 
Equatorial Guinea) 
 Base model 
(with outliers) 
Base model Sender 
leverage 
Salience 
violation 
Target 
instability 
Sender costs Full model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES tenure5 Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure Tenure 
        
Sanction -0.124 -0.125 -0.129 -0.110 -0.019 -0.169 -0.040 
 (0.109) (0.108) (0.111) (0.101) (0.088) (0.121) (0.095) 
Dominant -0.159 -0.188 -0.165 -0.192 -0.152 -0.216 -0.220+ 
 (0.124) (0.128) (0.127) (0.124) (0.125) (0.136) (0.132) 
Sanction*Dominant -0.097 -0.531** -0.587** -0.517** -0.591** -0.467* -0.543** 
 (0.222) (0.204) (0.202) (0.195) (0.198) (0.223) (0.206) 
Multi-party -0.315*** -0.308*** -0.277** -0.321*** -0.275** -0.266** -0.300** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.100) (0.091) (0.091) (0.095) (0.100) 
Other -0.142 -0.146 -0.215 -0.151 -0.277 -0.102 -0.321 
 (0.154) (0.153) (0.147) (0.150) (0.208) (0.172) (0.215) 
∆ Democracy -0.026 -0.029 -0.020 -0.056* -0.016 -0.006 -0.022 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) 
Human rights 0.017 0.013 -0.028 0.010 0.040 -0.050 -0.022 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048) (0.041) (0.044) 
Exports/GDP (log)   0.032    -0.090 
   (0.040)    (0.062) 
Aid/GDP (log)   -0.080**     
   (0.028)     
Coup d’état    -0.604***   -0.533*** 
    (0.118)   (0.133) 
Monitors    -0.101   -0.073 
    (0.063)   (0.060) 
Vote fraud    0.162   0.168 
    (0.128)   (0.108) 
GDP growth (log)     0.086*  0.067 
     (0.041)  (0.050) 
Demonstration     -0.055**  -0.032* 
     (0.020)  (0.016) 
Democratization     -0.004  0.005 
     (0.039)  (0.032) 
Gas (log)      0.020 0.027 
      (0.025) (0.022) 
FDI/GDP (log)      0.173*** 0.153*** 
      (0.031) (0.030) 
Trade volume (log)      0.007 0.123* 
      (0.039) (0.053) 
Population (log)   0.042   0.064 -0.019 
   (0.030)   (0.043) (0.054) 
GDP (log) 0.117*** 0.114***  0.107*** 0.142***   
 (0.024) (0.025)  (0.024) (0.026)   
Constant -0.763 -0.681 1.705* -0.489 -1.462* 0.176 -0.373 
 (0.730) (0.741) (0.720) (0.719) (0.718) (0.673) (0.658) 
        
Observations 1,609 1,571 1,522 1,571 1,469 1,435 1,349 
Countries 112 110 104 110 107 100 99 
Chi2 115.2 148.8 209.7 197.2 229.9 236.3 478.8 
Log pseudolikelihood -5580.162 -5426.802 -5224.63 -5364.731 -4925.695 -4699.419 -4218.933 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Note: Base: Strong regimes. 
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CHAPTER 5. SANCTIONS AGAINST MYANMAR AND FIJI 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4 I have shown that weak autocratic regimes (multi-party and personalist regimes) 
are more likely than strong regimes (military and one-party regimes) to comply with the EU 
before sanctions are imposed. As a consequence of these selection effects, I have 
demonstrated that multi-party regimes are less likely to be sanctioned than strong regimes 
like military or one-party regimes. Similarly, I have provided evidence that weak regimes that 
are targeted with sanctions are likely to have miscalculated their strength or the sender’s 
resolve to impose sanctions. As a consequence, they are inclined to comply shortly after 
sanctions have been imposed. Finally, I have also demonstrated that weak regimes are more 
often destabilised by sanctions than their strong counterparts. 
This chapter provides qualitative evidence of three cases of EU sanctions that support my 
theoretical argument. These cases are the sanctions regime imposed against Fiji between 
2001 and 2003 (Fiji I), and again between 2006 and 2014 (Fiji II), and the sanctions regime 
imposed against Myanmar (1991-ongoing). The three episodes are chosen because they 
neatly reflect the ways in which the domestic political institutions of a target state – and in 
particular, the size of the winning coalition - shape the policy preferences of the ruling elite in 
a sanctions game. 
The chapter proceeds in the following way. First, I analyse the EU’s sanctions imposed 
against Myanmar. Then I examine the two sanctions episodes imposed against Fiji in 2001-
2003 and 2006-2014. Fiji I is a good example of a multi-party regime (large winning 
coalition) that miscalculates its strength and ends up complying with the sender soon after 
sanctions have been imposed. The other two cases, Fiji II and Myanmar, are examples of 
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military regimes (small winning coalitions) that defy EU threats and withstand its sanctions 
for long periods of time. 
Finally, this chapter introduces a new explanatory factor that due to measurement problems 
could not be included in the regression models of Chapter 4: the presence of “black knights”. 
A broad agreement exists in the sanctions literature that “black knights” – i.e. third countries 
that provide economic, financial and diplomatic assistance to a sanctioned country – 
frequently play an important role in offsetting the impact of sanctions (Early, 2011; Galtung, 
1967). Thus, I control for this possibility to make sure that my results hold independently of 
the effects of this variable. 
 
5.2. Burma/Myanmar:
75
 1991-ongoing  
In November 2010, the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) held the first 
multi-party elections in Myanmar after twenty years of military dictatorship. One year later, 
the SPDC dissolved, the military – officially known as the Tatmadaw – returned to the 
barracks, and a nominally civilian government headed by President Thein Sein took office. A 
transition towards a multi-party system unfolded and an ambitious programme of economic 
and political reforms was unveiled. The quick transformation from a ruthless military regime 
into a more liberalised multi-party system paved the way for a substantive modification in the 
EU’s relation with Myanmar. 
After more than two decades of political confrontation with the military regime in Myanmar, 
the EU began lifting the sanctions that it had first imposed in 1991. Interestingly, neither the 
scope nor the length of the sanctions regime seemed to have mattered much in the regime’s 
                                                          
75
 The names of Burma and Myanmar are used interchangeably in this chapter.  
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calculations to liberalise the political system. On the contrary, this process has been the result 
of a carefully planned and implemented strategy, where the SPDC marked the pace and 
nature of the reforms. In this regard, international sanctions have neither deterred nor 
undermined the military regime, which has shown a remarkable degree of internal cohesion 
to survive in power and a stunning capacity to resist external pressure. Myanmar is thus a 
particularly interesting case of a strong regime with a small winning coalition that self-selects 
itself into sanctions and resists their economic burden for a long period of time. 
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Table 5.1. Coding summary: Myanmar. 
Episode Myanmar: 1991-ongoing 
Background In 1988, the military staged a coup d’état to bring unrest in the country to an end. Since then, the 
military junta has increased and institutionalised its power. In 1990, elections were held, which were 
won by Aung San Suu Kyis’ party, the New League for Democracy. However, the military ignored 
the result of the elections, clamped down on the opposition, and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under 
house arrest. Since 2010, the regime has begun a slow liberalisation of the political system, leading 
to the holding of elections in 2012, which saw Aung San Suu Kyi win a seat in Parliament. 
Dependent Variable The military’s regime refusal to recognise the 1990 elections results triggered EU sanctions against 
the military junta. Additional restrictive measured were imposed in the coming years and, especially, 
after the regime clamped down on the peaceful Buddhist “saffron revolution” in 2007. In 2012, the 
EU suspended most of its sanctions following the liberalisation of the military regime. 
Independent Variables 
 
Regime type Military (strong). After the 1988 coup and crackdown, the military took over power and 
institutionalised its rule through the creation of the SLORC/SPDC. 
Winning coalition Small: the most important decisions are taken by very few individuals of the military junta. 
Human rights Myanmar has a long record of human rights abuses. The military has systematically beaten, tortured, 
imprisoned, and undertaken extrajudicial executions of internal dissenters. Moreover, the use of 
forced and child labour in the country has led to international condemnation and the call for 
sanctions by the International Labour Organisation. 
Democratization After staging a coup d’état in 1988, the SLORC abolished the country’s constitution, declared a state 
of emergency and ruled by decree. The rule of law ceased in the country, a tight censorship on the 
media was imposed and no political rights were granted. Since 2003, the military regime has pursued 
a “discipline-flourishing democracy”. The junta presented a roadmap to democracy, convened a 
National Convention to draft a constitution, hold a referendum on it and hold elections in 2010 to 
form a new civilian government in 2011. 
Political instability 
 Protests Low: the military regime has faced a low number of protests over its two-decade long rule. In 2007, 
the Buddhists monks’ “saffron revolution” was forcefully suppressed. 
Tenure Long: the military junta has remained for over 20 years in office. In 2011, power was handed to a 
civilian government formed of former military officers. Nevertheless, the military remains strongly 
engaged in politics. 
Economic leverage 
 Trade dependence Low: the EU is Myanmar’s ninth largest trading partner, accounting for only 2.2% of Myanmar’s 
trade with the world. The EU lags far behind China (39.6%), Thailand (20.1%), Singapore (12.1%) 
and India (3.8%). 
Aid dependence Low: EU aid to Myanmar has been very low (less than 2% of Myanmar’s GDP). However, the EU 
has increased its development assistance to Myanmar following the liberalisation of the political 
system. 
Black knights Yes: China has been the major protector of Myanmar in the international community. Myanmar has 
also become economically dependent on its northern neighbour. Moreover, other ASEAN members 
have traditionally rejected sanctions and opted instead for an approach of “constructive 
engagement”. Also, India has strengthened its economic and military ties with Myanmar. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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5.2.1. Dependent variables: resistance and sanctions 
When the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) collapsed in 1988, widespread anti-
government protests demanding the democratisation of the country unravelled. In the face of 
a crumbling economy and ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar’s borderlands, the military staged 
a coup d’état and clamped down on anti-government demonstrators to preserve the integrity 
of the country (Taylor, 2009). Thousands of demonstrators died during the military’s 
repression in September 1988 and order was imposed through violence and fear. 
Immediately after the clampdown, the military established the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) – a military council formed of 19 members – to deal with the 
country’s mounting challenges. The military also made it clear that it did not intend to stay in 
office for a prolonged period of time and promised to hold multi-party elections on 27 May 
1990 (Tonkin, 2007). Still, in 1989 the SLORC declared martial law, arrested thousands of 
people, renamed the country Myanmar and set Aung San Suu Kyi – the leader of the pro-
democracy party New League for Democracy (NLD) and daughter of the national hero and 
founder of Burma, Aung San – under house arrest (Stacey, 2006). 
Despite the house arrest of Suu Kyi and other prominent NLD leaders, the NLD obtained a 
landslide victory in the 1990 elections, securing 59.87% of the votes and 392 out of 485 seats 
in Parliament (Tonkin, 2007). The elections portrayed the unpopularity of the regime and 
evidenced how badly the Tatmadaw had miscalculated its capacity to obtain the population’s 
support. Following the NLD’s victory, the EU and the US welcomed the result and urged the 
SLORC to free all political prisoners and cede power to a civilian government led by the 
NLD (Steinberg, 2001b). 
However, the military regime postponed the date to convene a National Assembly and 
ignored the EU’s and US’ threat of sanctions if the junta did not comply with the latter’s 
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demands. When the NLD and other opposition groups secretly met to convene a National 
Assembly in December 1990, the Tatmadaw dissolved the meeting by force, clamped down 
on the opposition, incarcerated many political activists, and pushed many others into exile or 
into joining resistance guerrillas in Myanmar’s borderlands (Tonkin, 2007: 36). 
The SLORC’s resistance to the EU’s threats of sanctions supports my Hypothesis 1 that 
regimes with small winning coalitions should be less likely to comply with the sender’s 
demands. Indeed, over the years the SLORC has continually ignored EU demands on 
political change in Myanmar, leaving the EU with no other option than to impose sanctions or 
to back down. 
On 4 January 1991, the EU Presidency issued a statement condemning the regime’s 
repression of the opposition, the situation of human rights, and the violation of civil and 
democratic rights in Myanmar (EU Presidency, 1991). The EU also imposed a number of 
sanctions, including the suspension of non-humanitarian development aid programmes, the 
reduction of economic and trade relations, the expulsion of all military personnel attached to 
the diplomatic representations of Myanmar in the EU, and an embargo on the sale of arms 
(EU Presidency, 1991; Minsat, 2012). Parallel to EU efforts, the US imposed wide-ranging 
economic sanctions and vetoed Myanmar’s access to aid, soft loans and credits from 
international organisations like the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(Human Rights Watch, 1992; Pedersen, 2008). 
The imposition of sanctions following the regime’s resistance to the EU’s demands is in line 
with my expectation that military regimes with small winning coalitions are recalcitrant and 
prefer to resist external pressure rather than complying with the sender’s requests (Hypothesis 
2). Importantly, while the regime has often criticised and asked for the lifting of Western 
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sanctions, it has never shown the slightest intention to compromise or comply with EU 
requests. 
In May and July 1996, the EU held meetings with the regime in New York and Jakarta where 
it renewed its demand to promote the democratization of the country ‘in light of the 1990 
election result’ (EU Presidency, 1996a). Specifically, the EU expressed its concerns 
regarding widespread human rights abuses, the incarcerating of political prisoners, the 
existence of forced labour, the neglect of democratic and civil rights, and the lack of 
democratic progress in Myanmar. It also requested the junta to establish a dialogue with the 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD to promote national reconciliation and find a way out of the 
political deadlock. Finally, it urged the SLORC to cooperate in clarifying the death under 
military custody of Mr. James Nichols, the EU’s honorary consul in Myanmar (EU 
Presidency, 1996a). 
The SLORC however refused to cooperate, and the EU issued a Common Position on 28 
October 1996 confirming the measures already adopted and introducing additional sanctions. 
The new measures included a visa ban for senior members of the SLORC and their families, 
a visa ban for senior members of the military, and the suspension of high-level bilateral visits 
to Myanmar (Council of the European Union, 1996). Moreover, pursuing reports on the 
SLORC’s use of forced labour, further measures were considered. In particular, the EU 
discussed suspending Myanmar’s access to the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), a 
threat that would materialise in 1997 after the International Labour Organisation found 
widespread evidence on the use of forced labour by the regime (Houses of the Oireachtas, 
1996). When the SLORC denied the allegations and refused to cooperate with the 
investigation by allowing a fact-finding mission into the country, the EU withdrew 
Myanmar’s access to the tariff preferences under the GSP framework (Council of the 
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European Union, 1997b; Portela and Orbie, 2014), whilst the US issued a prohibition on all 
new US investment in Myanmar (United States, 1997). 
Over the years and in light of the lack of progress, sanctions were continuously extended and 
expanded by adding a freeze on the assets of blacklisted individuals (Council of the European 
Union, 2000). Myanmar triggered a major diplomatic rift between the EU and ASEAN when 
it officially became a member of ASEAN in 1997. As a consequence, several ASEAN-EU 
meetings were cancelled between 1997 and 2000 and tensions spilled over to EU-ASEM 
meetings (International Crisis Group, 2008a: 15; Petersson, 2006). 
In April 2003 the EU opened again the possibility for engagement with the junta when it 
offered to suspend some of the measures until 29 October 2003 ‘if substantive progress 
towards national reconciliation’, the respect of human rights, and democratisation was 
undertaken by the SLORC/SPDC (Council of the European Union, 2003; Marchi, 2014: 67). 
However, this “carrot-and-sticks approach” suffered yet another blow when in May 2003 – a 
year after the SPDC had released Daw Aung Suu Kyi from house arrest –, the NLD leader 
and its motorcade were attacked while travelling through the country by members of the 
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), the regime’s civil society arm 
(International Crisis Group, 2004; Marchi, 2014; Seekins, 2005). 
The US reacted harshly to these events by approving the Burmese Freedom and Democracy 
Act (United States, 2003),
76
 whereas the EU expanded its sanctions regime by prohibiting the 
granting of financial loans or credits to Myanmar state-owned enterprises and by banning the 
acquisition or extension of a participation in state-owned ventures (Council of the European 
                                                          
76
 The measures imposed under the Burmese Freedom and Democracy act included ‘an extension of the visa ban 
on officials of the SPDC and the USDA; a freeze on the U.S. assets of Burmese officials; a ban on financial 
transactions between American parties and “entities of the Rangoon regime” (save for those that receive especial 
exemptions from the U.S. Treasury Department, such as non-governmental organizations [NGOs] working on 
humanitarian projects); and, most important, an embargo on all imports from Burma to the United States 
‘(Seekins, 2005: 439-40). 
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Union, 2004b, d). These measures caused important economic harm to the country’s 
economy, but did not influence the regime’s behaviour (Seekins, 2005; Steinberg, 2007). 
More sanctions were approved in October 2007, after the military regime cracked down on 
the peaceful demonstrations of Buddhist monks.
77
 This time, EU ministers agreed to target 
important sources of revenue for the regime ‘by adding trade, investment and financial bans 
on the logging and mining industries’ to the sanctions regime (Council of the European 
Union, 2007a, 2008d; International Crisis Group, 2008a: 16). 
However, the increasing coerciveness and scope of sanctions did not bring about change in 
the SLORC/SPDC’s behaviour. According to critical voices, ‘sanctions played into the hands 
of the military junta since they shield[ed] the country from external influence while 
contributing to its underdevelopment’ (Will, 2003: 17). Thus, sanctions pushed the military 
rulers towards increased isolation, whilst engagement and contact with the outside world 
might have been more productive in influencing the SPDC’s leadership (International Crisis 
Group, 2004: 21; Pedersen, 2008). In addition, they exacerbated the regime’s suspicion ‘that 
the West [aimed] to dominate and exploit Myanmar’, strengthening thereby its ‘resolve to 
resist’ (International Crisis Group, 2004: ii). 
The regime’s persistent refusal to accept the EU’s demands and resist sanctions for over 20 
years supports my claim of Hypothesis 3 that military regimes with a small winning coalition 
are more likely to withstand the economic burden of sanctions for long periods of time. In 
fact, although the regime repeatedly demanded the suspension of sanctions, it never showed 
any intention or willingness to compromise with Western senders. On the contrary, ‘the 
imposition of various economic sanctions that have periodically increased has not produced 
their intended effect [and] the vituperative language of much of the world has prompted a 
                                                          
77
 These demonstrations have also been referred to as the “Saffron Revolution”.  
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nationalistic response that on many occasions became strident and xenophobic’ (Steinberg, 
2010: 175). 
Moreover, even though sanctions have been wide-ranging in scope and very severe in their 
effects, they have not destabilised the military regime. This is exactly what I expect in 
Hypothesis 4, where I claim that military regimes with small winning coalitions are less 
likely to be destabilised by external shocks like sanctions. On the contrary, albeit by 2011 the 
EU had included over a thousand individuals and state-controlled entities in its blacklist 
(European Commission, 2011), the effects of sanctions have been questionable.
78
 
In 2010 events took an unexpected course when the SPDC held the first multi-party elections 
in the country in 20 years and promised to undertake further reforms of the political system. 
The EU and the US called these elections a sham, as the political party of the regime, the 
Union State and Development Party (USDP) obtained a decisive victory (BBC, 2010b). 
However, regional actors like Vietnam – the chair of ASEAN - praised the reforms as a step 
forward (Lunn, 2011). Moreover, the new scenario marked a clear liberalization of the 
political system, as state power was diffused and transferred from the junta to a new 
generation of military officers, technocrats, and to the newly designed institutions 
(International Crisis Group, 2011a, b). Together with a sense of sanctions fatigue, this 
process triggered a change of approach by the EU and the US (Portela, 2010), which reacted 
cautiously to the reforms, encouraging engagement with the regime and increasing support 
for the transitional process. 
In December 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Myanmar and held talks with 
President Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi. After these meetings, the US started lifting 
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 The cost of sanctions on Myanmar is difficult to estimate, as it is difficult to differentiate it from other factors 
like the country’s bad economic performance due to the SPDC’s mismanagement of the economy (House of 
Lords, 2007: 22, para. 57). 
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sanctions progressively and backed the regime’s reforms. In 2012, President Obama lifted the 
US ban on investment in Myanmar and the ban on imports from Myanmar (BBC, 2012b; De 
Young, 2012; Mahtani, 2013). One year later, the US lifted ‘a 1996 ban on granting U.S. 
entry visas to the former Burma’s military rulers, their business partners and immediate 
families’ (Eckert, 2013). 
The EU responded to the progressive democratisation of the country by suspending the visa 
bans against high ranking officials in 2011and lifting the suspension of high-level bilateral 
governmental visits to the country (Council of the European Union, 2011d). Although the 
decision to lift sanctions ‘did not receive full support from the Council’ (Giumelli, 2013a: 
31), further reforms by the regime led the EU to suspend sanctions in 2012, and – with the 
exception of the arms embargo – to lift them completely in 2013 (Bünte and Portela, 2012; 
Portela, 2014). In 2012, the EU increased its development aid, opened a delegation in 
Yangon, and prominent politicians like Lady Ashton – the High Representative for the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy – and Commission President Barroso undertook 
official visits to the country  (Euractiv, 2013a). Finally, Myanmar was reinstated into the GSP 
tariff preferences scheme in 2013, following a positive decision by the ILO (European 
Commission, 2013a). 
To sum up, the Myanmar sanctions episode provides evidence that military regimes with 
small winning coalitions are prone to resist external threats, even if this comes at the cost of 
twenty years of economic sanctions. Despite the scope and coerciveness of the measures 
imposed, the SLORC/SPDC was able to remain in power for a very long period of time. 
Although some analysts have suggested that sanctions have played an indirect role in 
accompanying Myanmar’s transition by establishing clear benchmarks for Myanmar to 
receive Western support and sanctions relief (Grant, 2012), this claim cannot be fully 
substantiated by the facts. Indeed, while the regime might have been willing to re-establish 
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relations with the West to balance the increasing economic penetration of China in the 
country (Interview, 2015c, h), Western pressure cannot explain the pace or extent of reforms 
undertaken. In fact, the West has remained a relatively passive spectator of the process, 
which has been dictated and shaped by the SPDC.  
 
5.2.2. Independent variables 
5.2.2.1. Regime type: military (strong)  
The military regime’s capacity to survive in power for over twenty years is a remarkable 
feature considering the numerous challenges that it has faced, including the confrontation 
with political parties like the NLD, ethnic insurgencies in Myanmar’s borderlands, and two 
decades of Western economic sanctions. The key to understand its survival resides in the 
institutionalisation of its rule through the establishment of the SLORC/SPDC and a wide 
system of patronage, the unity of strategy within the Tatmadaw, and its capacity to balance 
the interests of different factions to avoid a split within the armed forces. 
After the 1988 coup, the military quickly established the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC), a military cabinet composed of 19 active-duty officers that ruled by 
decree without a constitution or legislature of any kind (Selth, 2002; Steinberg, 2001a). 
Although the SLORC openly claimed to have no desire to retain power for a long period of 
time and promised to hold multi-party elections in May 1990 (Tonkin, 2007), it quickly 
realised that ‘transferring power immediately risked creating a weak state that could quickly 
collapse’ and put the interests of the Tatmadaw in jeopardy (Jones, 2014a: 788). Thus, after 
its failure to secure a victory of the military-backed National Unity Party’s (NUP), the 
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SLORC changed its approach and embarked on an ambitious state-building project (Bünte, 
2011). 
Under the leadership of Senior General Than Shwe, the SLORC undertook several important 
reforms in the country. First, it abolished the BSPP’s nationwide organisation, replacing it 
with Law and Order Restoration Councils, which essentially reproduced the hierarchical 
structure of the SLORC and which were directly under control of military officers (Selth, 
2002). These efforts were accompanied in 1993 by the creation of the USDA, a mass 
organisation to promote local development and rally support for the regime when necessary 
(Steinberg, 2001a). The USDA was given control of several businesses in the country, which 
were employed in co-optation and patronage functions for the regime (Jones, 2014b). At the 
same time however, the USDA was used a powerful weapon to intimidate and harass the 
opposition. 
Second, the SLORC undertook important reforms in the country’s economy, fostering a 
transition from state socialism to state-mediated capitalism. The regime promoted a process 
of economic liberalisation, but ‘exploited it to augment its own holdings’ (Jones, 2014b: 
149). It created two business conglomerates – the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings 
and Myanmar Economic Corporation – and ‘deliberately cultivated “national entrepreneurs” 
[…] to support [the regime’s] goals‘ (Jones, 2014b: 149). The SLORC also retained 
monopolies on trade and investment licences, and deliberately implemented arbitrary 
regulations to control the distribution of rents and the access to the state’s resources to reward 
the loyalty of its supporters. 
Third, the SLORC expanded and modernised the army to consolidate its power. Between 
1988 and 2000, the military increased its manpower to over 400.000 soldiers and bought 
Chinese military technology and arms to intensify its efforts against the ethnic insurgencies in 
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the country’s borderlands, thus strengthening the SLORC’s position at home and forcing 
many ethnic insurgencies to negotiate ceasefire agreements (International Crisis Group, 
2000a). Moreover, the SLORC made the Tatmadaw an attractive institution that offered its 
members and their families extensive business and wealth-accumulating opportunities 
(Callahan, 2007), and guaranteed privileged access to scarce resources like schools, 
medication, and supermarkets. 
Finally, the regime’s capacity to retain its grip on power for over twenty years was also the 
product of SLORC’s relative cohesion and its consensus on basic strategy. Although 
factionalism within the SLORC certainly existed, ‘the junta […] managed to maintain its 
internal differences and disagreements under control’ (Hlaing, 2009: 272; Min, 2008). This 
was achieved through regular purges, relocations, promotions and an effective surveillance 
apparatus. Most importantly however, the military stuck together ‘because the members still 
recognize[d] that they need[ed] each other’ to preserve the corporate and personal interests of 
the institution and its members (Steinberg, 2001a). 
The regime’s most important decisions were taken by the top five or top three of the SLORC 
leaders (International Crisis Group, 2000a), including decisions like the 1997 reorganisation 
of the SLORC into the SPDC. This helped the regime to get rid ‘of the more obviously 
corrupt and incompetent members of the SLORC, and [allowed] younger officers […] to play 
a greater role in running the country’ (Selth, 2002: 60). However, this decision also 
evidenced a sense of continuity, as the top leaders remained the same (Steinberg, 2001a). 
Nevertheless, the SLORC/SPDC also remained united despite prominent purges like that of 
the powerful Prime Minister Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt and several of his subordinates in 2004. 
While the purge evidenced the existence of a split within the top command of the SPDC, it 
did not alter the regime’s course of action. On the contrary, the regime proceeded with 
195 
 
Nyunt’s transitional roadmap towards a “discipline flourishing democracy”, evidencing in 
this way the existence of a broad agreement on basic strategy within the SPDC (International 
Crisis Group, 2008a). 
In fact, the regime’s ability to proceed with this process underscores its resilience vis-à-vis 
international and domestic pressures. Indeed, the conclusion of the 2003-2007 National 
Convention’s work on a draft constitution signalled the regime’s strength inasmuch as the 
SPDC managed i) to conclude a process that had failed in the 1990s; ii) to include several 
ethnic insurgencies in the process; iii) to retain most of the elements that the opposition 
rejected during the 1993-1996 National Convention; and iv) to approve the Constitution in a 
nation-wide referendum in 2008 (Jones, 2014a). Moreover, the 2010 elections further proved 
the SDPC’s strength and the undeniable fact that the roadmap was ‘the only game in town’, 
as a sector of the NLD splintered from the mother party and created the National Democratic 
Force to participate in the elections (Jones, 2014a: 795). 
Thus, the liberalisation of the political system was neither the result of the regime’s 
weakness, nor the product of Western economic pressure; on the contrary, it was the 
culmination of a long and slow process of political reforms where the SPDC pushed its policy 
agenda through (Jones, 2014a). Indeed, the regime completed its roadmap from a position of 
strength, having enshrined the military’s corporate interests in the country’s constitution 
(Jones, 2014b).
79
 Indeed, only when the military considered that it was safe to do so, it 
proceeded to dissolve the SDPC and to hand power to a nominally civilian government on 30 
March 2011 (Guardian, 2011). As Bünte has succinctly put it, ‘the military’s withdrawal from 
power does not mean a retreat into the barracks, but rather a further institutionalization of 
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 As one interviewee pointed out, the junta has a de facto veto power on any modification of the constitution, 
which requires more than 75% of the votes in Parliament (Interview, 2015c). This has led Aung San Suu Kyi to 
as “one brave soldier” (Peel and Pilling, 2015) to vote with the opposition and overrun the military’s veto.  
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military control’ (Bünte, 2011: 16-18). In this sense, Myanmar’s political system can be 
accurately described as a “tutelary democracy” or a “democracy with adjectives” (Collier and 
Levitsky, 1997; Merkel, 2004), where the role of the military is still substantial behind the 
scenes. Finally, the transition and the elections can also be regarded as a strategic move by 
the SPDC to reward and promote younger cohorts of the Tatmadaw whilst easing 
generational pressures within the ruling military elite (Bünte, 2011; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 
2009). 
 
5.2.2.2. Human rights and democracy 
Since 1988, the military regime in Myanmar has been one of the most repressive regimes in 
the world (Pedersen, 2008). The SLORC/SPDC has been widely criticised by Western 
governments and human rights organisations for its numerous human rights violations and the 
lack of civil and political freedoms in Myanmar. In 1988, the military did not hesitate to 
dissolve the anti-government protests that swept Rangoon by force, killing thousands of 
demonstrators and sending many others into exile. Moreover, the SLORC/SPDC has 
systematically tortured, harassed, and jailed domestic political activists during its rule. 
Continued international criticism has not affected the regime, which has defied Western 
powers by placing Aung San Suu Kyi and other prominent members of the NLD under house 
arrest for many years. 
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Graph 5.1. Level of democracy and human rights in Myanmar, 1988-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data for democracy from Wahman et al. (2013); data for human rights from 
Gibney et al. (2015). 
 
Although the SLORC’s failure to honour its promise to cede power to a civilian government 
after the 1990 elections triggered EU and US sanctions, further events like the unexplained 
death of the EU’s honorary consul in 1996, the regime’s implication in the violent events 
against Suu Kyi’s motorcade in 2003, the junta’s crackdown on the Buddhist monks’ protests 
in 2007, and the non-existence of the rule of law in the country contributed to the imposition 
of additional sanctions over the years (Freedom House, 1998). 
However, the regime’s liberalisation of the political system following the approval of a new 
constitution in 2008 and the holding of multi-party elections in 2010 and 2012 have led to the 
progressive suspension of sanctions. Despite the flaws and lack of real opposition that have 
surrounded the transition, the reforms were welcomed by the US and the EU, who hastened 
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to ease sanctions in 2011, suspend them in 2012, and lift most of the measures in place by 
2013 (Bünte and Portela, 2012; Portela, 2013). 
 
5.2.2.3. Economic leverage 
Overall, the EU’s economic leverage over Myanmar has been rather small. Although the 
trade relationship between the EU and Burma has increased over time, in 2013, the EU was 
only Myanmar’s eight largest trading partner, trading commodities for a value of 533 million 
euros. The EU accounted for a scant 2.3% of Myanmar’s total trade, lagging far behind other 
regional trading partners like China or Thailand, which accounted for 34.6% and 25.2% of 
Myanmar’s trade respectively (European Commission, 2015b). The EU’s low economic 
leverage cannot be attributed to the its suspension of Myanmar from the GSP scheme in 
1997, as this decision only affected a small number of areas of the latter’s economy and did 
not alter the general increase in trade between the two parts (Zhou and Cuyvers, 2011). 
A similar picture emerges with regard to development assistance, which has been very low 
since the EU suspended its disbursements in 1991.
80
 Although EU leverage thus remained 
small between 1988 and 2010, in recent years the EU and its member states have 
considerably stepped up aid disbursements to Myanmar to deal with emergency situations 
caused by natural disasters  like Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Rieffel and Fox, 2013), and to 
support the transition process since 2013 (Council of the European Union, 2013a). 
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 EU development assistance to Myanmar was relatively small before 1990.  
199 
 
5.2.2.4. Black knights 
Myanmar has benefitted from the patronage of strong regional and international allies to 
offset EU and US pressure. China has undoubtedly been the SLORC/SPDC’s most important 
ally, supplying the military regime with weapons, grant aid, preferential loans and debt relief 
(Haacke, 2010a). This support has been critical to allow the regime to expand its army and 
force ethnic insurgent groups to the bargaining table (International Crisis Group, 2000a). 
China and Russia have also actively protected the military regime in the United Nations, 
watering down critical resolutions of the SLORC/SPDC. For instance, in January 2007 they 
protected the military junta with a historical double veto against a joint US/UK initiative that 
aimed to criticise the regime in the UN Security Council (Haacke, 2010b). 
In addition, other regional actors have played an important role in mitigating the impact of 
sanctions against Burma. First, ASEAN has been a strong defender of Myanmar, advocating 
a constructive and flexible approach to deal with the SLORC/SPDC (Haacke, 1999, 2008). Its 
lack of criticism towards the regime in the 1990s tightened the relationship with Western 
partners and led to the suspension of several region-to-region meeting between ASEAN and 
the EU (Petersson, 2006). Tensions also spilled over to other interregional frameworks like 
the Asia Europe Meeting (Wilson, 2007: 92). Besides ASEAN’s role, Thailand has 
strengthened trading links with Burma, allowing the Tatmadaw to circumvent EU and US 
sanctions against its business holdings in timber and gem stones (Grant, 2012; Jones, 2014b). 
Finally, India’s increasing trade and investment in Myanmar has also helped ‘the SLORC to 
evade the full impact of Western sanctions’ (Haacke, 2006: 38). 
However, a caveat regarding the importance of these actors in offsetting Western sanctions is 
necessary. First, even though Myanmar’s trade with its regional neighbours has increased 
over the years, it ‘remains one of the most closed countries in the world’ (International Crisis 
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Group, 2004: 11-17). The country is ‘self-sufficient in food, and the domestic economy is 
large enough for the army to extract what it needs to function’. As a consequence, ‘the 
government ultimately does not depend on external economic linkages for its survival’ 
(International Crisis Group, 2004: 11-17). Second, the regime is extremely suspicious of any 
type of external interference in its domestic matters. This does not only apply to Western 
sanctions, but also to ASEAN, Chinese and UN efforts to promote change in Myanmar. 
Indeed, the regime’s defiance of external pressures to reform has frustrated Western powers 
and regional allies alike (Haacke, 2008). Hence, the presence of black knights can best be 
regarded as a necessary but insufficient condition to explain the regime’s capacity to hold 
onto power. 
 
5.3. Fiji 
On 22 September 2014, former military chief Commodore “Frank” Bainimarama was sworn 
in as Prime Minister after Fiji’s first competitive elections in eight years. Having personally 
overthrown the former democratically elected premier in a bloodless coup in 2006, 
Bainimarama staged a state-controlled transition from a military regime to a new multi-party 
system, putting in this way end to one of the most turbulent periods of Fiji’s young history as 
an independent country. After the elections, the EU and other sender countries like Australia 
and New Zealand begun to normalise their relations with Fiji, lifting the remaining economic 
sanctions that had been in place since the coup d’état. 
Fiji is an interesting case because it has been sanctioned by the EU in two occasions: first 
during the period 2001-2003 (as a multi-party or weak regime, Fiji I) and then again after the 
coup d’état in 2006 (as a military or strong regime, Fiji II). Fiji’s response to the sanctions 
has been very different from one episode to the other: whilst the regime complied with the 
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EU and all other senders quickly after sanctions were imposed in 2000, it defied them after 
the coup of 2006, resisting their pressure for almost 8 years. 
The selection of Fiji as a case study is driven by the rare opportunity to see a country being 
sanctioned twice under different institutional settings. Since regime type is a slow-varying 
variable, Fiji represents a unique opportunity to observe how the probability of being 
sanctioned varies depending on the size and cohesion of the domestic institutions of the target 
state. Moreover, it also allows witnessing how sanctions affect multi-party and military 
regimes differently: whilst sanctions were short-lived and destabilised the ruling elite in Fiji I, 
they lasted many years but did not undermine the cohesion of the military junta in Fiji II. In 
sum, the case study provides a good example of a multi-party regime that miscalculates its 
strength to remain in power on the one hand (Fiji I), and one of a strong regime that 
consciously self-selects itself into sanctions (Fiji II) on the other hand. 
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5.4. Fiji (I): 2000-2003 
In May 2000, a group of armed civilians led by businessman George Speight stormed the 
Parliament building taking Prime Minister Chaudhry, most of his cabinet and other members 
of parliament hostage for 56 days. Through the coup, which overthrew the first ever Indo-
Fijian prime minister of the country, Fijian nationalists sought to restrict the influence of 
Indo-Fijians in the country’s politics, which they perceived as a threat to indigenous Fijians. 
Although the putsch had some domestic support in sectors of Fijian politics, police, and 
military, it was immediately condemned by the international community and domestic actors, 
including President Mara and, most importantly, the head of the military, Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama. The hostage crisis prompted Bainimarama to assume executive powers, 
impose martial law, and revoke the 1997 Constitution (European Commission, 2000). 
In June 2000, whilst negotiations with the coup plotters to release the hostages were taking 
place, Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs appointed Iloilo as the country’s new President, who in 
turn appointed Laisena Qarase - a former banker and indigenous Fijian - as the interim Prime 
Minister in July. In this way, a civil-military interim government of Indigenous Fijians was 
installed, ignoring the deposed Indo-Fijian government’s legitimacy to return to office. 
This announcement sparked harsh international criticism. Having threatened sanctions if Fiji 
did not return to the democratic path, Australia and New Zealand imposed travel restrictions 
on the members of the regime and suspended military cooperation with Fiji (Telegraph, 
2000). Fiji had already been suspended from its membership in the Commonwealth and the 
Pacific Island Forum earlier that year. Finally, and though with some delay, the EU followed 
suit and imposed sanctions against Fiji in May 2001. 
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Table 5.2. Coding summary: Fiji I. 
Episode Fiji (I): 2000-2003 
  
Background After a coup d’état was staged in May 2000, the EU and other international 
senders threatened to impose sanctions. 
Dependent Variable  
 The EU, Australia and New Zealand imposed aid and travel sanctions to 
restore the democratic order in Fiji. The interim government complied with 
most of the senders’ demands and sanctions were lifted between 2001 and 
2003, once free and fair elections had been held and all demands had been 
met. 
Independent Variables  
Regime type Multi-party (weak). Three months after the coup a civil-military interim 
government was formed to deal with the crises and establish a timetable to 
democratic elections. 
Winning coalition Medium/Large: Power was shared between a civil-military interim 
government. The Council of Great Chiefs also played a role in the 
nomination of the interim government, and the judiciary played an 
important role in the dissolution of the government. 
Human rights Low/Moderate: Arbitrary detentions and beatings of coup and military 
mutiny perpetrators were carried out by the military. 
Democratization After businessman Speight’s coup d’état, democracy in Fiji deteriorated 
gravely. The head of the military Commodore Bainimarama assumed 
executive powers, revoked the 1997 Constitution and declared the state of 
emergency. A civil-military government was appointed shortly afterwards, 
yet this was declared illegal in a Court’s ruling in April 2001. After the 
ruling, the interim government dissolved and democratic elections were 
held in September 2001. 
Political instability  
Protests Low: Although looting against the Indo-Fijian community took place, the 
interim government did not face serious protests. 
Tenure Short: the interim government lasted about 15 months 
  
Economic leverage  
Trade dependence Moderate: Fiji was very sensitive to the suspension of the EU’s Sugar 
Protocol, under which the EU buys sugar to Fiji under subsidised prices. 
The sugar exports to the EU account for about 26% of Fiji’s total export 
earnings.  
 
Aid dependence 
 
Low: Fiji is not an aid-dependent country, as development assistance 
making up less than 1% of the country’s GDP. 
  
Black knights No 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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5.4.1. The dependent variables: threat of sanctions, sanctions and compliance 
In October 2000, the EU opened negotiations with Fiji under Article 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement. Meeting in Brussels with a Fijian delegation, the Commission deplored the 
overthrow of the democratic government and the revocation of the 1997 constitution. It 
demanded the adoption of a new democratic constitution by December 2001 and the 
restoration of the democratic process through free and fair elections by June 2002. In 
addition, the Commission requested the interim government to undertake judiciary 
procedures against the coup plotters and its associates (European Commission, 2001b). 
The Fijian delegation agreed to most of the conditions and presented a plan and a timetable to 
hold elections and return to the democratic path within 18 months’ time. However, even 
though Fiji complied with most of the EU’s (and the other senders’) requests, the civil-
military government ignored one key demand, namely the reinstatement of Chaudhry’s 
deposed government (European Commission, 2001b). Instead, Fiji’s political elites had 
installed an indigenous civil-military interim government to take the reins of the country 
during the transitional period, unleashing thereby a round of sanctions from Australia and 
New Zealand (Telegraph, 2000). Similarly, in March 2001 the European Commission 
proposed to the European Council the imposition of “appropriate measures” 81  to exert 
pressure on the Fijian regime to progress towards democracy. 
However, developments in the country would have an unexpected impact on the stability of 
the interim government. In April, the Fijian Supreme Court ruled that the 1997 Constitution 
remained the supreme law in the atoll and that the civil-military government that had come 
out of the coup was illegal (Williams, 2001a). Following this judgement and after some 
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 The Commission’s proposal to the Council included some tough measures like the suspension of all 
investment projects under the 6
th
, 7
th
 and 8
th
 European Development Fund (EDF), a conditional approach to the 
signing of financing agreements, and the delay of the announcement of the 9
th
 EDF amount. 
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hesitation by the interim government, the regime committed to respect the 1997 Constitution, 
the interim government dissolved, and the holding of elections in September 2001 was 
announced. These developments were welcomed by the EU Council (EU Presidency, 2001), 
who proceeded to conclude negotiations with Fiji and, following the Commission’s 
suggestion, approved a series of appropriate measures to support the transition. 
Due in great measure to the positive developments experienced in the country between March 
and April, the measures imposed by the Council were a watered-down version of the 
Commission’s initial proposal. 82  The Council decided that the notification of the 9th 
European Development Fund (EDF) would be made ‘once free and fair elections [had] taken 
place and a legitimate Government ha[d] assumed office’ (Council of the European Union, 
2001a). The same would apply to the financing and implementation of new programmes and 
projects under the 6th, 7th and 8th EDF National Indicative Programmes. Other projects of 
humanitarian nature would be maintained, whilst support for the transition to democracy was 
offered. 
Although the EU’s imposition of sanctions on Fiji contradicts my expectation that multi-party 
regimes should be less likely to be sanctioned (Hypothesis 2), this outcome needs to be read 
carefully. First, the EU’s “appropriate measures” can be better described as “negative 
incentives” – rather than as a pure punishment – to guide Fiji in its return to democracy. 
Indeed, the EU took a proactive role in encouraging and supporting the country’s transition to 
democracy, making its allocation of aid conditional on the achievement of the civil-military 
regime’s timetable (Portela, 2010). In this regard, the measures approved were not aimed at 
punishing the regime, but at encouraging it to return to the democratic path. 
                                                          
82
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Second, as I expect in Hypothesis 3, sanctions were short-lived. Having miscalculated its 
capacity of maintaining its winning coalition together to retain office, the Fijian interim 
government was forced to dissolve and to call elections before December 2001. After 
credible elections were won by Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) coalition 
(Council of the European Union, 2001b; Freedom House, 2002), relations between Fiji and 
the sender countries were slowly restored, leading to the progressive lifting of sanctions. 
However, the EU only fully resumed cooperation with Fiji in November 2003, when the 
political deadlock regarding the allocation of government positions to the opposition was 
solved (Chandra and Wermester, 2003: 152; European Commission, 2003b). 
Still, the EU’s delay in lifting sanctions does not contradict my theoretical expectations or the 
empirical results of Chapter 4. In fact, the sanctions episode lasted about two and a half years, 
being relatively shorter than the mean duration of sanctions for multi-party regimes – which 
is slightly over three years. Consequently, this example reinforces my argument (see H1) that 
multi-party regimes are more likely to comply with the sender and that that they are more 
likely to do so early after sanctions have been imposed (see H3). 
Finally, sanctions exerted an important pressure on the target regime and contributed to its 
destabilisation (Portela, 2010). Although sanctions did not directly target the Fijian economy, 
they had severe collateral effects on tourism, businesses, investment, and trade (International 
Monetary Fund, 2003). They also signalled the senders’ discontent with the situation and 
marked the way for the normalization of political and economic relations, making the latter 
conditional on political progress. In this regard, sanctions served as an external catalyst to 
induce the regime to acquiesce with the senders’ demands, including the dissolution of the 
interim government, the holding of democratic elections in due time and the respect of the 
ethnical quotas in government as established by the country’s constitution. Lastly, 
international pressure was also important in forcing the interim government to comply with 
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the Court of Appeal’s March 2001 ruling, contributing thence to its dissolution and the 
holding of elections in September 2001 (Premdas, 2003). This is in line with my Hypothesis 
4, which expects multi-party regimes to be more likely destabilized by sanctions. 
 
5.4.2. Independent variables 
5.4.2.1. Regime type: “multi-party” regime (weak) 
As the case study evidences, Fiji’s institutional structure and the power relations underlying it 
largely explain the country’s reaction to the threat and imposition of sanctions. Fiji is coded 
as a “multi-party” regime between 2001 and 2003, which, according to my theoretical 
approach, implies that autocratic rulers need to maintain a large winning coalition to remain 
in office. Yet as the Fijian example evidences, this was not the case after the 2000 coup 
d’état. 
First, the head of the military, Commodore Frank Bainimarama felt uneasy intervening in 
politics, as he would recall years later after staging a coup himself (United Nations, 2007). 
Fearing that the neutrality of the Armed Forces – which were mostly formed by Indigenous 
Fijians – would be jeopardised, Bainimarama only took power reluctantly to solve the crisis. 
But even when he did so, he appointed a civilian government after three months and proposed 
a timetable to return to democratic rule in a short period of time  (BBC, 2000; European 
Commission, 2001b). 
Thus, the creation of a civil-military interim government headed by Iloilo and Qarase 
reflected the need to build a strong consensus amongst the Fijian political elites to deal with 
the crisis situation and maintain the stability of the interim regime. The fragility of the 
winning coalition was also evidenced in November 2000 when a military mutiny instigated 
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by some of Speight’s collaborators took place. On this occasion, Bainimarama only narrowly 
escaped death, but the image of the army as being ‘infected by the dangerous virus of 
indiscipline, insubordination and provincialism’ extended amongst Fiji’s population, as some 
of these forces had been instrumental to the execution of the coup (Lal, 2006: 208). 
Moreover, the interim government’s weakness led it to the negotiation table and to accept all 
of the senders’ demands but one: to reinstate Chaudhry and his government. Nevertheless, 
this refusal would put the regime’s cohesion to a tough test. First, international sanctions 
were imposed by Australia, the EU and New Zealand. And second, when in March 2001 the 
Court of Appeals ruled that the interim government was illegal and that the 1997 Constitution 
that had been abrogated by Bainimarama was still the valid legal norm in the country (Head, 
2001; Williams, 2001b), fractures started to emerge in the interim government. 
Importantly, the Court argued that the interim government had not managed to obtain 
international recognition or domestic support, and pointed to the legitimacy of Chaudhry’s 
deposed government (Williams, 2001a). Qarase initially refused to step down, but after 
consulting with Iloilo and the Great Council of Chiefs, he accepted to dissolve the interim 
government. Nevertheless, he managed to remain as interim prime minister to prepare the 
holding of elections (Tarte, 2002), a move that generated further tensions. While the 
international community accepted this solution as long as the timetable to hold elections was 
maintained, domestically it was questioned by parts of the military and, especially, by 
Chaudhry’s Labour party. 
Finally, to maintain his administration’s stability, Qarase made important concessions to the 
ethnic Fijian population and, most prominently, to Speight and the nationalists. These 
concessions, together with his decision to run for Prime Minister in the September 2001 
elections were disapproved of by Bainimarama, as ‘Qarase’s government was politically tied 
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to reinforcing and elevating into office precisely those forces that the commander felt he had 
to suppress and bring to justice’ (Firth and Fraenkel, 2009: 125). Bainimarama’s hostility 
towards Qarase grew when, after winning the elections, the latter refused to comply with the 
constitution and include members of the Indo-Fijian opposition in his government. 
International condemnation, sanctions, and increasing domestic pressure finally subdued 
Qarase’s resistance (Tran, 2000). 
 
5.4.2.2. Human rights and democracy 
After the coup d’état, the situation in the country was very tense. Businesses in the capital 
Suva closed after looting against the Indo-Fijian population began. In other parts of the 
country, indigenous Fijians illegally grabbed Indo-Fijian land, burned their houses and 
robbed their valuables, sometimes with the complicity of the security forces. Moreover, many 
skilled Indo-Fijians were internally displaced and, following the military mutiny in 
November 2000, extrajudicial killings, beatings and tortures by military personnel involved 
in the mutiny were reported (Amnesty International, 2001). 
The democratic process was halted through Speight’s coup and the curfew imposed by the 
military. This affected the Parliament’s activity, which ceased until the composition of the 
new legislature after the September 2001 elections. Moreover, the legitimacy of the interim 
government was put into serious question after the Court of Appeals’ ruling in March 2001, 
leaving the country close to a legal limbo. In this situation, President Iloilo proceeded to 
formally dissolve Parliament and call for elections. 
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Graph 5.2. Level of democracy and human rights in Fiji, 1988-2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data for democracy from Wahman et al. (2013); data for human rights from 
Gibney et al. (2015). 
 
The coup and the following deterioration of the democratic process in the atoll had a very big 
influence on the senders’ decision to use sanctions, especially after the interim government 
refused to reinstate Chaudhry and appointed Qarase instead. Nevertheless, most senders were 
satisfied with the transition to democracy and proceeded to lift their sanctions once elections 
had been held. 
 
5.4.2.3. Economic leverage 
The senders’ economic leverage did not play a major role in forcing Fiji’s leadership to 
comply, even though powerful instruments were available to Australia, New Zealand and the 
EU. On the one hand, Australia and New Zealand had an important commercial leverage, 
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accounting together for about 60% of Fiji’s trade. On its side, the EU could suspend its Sugar 
Protocol, which was vital for Fiji’s sugar export industry (Dearden, 2010). However, none of 
these countries was willing to impose commercial sanctions on Fiji, as these would have had 
detrimental effects on the population and the wider Pacific area (Dubecki, 2006). 
As a consequence, the effect of sanctions was, at best, symbolic and the suspension of aid 
was not particularly threatening. As an upper middle income country, Fiji is not dependent on 
aid and hardly qualifies for official development assistance (Schmaljohann and Prizzon, 
2014). However, sanctions had an indirect impact on the country’s economy, signalling 
uncertainty to investors and tourists. The sugar sector was particularly affected by this, as it 
required large sums of investment for its modernisation. Finally, a boycott on the garment 
industry by Australian trade unions had devastating effects on the sector  (Guardian, 2000). 
 
5.4.2.4. Black knights 
To offset the impact of sanctions and the bad economic situation in the country after the 
coup, the Qarase government initiated a “look North” policy to attract investment from Asian 
and other regional countries (Lal, 2006). For this purpose, Fiji backed Japan’s ambition to 
become a member of the United Nation Security Council and China’s candidacy to become a 
member of the World Trade Organisation (Tarte, 2010: 122). However, this policy was not 
very successful, as it only managed to obtain some financial help from China and Japan, but 
the quantities were negligible and temporary, and never managed to become a credible 
alternative to the revenues generated by trade with Fiji’s main trading partners, Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Yang, 2011). 
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5.5. Fiji (II): 2006-2014 
On 5th December 2006 the military under command of Commodore “Frank” Bainimarama 
overthrew the Government of Prime Minister Qarase and declared the state of emergency. 
This time, the coup ‘was neither unexpected nor secretive’ (Finin, 2007), as Bainimarama had 
been publicly threatening to overthrow the government if Qarase did not alter his nationalist 
policies and, eventually, step down (Guardian, 2006). Worryingly, the coup came after 
elections had been held in May 2006, which had seen Qarase winning a second term in office. 
Since 2005,  Bainimarama – who had been a key figure in subduing the rebels of the 2000 
coup and steering the country back to the democratic path –, had become increasingly critical 
of Qarase and his nationalist politics, which he regarded as racist and playing against the idea 
of a multi-racial Fiji. In particular, Bainimarama disapproved the government’s soft hand 
against the 2000 coup perpetrators, its intention to give indigenous Fijians coastal ownership 
rights, and the rampant corruption in the country (Economist, 2006). In addition, 
Bainimarama grew wary about Qarase’s military budget cuts and his attempts to replace the 
Commodore as chief of the army (Finin, 2007; Fraenkel, 2009). All of this was aggravated by 
the personal hostility between Bainimarama and Qarase. 
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Table 5.3. Coding summary: Fiji II. 
Episode Fiji (II): 2006-2014 
  
Background Sanctions were imposed following the military’s overthrow of Prime 
Minister Qarase and his elected government in December 2006. 
Dependent Variable  
 Sanctions were imposed after the 2006 coup and tightened in 2009 after 
Bainimarama’s postponement of democratic elections. The regime 
openly defied sanctions and never complied with the senders. Sanctions 
were lifted progressively from 2012 to 2014. 
Independent Variables  
Regime type Military (strong). The military took control of all strategic positions in 
government and society. 
Winning coalition Small: The military under Commodore Bainimarama controlled 
executive power in the country. 
Human rights Moderate: Arbitrary detentions, tortures and beatings were reported after 
the coup had been staged. 
Democratization Democracy in Fiji suffered a major blow through the 2006 coup d’état. A 
state of emergency was invoked after the coup. Moreover, extremely 
strict public order regulations were passed in 2009, censorship on the 
media was tightened and the political opposition was harassed, jailed, or 
sent into exile. Judges were deposed, intimidated, and irregularly 
replaced. 
Political instability  
Protests Low: During the first years of the coup, the regime faced a few strikes 
and passive resistance from the Church, the trade unions, and the media. 
 
Tenure Moderate/long: Bainimarama’s military regime resisted over 8 years, 
until in 2014 elections were held which Bainimarama won. 
  
Economic leverage  
Trade dependence Moderate: Fiji was very sensitive to the suspension of the EU’s Sugar 
Protocol, under which the EU buys sugar to Fiji under subsidised prices. 
 
Aid dependence 
 
Low: Fiji is not an aid-dependent country, with official development 
assistance accounting for less than 1% of the country’s GDP. 
  
Black knights Yes: With its “look north” policy, Fiji attracted investment from China 
and other Asian countries 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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5.5.1. Dependent variables: Resistance and sanctions 
The coup drew strong domestic and international condemnation and targeted sanctions were 
imposed by Australia and New Zealand (BBC, 2006; Clark, 2006). The regime’s resistance 
and the subsequent imposition of sanctions are in line with my Hypotheses 1 and 2, where I 
predict that strong regimes are more likely to defy the threats of sanctions and, as a 
consequence, that they are more likely to be sanctioned. In fact, sanctions were not imposed 
simply as a direct reaction to the coup, but as the consequence of months of mounting 
tensions and failed negotiations with the military. 
Until the end of November, negotiations to avert the coup had been taking place between 
Qarase, Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and Bainimarama and the military on 
the other (Tait, 2006). Whilst Qarase had acceded to most of Bainimarama’s demands,83 the 
Commodore showed no desire to reduce the tensions and desist in his ambition to overthrow 
Qarase and his government (Lal, 2009a). Instead, Bainimarama had become increasingly self-
assured of his actions by reaching out to the media to demand the resignation of Qarase. As 
someone who had been close to the events during the 1987 and 2000 coups in Fiji, the 
Commodore ‘knew well the routine sanctions that would ensue once he took formal control’ 
of the government (Finin, 2007) and was therefore well aware of the consequences his 
actions would have. Yet even on the eve of sanctions, Bainimarama’s coup showed that he 
was determined not to back down. 
                                                          
83
 The demands included a public declaration by the government that the 2000 coup events were illegal and that 
those associated with them should be removed from office; the withdrawal of three contentious bills, including 
one that would have granted amnesty to the coup perpetrators; dropping all investigations against Bainimarama 
and the Armed Forces; terminating the contract of Police Commissioner Hughes; assuring that no foreign 
military/policy intervention would take place; reviewing the role of the Police special unit; reviewing the 
commercial arm and role of the Native Lands Trust Board; addressing the military’s concerns about the 
structure and organization of the armed forces; and the Government’s commitment to address good governance 
issues. 
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Thus, international sanctions came as no surprise to anyone. While Australia and New 
Zealand took the lead, Fiji was barred from participating in the meetings of the Pacific 
Islands Forum and the Commonwealth in 2007, and suspended from its membership in 2009 
(ABC, 2009; BBC, 2009b). In Europe, France and the UK suspended military co-operation 
with Fiji (European Commission, 2007a), whereas the EU itself condemned the coup on 11 
December 2006 and opened negotiations with Fiji under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement 
(Council of the European Union, 2006c). 
During a meeting with a Fijian delegation in April 2007, the Commission demanded 
 
(1) the urgent and peaceful return to democracy within the existing legality and in full respect of the 
Constitution; (2) establishing a government with a mandate from and a majority in Fiji’s parliament, 
which was elected in free and fair elections in May 2006, or organising early free and fair elections, 
while avoiding a prolonged period with an “interim” government; (3) a plan with targets and benchmarks 
as well as a time-table for the above; (4) full respect for human rights, with special focus on the freedom 
of expression; (and) (5) full respect for the rule of law (European Commission, 2007a). 
 
The Fijian delegation made a submission justifying the reasons for the coup and explaining 
the situation in the country. It also presented a plan for a transitional period to restore 
democratic rule and made a series of commitments to respect democratic principles, the rule 
of law, and human rights and fundamental freedoms (Council of the European Union, 2007b; 
European Commission, 2007b). Most importantly, the regime promised holding democratic 
elections by March 2009 the latest (Perry, 2007). 
These commitments were welcomed by the Council, who decided to take appropriate 
measures to support the transition. Acknowledging that the implementation of the regime’s 
commitments would be carried out during an extended period of time, the Council offered 
assistance to support the process and promised to monitor the developments in the country. 
Nevertheless, it decided to suspend Fiji’s 2007 sugar allocation and made future allocations 
conditional on the progress towards democracy. Furthermore, the Council made aid 
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disbursements conditional on the fulfilment of the regime’s commitments and offered 
additional financial incentives if these were met (Council of the European Union, 2007b). 
However, as the regime increased its grip on power, it became clear that it had no intention to 
comply and hold elections anytime soon. Its attitude implied a unilateral break with the 
commitments made to the EU, which led the latter to extend the measures first every six 
months, then every year or more (Carbone, 2011b; Council of the European Union, 2007b, 
2009c, 2012c, 2013d). Following the suspension of Fiji’s sugar allocation in 2007, 
subsequent allocations were also lost or cancelled due to the lack of compliance of the Fijian 
regime. Unallocated amounts of aid were nonetheless disbursed for humanitarian needs 
through non-government channels, mainly by means of grassroots organizations and NGOs. 
Although sanctions certainly caused ‘significant inconvenience to members of the Fiji 
Government and military, [their] impact was not sufficiently damaging to induce any change 
in their thinking’ (Hayward-Jones, 2014: 2). As years passed, the regime’s dominance of 
Fiji’s politics became manifest, while sanctions were proven ineffective in altering 
Bainimarama’s policies. The regime’s resistance over such long period of time confirms my 
Hypothesis 3 that military regimes are strong and more likely to resist sanctions for longer 
periods of time. The military regime in Fiji resisted sanctions for almost 8 years, clearly 
above the mean duration of sanctions in the case of strong regimes – which is only short of 
seven years. 
As a consequence, the political deadlock between the senders and Fiji would over time give 
way to a more pragmatic approach on the senders’ side. Slowly, developments in the country 
made a rapprochement between the sides feasible. The lifting of the Public Emergency 
Regulations on January 2012, the approval of a new constitution in 2013, and the call for 
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elections in September 2014 were welcomed by the EU (Council of the European Union, 
2013d), who made preparations to support the electoral process and the transition. 
At the same time, new governments in Australia and New Zealand showed a predisposition to 
restart their relationship with Fiji. With the political stalemate having prevailed for five years, 
the former opted to change course and modify their confrontational approach with Fiji, 
pursuing instead an open dialogue to re-engage with Bainimarama. Australia had started 
normalising the relationship in 2012, when it resumed diplomatic representation in Fiji at 
high commissioner level (Firth, 2013). From then on, it accelerated the process and in 
February 2014 foreign Minister Julie Bishop flew to Suva in the first official visit in eight 
years (Australian, 2014; Hayward-Jones, 2014). By March 2014, Australia and New Zealand 
began lifting the travel sanctions on senior Fijian officials, months before elections were held 
(ABC, 2014). 
Thus, the lifting of sanctions cannot be regarded as signs of the regime’s compliance. On the 
contrary, the regime followed its own agenda and systematically rejected any external 
inference or advice. In fact, sanctions only contributed to harden the regime’s stance and their 
failure to coerce Bainimarama is the clear proof of the military’s regime resilience. 
Revealingly, the fact that rapprochement was favoured despite the flawed constitutional 
process of 2013 and the strict limitations placed on the registration of political parties before 
the 2014 elections sums up the senders’ inability to alter Fiji’s behaviour by coercive means 
(European Commission, 2013b). Thus, sanctions were unable to destabilise Bainimarama and 
his (strong) military regime, just as I predict in Hypothesis 4. 
The September 2014 elections were easily won by Bainimarama, who had previously stepped 
down as army commander and was running as a civilian (Firth, 2014; Reuters, 2014). The 
elections were hailed “credible” by international observers, clearly reflecting the 
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international’s community predisposition to move on with the normalisation of relations 
whilst ignoring all the flaws of the process (Hayward-Jones, 2014). By October 2014, 
Australia and New Zealand had lifted all of their sanctions, while the EU welcomed the 
holding of elections and was ready to resume cooperation with Fiji (European Commission, 
2014). 
In sum, my theoretical approach predicts very well the military’s decision to defy the threats 
of sanctions and to resist external pressure for a prolonged period of time. The regime’s 
resilience stemmed from its small but cohesive winning coalition, which allowed 
Bainimarama to survive in power. In this regard, the senders’ lifting of sanctions responds to 
the inefficacy of sanctions in altering Bainimarama’s policies.84 
 
5.5.2. Independent variables 
5.5.2.1. Regime type: military regime (strong) 
The resilience of the military regime to domestic and international pressures can be largely 
accounted for by its internal cohesion and the small size of Bainimarama’s winning coalition. 
The latter’s absolute control over the military, together with patronage and the systematic 
elimination of opponents played a key role in assuring the regime’s survival. 
First, after staging the coup and once Bainimarama had assumed executive powers from 
President Iloilo,
85
 he announced a state of emergency. The military proceeded to detain and 
intimidate important figures of the Fijian society, ‘including notably the Vice President, the 
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 In the sanctions tree (Graph 2.1), this would represent a fourth stage, where in light of the ineffectiveness of 
sanctions, the sender decides to back down and lift the measures. 
85
 In a bizarre sequence of events, Bainimarama first reappointed Iloilo as President in January 2007, who then 
surprisingly altered his previous opposition to the coup, and appointed Bainimarama as interim Prime Minister 
in return (Fraenkel, 2008). 
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acting police commissioner, as well as the CEO for the Ministry of Finance, who [was] also 
[the] National Authorising Officer of the European Development Fund in Fiji’ (European 
Commission, 2007a).  
The Commodore solidified his position through the control of all strategic sectors of 
government by the military. As Firth and Fraenkel (2009: 128) note, 
the 2006 coup entailed a considerable militarization of government. Military patronage gave senior 
officers a direct personal stake in the new order. With traditional officer-training in Australia and the 
USA barred because of the coup, the interim government sent officers to India and China. Bainimarama 
consolidated power by dismissing numerous public servants and heads of government boards and 
organizations, and giving the military direct control of the police, prisons, immigration, justice, the postal 
service and fisheries. He ensured that a military appointee was in charge of airports, and posted others to 
diplomatic. 
 
To achieve this goal Bainimarama had begun purging the military ranks after the failed 
military mutiny of November 2000. By dismissing critical military officers and promoting his 
own men to key positions within the Fijian military, he achieved a greater cohesion and 
loyalty of the Armed Forces (Firth and Fraenkel, 2009). This led the Commodore to claim 
that the Armed Forces had ‘never been as united as now’ (Finin, 2007). Lastly, in 2007 
Bainimarama granted himself and the military personnel involved in the putsch immunity 
from legal prosecution (AP, 2007). 
Yet while Bainimarama’s stability resided in the cohesion of the military, during the first 
years in power, the Commodore sought to obtain a broader legitimacy for his rule. 
Importantly, he co-opted members of the Labour party to take positions in his administration. 
These included, most notably, the former and deposed Prime Minister Chaudhry, who took 
the role of Finance Minister (New York Times, 2007). Bainimarama also weakened and 
divided the indigenous Fijian side, as some indigenous Fijians took key positions in his 
administration (Lal, 2009b). Noteworthy, part of the Fijian population implicitly supported 
the motives of the coup, as they saw Bainimarama’s goals to reduce corruption and crime 
rates with good eyes (Finin, 2007). Even the Great Council of Chiefs – a traditional and 
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powerful organization in Fijian society that brought together the leaders of the different tribes 
– backed the regime after some initial hesitation. 
However, while the governing coalition ‘might have been united by their desire to remain in 
power, […] their various visions for Fiji’s future differed’ (Fraenkel and Firth, 2009: 15-16). 
In 2008, the Labour party abandoned the coalition and the economic situation in the country 
worsened. The regime was also facing growing domestic opposition, including trade union 
protests in 2007, criticism by the Methodist Church, and schisms in the military top command 
in 2010 (Economist, 2012a; Fraenkel, 2012). In addition, in a similar case than in the 
aftermath of the coup in 2000, in April 2009 the Court of Appeal ruled that the government 
that had come out of the 2006 coup was illegal (McClymont, 2009). 
To deal with these challenges, the regime became increasingly coercive. Following the Court 
of Appeals’ ruling, Bainimarama clamped down on the judiciary, dismissed all judges and 
imposed new judges of the military’s own choice (BBC, 2009a). Moreover, he abrogated the 
1997 Constitution and imposed draconian Public Order Regulations and a strict media 
censorship between 2009 and 2012 (Siegel, 2012). The Commodore’s promise to hold 
elections by March 2009 was initially postponed to 2010, and finally to 2014. At the same 
time, he disbanded the Great Council of Chiefs in 2012 (Pearlman, 2012) and sent former 
Prime Minister Qarase to jail on alleged corruption charges (Telegraph, 2012a). His former 
ally Chaudhry was also accused of mismanagement of the finances and risked jail. The 
balance of the regime’s suppression of dissent was appalling: by 2011 most of its critics had 
been silenced, were in exile, or were under arrest. 
After 2011, when the economy recovered and Bainimarama started preparing the holding of 
elections, he began distributing public goods in the form of infrastructure, health services, 
clean water, electricity, and subsidised transport services (Marks, 2014). Moreover, the 
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military regime provided security and virtually eliminated ethnic tensions. These 
achievements increased the Commodore’s winning coalition and popularity in the built-up to 
the elections and, together with the limitations placed on the opposition, propelled him to a 
landslide victory in the 2014 elections. 
Still, the regime’s resilience to external and domestic threats was only possible due to the 
cohesiveness of the military and the small size of the winning coalition. In effect, although 
Bainimarama sought to legitimise his rule by co-opting members of Fiji’s political parties, his 
authority and the stability of his regime emanated from the armed forces. Moreover, he did 
not hesitate to use physical force to pursue his policies and eliminate any opposition. His 
landslide victory in the 2014 elections and the normalisation of relations with international 
senders of sanctions were therefore the consequence of the Commodore’s domination of 
Fijian politics, and not a sign of weakness. In this regard, my strategic interaction model 
explains very well how the Fijian regime was able to survive and resist sanctions for so long. 
 
5.5.2.2. Human rights and democracy 
The coup d’état and the consequent deterioration of democracy in Fiji were the immediate 
trigger of international sanctions. While the senders made the lifting of sanctions conditional 
on Fiji’s return to the democratic order, the situation in the country deteriorated seriously in 
the aftermath of the coup. Numerous abuses of human rights by the military were reported 
(Amnesty International, 2007) and the independence of the judiciary came under intense 
pressure. Moreover, although no strict censorship was initially imposed on the media, 
journalists and publications were intimidated and thwarted against publishing critical 
commentaries of the coup (Hunter, 2009). 
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Between 2009 and 2012 the military reintroduced the state of emergency and, although its 
lifting in 2012 was welcomed by the senders, the military regime passed draconian Public 
Order Regulations that limited the freedom of the country’s citizens and the media (BBC, 
2012a; Interview, 2015b). In addition, the military’s interference in the drafting of a new 
Constitution and destruction of draft constitutions in December 2012 further signalled the 
country’s clear shortcoming in respecting civil and political rights (Amnesty International, 
2013). Finally, the military placed strict limitations on the registration of political parties for 
the September 2014 elections, thereby excluding any credible competition for Bainimarama. 
Strikingly, none of these clear violations of democratic and human rights principles seemed 
to trigger more than critical statements by the senders, which were more interested in 
normalising relations with Fiji after the elections. 
 
5.5.2.3. Economic leverage 
Fiji’s resilience vis-à-vis Western economic sanctions is a good example of how economic 
leverage is often not enough to alter a target’s policies. Although the country’s economy is 
relatively vulnerable to external shocks, the regime managed to survive even under bad 
economic circumstances. In fact, sanctions and the bad state of the economy in the early 
years after the coup did not seem to preoccupy Bainimarama much, as he did ‘not have to 
worry about votes’ (Chand, 2009: 139). 
First, the regime overpassed the ban on access to loans from the IMF and the Asian 
Development Bank by recurring to non-conventional aid from other Asian countries 
(Schmaljohann and Prizzon, 2014). Moreover, the regime invested heavily in strategic sectors 
that boosted economic growth like infrastructure, transport and tourism (Asian Development 
Bank, 2014). Finally, the regime did not tremble when the EU suspended Fiji’s sugar 
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allocations under the Sugar Protocol. Although Fiji’s sugar industry is particularly dependent 
on subsidised prices from the EU, it has the potential to be competitive in international 
markets (Dearden, 2010: 50). For this reason, the regime invested in technology to modernise 
this sector, which saw an increase in its production in 2013 (Asian Development Bank, 2014; 
Firth, 2007). 
 
5.5.2.4. Black knights 
To offset the negative effects of sanctions, the Fijian regime invested new energy in pursuing 
Qarase’s “look North policy” by sending new diplomatic delegations to other countries, most 
notably China, Taiwan, Russia and Malaysia. Particularly relevant, since 2006 China had 
increased its commitments of aid and loans to Fiji,
86
 undertaking several infrastructure 
projects like the building of a hospital in Suva or the hydro-electric dam at Nadarivatu 
(Hayward-Jones, 2011; Schmaljohann and Prizzon, 2014; Yang, 2011). China’s increasing 
involvement in the region and its ‘sympathetic assistance to Fiji following the coups’ 
(Henderson, 2003: 238; Henderson and Reilly, 2003) alarmed Australia and New Zealand 
which, in light of the inefficacy of sanctions and the deadlock of the political situation, 
started pursuing a more pragmatic approach to the regime (Craymer, 2014; Hayward-Jones, 
2014). This led ultimately to the gradual lifting of travel sanctions and the restoration of 
contacts with the Fijian ministries in 2012 (Fraenkel, 2012). 
However, while the support of China and other countries as “black knights” cannot be 
dismissed easily (Interview, 2015b), their role in keeping the regime alive was less important 
than might seem. First, while China’s soft loans boosted oxygen into an asphyxiated 
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 According to some estimates, China’s financial assistance in terms of soft loans amounted to US$253.4 
between 2005 and 2009 (Hayward-Jones, 2011). Moreover, the actual size of China’s assistance to Fiji remains 
unknown, as it has not made any figures publicly available (Interview, 2015b, g).  
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economy, its cooperation with Fiji – and other Pacific Islands – had already begun before the 
coup in 2006 and cannot therefore be read purely in geostrategic terms (Yang, 2011). 
Moreover, China’s and Malaysia levels of aid – mainly soft loans for infrastructure projects – 
never reached the levels of assistance that the EU, Australia, or New Zealand had granted to 
Fiji prior to the coup (Schmaljohann and Prizzon, 2014). 
A different story is Bainimarama’s regional co-operation through the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group and his creation of the Pacific Islands Development Forum, which competes with the 
Pacific Island Forum and excluded Australia and New Zealand (Hayward-Jones, 2014; 
Poling, 2013). Bainimarama achieved a certain degree of legitimacy, as the Pacific island 
countries are very reluctant about other nations’ interference in their sovereignty. 
But overall, the role of black knights is limited in explaining the regime’s survival or Fiji’s 
economic recovery. In fact, the most important factors for Fiji’s economic recovery from 
2011 onwards were the boost of the tourist industry, the increase of public spending in 
infrastructure and basic services, an emerging industry of mineral exports, and the increasing 
level of remittances that entered the economy (Asian Development Bank, 2013). 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The case studies presented in this chapter have shed light into several important issues 
regarding the imposition and effects of economic sanctions. First, I have shown that what 
matters for a sender’s decision to impose sanctions is the target’s regime resolution to reject 
the sender’s demands and resist. As the cases of Fiji I and Myanmar illustrate, sanctions were 
imposed after their ruling elites failed to comply with EU demands. This happened about a 
year after the coup in Fiji, and almost three years after the coup in Myanmar – or about six 
225 
 
months after the 1990 elections.  Only in the case of Fiji II were sanctions imposed 
immediately following Commodore Bainimarama’s coup. Yet even then, sanctions were 
preceded by months of intense negotiations between Bainimarama on the one hand, and 
Australia and New Zealand, on the other. 
Second, the case studies illustrate very well how the domestic institutions at the target states 
provide the ruling elites with incentives to comply or resist EU pressure. In this regard, the 
multi-party regime in Fiji I relied on a relatively large winning coalition and was in a position 
of weakness to resist. Therefore, it was keen to negotiate with the EU and accept most of its 
demands. This however was not the case in Fiji II and Myanmar, where the military regimes 
depended for their survival on a small winning coalition and were therefore able to ignore the 
threats of sanctions. Thus, they consciously self-selected themselves into sanctions, just as I 
predict in Chapter 2. 
Admittedly, while the regime in Fiji I was also sanctioned - thus contradicting my 
expectation that multi-party regimes should be less likely to be sanctioned -, four factors 
make this case qualitatively different from the former two. First, even though it failed to do 
so, the interim government in Fiji I sought to comply with the EU’s demands. Thus, the 
regime’s conciliatory behaviour was significantly different from the confrontational stance of 
the military juntas in Fiji II and Myanmar. Second, as a consequence of the regime’s 
compliance after sanctions were imposed, these were short-lived. Quite the opposite was the 
case in Fiji II and Myanmar, where sanctions remained in place for many years. Finally, 
sanctions did contribute to destabilise the winning coalition in Fiji I, whereas they did not 
affect the military regimes in Fiji II and Myanmar. Indeed, sanctions undermined the 
regime’s capacity to hold onto power in Fiji I and fostered internal divisions within the 
winning coalition. 
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The differences between Fiji I on the one hand, and Fiji II and Myanmar on the other, reside 
in the fact that the interim government in Fiji I starkly miscalculated its strength and internal 
cohesion, whereas the military juntas in latter cases did not. In essence, the multi-party 
regime in Fiji I was weak and unable of holding its winning coalition together, whereas the 
military regimes in Myanmar and Fiji II were aware of their cohesion and resilience, being 
therefore able to bear the cost of sanctions. As a consequence, the former ended up 
complying with the EU, whereas the latter resisted its pressure and endured economic 
sanctions for many years. In sum, the case studies exemplify well how the size of the winning 
coalition constraints and shapes a regime’s policy options. 
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CHAPTER 6. SANCTIONS AGAINST BELARUS AND ZIMBABWE 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters I have provided quantitative and qualitative evidence to prove 
that domestic institutions generate incentives for target regimes to comply or resist sanctions. 
I have demonstrated that autocratic regimes with small winning coalitions like the military 
regimes in Fiji II (2006–2014) and Myanmar (1991–ongoing) faced incentives to resist 
sanctions. As a consequence, they were willing to endure economic coercion for long periods 
of time. In the same vein, I have provided evidence that autocratic regimes with large 
winning coalitions like multi–party and dominant regimes were less likely to be sanctioned.  
In addition, I have shown that, once sanctions have been imposed, the domestic institutions in 
targeted countries have also an important effect in determining the duration of sanctions. I 
have argued and proved that regimes with large winning coalitions are more likely to face 
shorter sanctions spells than those regimes with small winning coalitions. These results were 
confirmed by the statistical results of Chapter 4 and by the qualitative evidence provided by 
the case study of Fiji I (2001–2003) in Chapter 5.  
However, recall that my statistical analyses in Chapter 4 improved substantially when a few 
observations were dropped out of the regression models. These observations belonged to the 
sanctions regimes imposed by the EU against Belarus and Zimbabwe. Interestingly, these two 
countries have relatively large winning coalitions and yet they have defied EU pressure for 
many years. Indeed, Alexander Lukashenka’s dominant regime in Belarus and Robert 
Mugabe’s multi-party regime in Zimbabwe have withstood economic sanctions for prolonged 
periods of time, yet they have not shown signs of being destabilised by them, nor have they 
demonstrated a need to compromise or accommodate the EU’s demands. Since these two 
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cases challenge the validity of my argument, this chapter analyses these cases in depth to 
understand why they deviate from my expectation.  
Noteworthy, I find evidence that these two cases constitute outliers to my theoretical 
argument. Most importantly however, my analysis shows that the resilience of Lukashenka 
and Mugabe does not stem from the cohesiveness of their winning coalitions. On the 
contrary, the survival of their regimes is largely explained by the presence of black knights or 
sanctions busters that have allowed these regimes to resist both external and domestic 
pressures for many years. Although it is difficult if not impossible to prove the 
counterfactual, it is likely that neither Lukashenka in Belarus nor Mugabe in Zimbabwe 
would have been capable of surviving in power for so long without the support Russia and 
South Africa respectively. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I analyse the EU’s sanctions regime imposed against 
Belarus since 1997. The Belarusian case is interesting because Lukashenka has been able to 
resist the EU’s pressure for a long spell despite the EU’s relatively large leverage thanks to 
the economic and political backing that Russia has provided him. The chapter then proceeds 
to study the case of Zimbabwe. As with Belarus, the Zimbabwean case is interesting because 
the effect of sanctions has been largely mitigated by regional actors like South Africa, but 
also because these partners have shielded Mugabe from a very strong domestic opposition 
that has threatened the very survival of the regime.     
 
6.2. Belarus (1997–ongoing) 
Belarus has the dubious honour of being the last dictatorship in Europe. Since Alexander 
Lukashenka became president in 1994, the country has drifted relentlessly towards 
authoritarianism. The regime has disrespected the rule of law and its continuous clampdown 
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on the political opposition has triggered several waves of EU sanctions since 1997. Almost 
twenty years later, sanctions are still in place, but nothing seems to have changed in Belarus. 
The relationship between Belarus and the EU has always been complicated, with prolonged 
phases of diplomatic stalemate being followed by spells of quick and intense re–engagement.  
However, EU attempts to engage the regime in the area of human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law have been futile. Almost twenty years of economic coercion have not destabilised 
the regime’s domestic position either. In fact, the crucial element that has determined the 
stability (and the instability) of the Belarusian regime has been the influence of Russia. 
Indeed, Moscow’s political and economic sponsorship has been pivotal to the regime’s 
capacity to withstand sanctions. Russia has systematically provided Belarus with economic 
subsidies, loans and credits worth billions of dollars that have allowed the economy to grow 
at relatively high levels and keep the support for the regime high. Yet at the same time, 
Belarus’ increasing fear of Russia’s growing assertiveness has periodically pushed Minsk to 
seek political rapprochement with the EU. 
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Table 6.1. Coding summary: Belarus. 
Episode Belarus: 1997–ongoing 
Background Since Alexander Lukashenka’s electoral victory in 1994, a promising democratisation was 
thwarted and Belarus entered a negative spiral towards increased authoritarianism. From the very 
beginning, Lukashenka undermined the rule of law, violated human rights and repressed an 
incipient democratic opposition. After more than twenty years of rule that have been marked by 
confrontation with the West and almost two decades of sanctions, Belarus remains the most 
isolated and closed country in Europe. 
Dependent Variable  
 
Following the increasing authoritarianism in the country and the regime’s unwillingness to 
comply with the EU’s demands, the latter imposed sanctions against Belarus for the first time in 
1997, when it refused to ratify the Economic and Partnership Agreement and when it froze aid to 
the country. Since 2004 and especially since 2011, the EU has imposed more expansive and 
coercive measures that have directly targeted President Lukashenka and his inner circle. At the 
same time the EU has pursued a policy of “critical engagement” with the regime, combining 
sanctions with incentives to promote cooperation and the regime’s political liberalisation.  
Independent Variables 
 
Regime type Dominant (weak). Since 1994, Lukashenka rules Belarus through the institutionalisation of 
power around the figure of the president. His decrees have the force of law and he appoints 
legislators and other institutional figures. 
Winning coalition Medium. Lukashenka’s regime was initially based on the siloviki (security services) to repress 
domestic opposition and on Russian subsidies to feed his winning coalition. The modernisation 
of the economy has given rise to an incipient middle class and a larger winning coalition. 
Human rights Before 2000, the regime’s use of violence and intimidation reached unprecedented levels with the 
disappearance and extrajudicial killing of four well–known individuals. The regime’s repression 
of the opposition tends to be targeted, and increases in the aftermath of elections. 
Democratization Belarus has been dubbed “the last dictatorship in Europe” and “the Cuba of Europe”. Despite the 
liberalisation of its economy since 2006 and the reshuffle of the elites to include more liberal 
figures, it remains strongly authoritarian.  
Political instability  
Protests Moderate. The country has witnessed anti-government demonstrations after the flawed elections 
of 2001, 2006 and 2010, yet these are systematically silenced or crashed by the regime.   
Tenure Long: Lukashenko has ruled as Belarus’ president since 1994.  
Economic leverage  
Trade dependence The EU’s trade leverage over Belarus was small in the1990s, although it has increased steadily as 
Belarus has liberalised its economy. 
Aid dependence Low: Belarus is not dependent on EU aid.  
Black knights Yes: Russia has for many years offered a blank check to Belarus to maintain it in its orbit. 
Although relations have worsened in recent years, Russian assistance allows Lukashenka to 
offset the impact of Western sanctions. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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6.2.1. Dependent variable: Resistance and sanctions 
Since 1996, the increasing authoritarianism displayed by President Alexander Lukashenka in 
Belarus became a growing concern in Brussels. Restrictions on the freedoms of assembly, 
demonstration and the media were accompanied by the approval of a new constitution in a 
national referendum that concentrated powers in the figure of the President (Council of 
Europe, 2000; Portela, 2010: 87-88). In December 1996, the Council of the EU expressed its 
concern over the deteriorating situation and warned the Belarusian authorities that the lack of 
progress in the areas of ‘internationally accepted democratic and constitutional principles and 
practices [...] would have a negative impact on relations between Belarus and the European 
Union and on Union support for Belarus’s accession to the Council of Europe’ (EU 
Presidency, 1996b).  
By the end of 1997, no real progress had been made and the EU noted ‘its disappointment 
and displeasure at the clear absence of goodwill on the part of the [Belarusian] Presidency’ 
(Council of the European Union, 1997a). The regime’s non-constructive and even obstructive 
behaviour in its relations with the EU led the Council to impose a first round of sanctions to 
make Lukashenka reconsider his position. These initial measures included i) the EU’s 
withdrawal of support for Belarus’ membership of the Council of Europe; ii) the temporary 
suspension of the tripartite working party between the EU, the Belarusian government and 
members of the Belarusian parliament; iii) freezing the ratification of the interim agreement 
and the partnership and cooperation agreement with Belarus; iv) the suspension of bilateral 
ministerial meetings; and v) the suspension of technical assistance programmes ‘except in the 
case of humanitarian or regional projects or those which directly support the democratization 
process’ (Fierro, 2003: 369). 
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The relationship between the EU and Belarus deteriorated between June and July 1998, when 
Lukashenka cut off electricity and water to the European embassies in Minsk (BBC, 1998). 
The EU imposed targeted sanctions, but these measures were soon lifted after both sides 
reached an agreement in February 1999 (Portela, 2011). Moreover, most of the diplomatic 
sanctions that had been enacted in 1997 were also lifted after the OSCE sent an Advisory 
Monitoring Group (AMG) to Minsk in 1999. The situation escalated yet again when 
Lukashenka refused ‘to extend the visas of the members of the AMG’ after it published 
critical reports of the 2000 parliamentary and the 2001 presidential elections. All EU member 
states but Portugal imposed new travel bans on Belarusian officials but lifted them again in 
2003 when Lukashenka allowed the OSCE to open a delegation in Minsk (Kreutz, 2005: 
38).
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Noting the difficulties to deal with Minsk, the EU sought to engage the regime through a 
step–by–step approach that conditioned the removal of sanctions to the regime’s fulfilment of 
four benchmarks set by the OSCE, including i) the return of substantial powers to the 
Parliament; ii) allowing the opposition to be represented in electoral commissions; iii) 
granting the opposition fair access to the state media; and iv) adopting electoral legislation in 
conformance with international standards (European Commission, 2003a; Zagorski, 2002). 
This offer however fell on deaf ears, and Lukashenka rigged the 2001 presidential elections 
to secure an overwhelming 75% of the vote (Silitski, 2005).  
The EU’s position hardened in May 2004 after a critical report of the Council of Europe 
pointed to the direct involvement of Belarusian authorities in the politically motivated 
disappearances of four prominent figures of Belarusian society between 1999 and 2000 (EU 
Presidency, 2004). After the regime ignored the EU’s request to undertake a credible and 
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 Portugal rejected to impose sanctions due to the negative effect that these measures would have on the 
upcoming summit (Eriksson, 2005). 
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independent investigation of the disappearances, the Council imposed in September 2004 a 
travel ban on four individuals suspected of having participated in the disappearances (Council 
of the European Union, 2004c).  
More sanctions followed between October and December 2004 after Belarus held 
parliamentary elections and a national referendum to modify the 1996 constitution and allow 
Lukashenka to run for a third consecutive term (Council of the European Union, 2004e, f). 
The electoral process and the referendum fell short of OSCE standards and state–sponsored 
violence and arbitrary detentions of opposition members ensued in the aftermath of the 
election (OSCE, 2004).
88
 At the same time, the Council excluded Belarus from participating 
in the EU’s new regional initiative, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), although it 
left the door open to its participation if the situation improved (Vysotskaya, Vieira and Bosse, 
2008). 
However, the bilateral relationship between the EU and Belarus hit a new low after the 
presidential election of March 2006. Once again, the elections were deeply flawed and the 
regime violently cracked down on demonstrators in the aftermath of the elections (SPIEGEL, 
2006). This time, the EU extended the scope of sanctions by imposing an assets freeze on 
those individuals responsible for the flawed elections and the crackdown on the opposition. It 
also added 31 new names to the travel ban and included President Lukashenka for the first 
time in the blacklist (Council of the European Union, 2006a, b).  
Yet again, the regime ignored the EU’s pressure and withstood sanctions. The Belarusian’s 
regime defiance of the EU’s threats thus contradicts my expectation that dominant regimes 
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 The state-controlled Central Election Commission proclaimed that Lukashenka's referendum proposal had 
been backed by 88% of the voters, whereas the neutral Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS) estimated the yes-vote to be closer to 49%. According to this, Lukashenka's proposal should 
have failed, as it needed at least 50% of approval. After this, the IISEPS closed down in April 2005 and was 
forced to move to Lithuania (Wilson, 2011: 207). 
234 
 
should be more likely to comply with the sender before sanctions are imposed (H1). 
Moreover, the regime’s willingness to resist sanctions also refutes my argument that 
dominant regimes should be less likely to be sanctioned (H2). Although in the late 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s the regime accommodated some of the EU’s requests by allowing the 
OSCE’s AMG into the country, these actions were purely cosmetic and were soon afterwards 
followed by increasing deviation from EU demands elsewhere. 
Since 2006 however, the EU’s policy towards Belarus experienced a slow transformation. 
First, the EU started to acknowledge that the isolationist approach based on disengagement 
and sanctions had failed to produce any tangible results (Grant and Leonard, 2006). 
Moreover, the EU’s enlargement of 2004 brought in new Eastern member states like Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania, who had a big interest in a stable and well governed Belarus and who 
largely contributed to a change in the EU’s policy towards their eastern neighbour 
(Hellmeyer, 2014; Wilson, 2008).  
The change of course was first noticeable in December 2006, when the Commission issued a 
“Non–paper” outlining a series of vaguely defined incentives that it was willing to offer 
Belarus if the regime modified its behaviour with regard to human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law (Bosse, 2012; European Commission, 2006). At the same time, Poland, Latvia 
and Lithuania lobbied against new sanctions and vetoed for some time the EU’s suspension 
of Belarus’ GSP trade preferences (Rettman, 2006).89  
Yet the main catalyst for the change of course was triggered by Russia’s oil and gas wars 
with Belarus since December 2006. Although the relation between Russia and Belarus had 
started to deteriorate after Vladimir Putin gained access to the Kremlin in 2000, Moscow’s 
unilateral decision to increase the price of Russian gas exports and to impose a duty on its oil 
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 The suspension of the GSP preferences would be confirmed in June 2007 (Rettman, 2007). 
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exports took Lukashenka and his government by surprise  (Wilson, 2011). The Kremlin’s 
decision imposed a huge burden on Belarus’ finances and pushed Lukashenka to look for new 
commercial partners in Venezuela, Iran and Azerbaijan (Korosteleva, 2011). However, when 
these efforts proved insufficient to reduce or substitute Russia’s strategic position as a 
supplier of cheap energy, investment and diplomatic recognition, the Belarusian regime 
moved quickly to reengage with the EU to offset the impact of Russia’s measures (Bosse and 
Korosteleva-Polglase, 2009; Dura, 2008).  
Fortunately for Lukashenka, the EU was eager to normalise the bilateral relation and 
reengagement between the two sides quickly gained pace. In early 2007, a dialogue on energy 
was established between the EU and Belarus, which was followed by the opening of an EU 
delegation in Minsk in March 2008 (Bosse and Korosteleva-Polglase, 2009; Portela, 2011). 
The EU welcomed the reforms undertaken by the regime, including a privatisation 
programme to attract EU investment in April and the release of the last political prisoners in 
May 2008  (Council of the European Union, 2009b). Moreover, Poland and Sweden lobbied 
for a change of policy and ‘held consultations on the [inclusion of Belarus in the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership] with Belarusian government officials’ (Bosse, 2012: 379).90 
The EU also appreciated Belarus’ non-recognition of the secessionist territories of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia after the war in Georgia in August 2008 (Lindner, 2008; Stewart, 2009). 
The EU’s willingness to reengage was so strong that it celebrated the small ‘positive 
developments’ in the parliamentary elections of 2008 (Council of the European Union, 
2008b), despite the many irregularities that had taken place and even ignored the fact that no 
opposition candidate had won a seat in the legislature (Silitski, 2009).  
                                                          
90
 The Eastern Partnership was launched in Prague in 2009, but Belarus only participated in the multilateral 
sphere, not on the bilateral and more comprehensive one. 
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Most importantly, the Council temporarily suspended most of its sanctions in October 2008 
to encourage reforms in the country (Council of the European Union, 2008a). The suspension 
was extended in 2009, and then again in October 2010 (Council of the European Union, 
2010), despite clear indications that the reforms had stalled and that the situation of human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law had deteriorated again.  
In fact, the lack of willingness of the Belarusian regime to cooperate with the EU in sensitive 
areas like human rights, democracy and the rule of law soon evidenced the limitations of 
rapprochement. Despite the release of political prisoners in 2008, the number of political 
prisoners increased again in 2009 and new restrictions were placed on the media and on the 
registration of political parties (Freedom House, 2010). The change of mood in Brussels was 
reflected in the Council Conclusions of November 2009, where the EU regretted the 
worsening of the situation of human rights in the country and in October 2010, when the EU 
decided to extend the restrictive measures that remained in place shortly before the December 
presidential elections (Council of the European Union, 2009a, 2010). 
Still, in November 2010, shortly before the Belarusian presidential elections, the Polish and 
German foreign ministers attempted a last and desperate attempt to convince Lukashenka to 
remain on the reform path. The ministers flew to Minsk and offered the regime a big carrot of 
€3 billion in assistance if Lukashenka held free and fair elections (Rettman, 2010). However, 
Lukashenka ignored these requests and proceeded to rig the elections despite the large 
present of OSCE observers (Economist, 2010).  
Most worrisome, the regime clamped down violently on the demonstrators that gathered in 
Minsk’s October square after the elections, putting many under police custody and 
imprisoning all the presidential candidates that had run against Lukashenka (Parfitt, 2010). 
The crackdown marked the breakdown of the EU’s reengagement efforts and forced the 
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Council to re-impose the suspended sanctions and extend the scope of restrictive measures 
against the Lukashenka regime (Council of the European Union, 2011b). The Council 
reintroduced targeted travel bans and assets freezes, and added new individuals and entities to 
hit Lukashenka’s inner circle of supporters (Council of the European Union, 2011f). In 
addition, the EU imposed an embargo on the sale of weapons that could be used for internal 
repression and froze the activities of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in Belarus (Council of the European 
Union, 2011a, e). 
Since 2011, sanctions have been progressively expanded and modified, with more individuals 
and entities being added to the blacklist (Hellmeyer, 2014). At the same time however, the 
EU has fostered an approach of “critical engagement” with Belarus, promoting cooperation 
with Belarusian civil society whilst making broader bilateral development cooperation with 
the authorities conditional on progress in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law (Hellmeyer, 2014). The EU has promoted initiatives addressed to the Belarusian 
population and the civil society like the Dialogue of Modernisation, and since 2014 it has 
negotiated a visa facilitation and readmission agreement with the government for the benefit 
of the population (Interview, 2015f).  
Moreover, it has praised Belarus’s brokering of the Minsk Agreements during the ongoing 
Ukrainian crisis, which has generated expectations that the EU might reward Belarus for its 
role in the crisis with closer cooperation (Rettman, 2015).
91
 In fact, the relationship with 
Belarus seems to have improved substantially in the last years, and Lukashenka was even 
invited to attend the Eastern Partnership Meeting in Riga in May 2015  (Kaža, 2015).    
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 Although Member states like Germany have stated that the good offices of Belarus will not influence a 
change in the EU's policy, EU officials are less categorical about this. According to one interviewee, ‘the EU is 
very grateful for Belarus’ recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine’, and Belarus has been rewarded 
accordingly by the EU with official visits to Minsk and the resumption of political dialogue (Interview, 2015a). 
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Thus, despite the increasing scope and severity of sanctions, their effect has been rather mild, 
as the regime has not made substantial concessions regarding human rights, democracy or the 
rule of law. Overall, Belarus has been under EU sanctions for about 17 years. This goes 
against my expectation that sanctions against dominant regimes should be short-lived (H3). 
Moreover, sanctions have not destabilised the regime, as I expect in H4. Although some 
authors have claimed that the release of a few political prisoners since 2011 can be attributed 
to sanctions (Korosteleva, 2012b), this claim is hard to prove and is not substantiated by the 
regime’s actions.  
A few factors help to account for the weakness of my model in predicting the Belarusian case 
correctly. First of all, the EU’s leverage over Belarus in the 1990s was low, as the country 
remained relatively isolated internationally with low commercial linkages and people 
exchanges with the West (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Therefore, the effects of sanctions could 
only be limited.  
Second, inconsistency in the EU’s policy towards Belarus has increased over time. Some 
member states have been particularly keen to do business with Belarusian oligarchs, vetoing 
the inclusion of some names in the blacklist and lobbying their peers to delist others 
(Economist, 2012b; Rettman, 2011b, 2012a, b). Moreover, countries like Latvia and 
Lithuania have profited enormously as transit countries for Belarusian exports, whilst the 
Netherlands have benefited from rebranding and exporting Belarusian oil products from 
Rotterdam (Nielsen, 2012). Ironically, these practices have allowed the Belarusian regime to 
launder its exports of oil products and its derivatives and to circumvent EU and US sanctions 
(Nielsen, 2012; Zakharova, 2012). As one EU official bluntly put it, the ‘Netherlands is the 
member state gaining the most trading with Belarus, but at the same time it screams at human 
rights violations’ (Interview, 2015a). Predictably, these loopholes in the sanctions regime 
have reduced the efficacy of sanctions. 
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Notwithstanding this bleak picture about the little efficacy of sanctions in altering the 
Belarusian’s regime behaviour, it is important to note that the Belarusian case does not 
completely deviate from the expectations of my model. In fact, the short 2006–2010 
reengagement process illustrates well how EU sanctions had a certain destabilising impact on 
the regime. In the absence of Russian support, the EU’s assistance and, especially, 
investment, was paramount for the Lukashenka regime to remain in power. Thus, sanctions – 
and the lack of investment that ensued as a consequence of the inexistent political 
relationship with the EU – had a very big destabilising impact (Portela, 2011). Since Russia’s 
role as a black knight is crucial to understand the resilience of the Belarusian regime, I 
discuss it in more depth below. 
 
6.2.2. Independent variables 
6.2.2.1. Regime type: dominant (weak): medium to large winning coalition 
Alexander Lukashenka’s survival in power for over 20 years has stunned many analysts who 
have underestimated his capacity to manoeuvre in difficult environments. To the surprise of 
those who have anticipated the end of his regime in every crisis with Moscow or in every 
small concession that he has made to the EU, Lukashenka has disappointed them with his 
remarkable capacity to adapt and protect his regime from every crisis with Europe and 
Russia. 
Lukashenka has gained himself a reputation of being a chameleon and a political opportunist, 
someone who has known when and how to adapt to the changing political situation in Europe 
(Wilson, 2008). Indeed, whilst other presidents in his neighbourhood have been swept away 
by colour revolutions in the last twenty years, he has managed to withstand domestic and 
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external pressures, steering Belarus through the treacherous and changing political waters 
between Russia and the EU. Most importantly perhaps, Lukashenka has made out of every 
challenge to his rule an opportunity for the perpetuation of his regime. 
After being elected in 1994, Lukashenka moved quickly to combat powerful oligarchs and to 
weaken the opposition to consolidate his power (Wilson, 2011). First, he limited the growing 
independence of the parliament by promoting a referendum to revise the 1994 constitution. 
This process ‘transfer[ed] many of the parliament’s functions [such as appointment of 
members of the Constitutional Court, the Central Election Commission, and even part of the 
newly created upper house of parliament] to the presidency, extend[ed] his term of office by 
two years, and, by breaking the system of checks and balances, eventually liquidate[d] the 
remaining democratic institutions in the country’ (Silitski, 2003: 45). 
At the same time, Lukashenka initiated a campaign of attacks against the press and 
independent NGOs. He severely restricting their activities and their capacity to operate in the 
country by banning the publication of articles denouncing state corruption or being critical 
with the government, excluding mass media from state printing and distribution systems and 
arresting and intimidating independent journalists (Sahm, 2009: 50-1). Moreover, when 
political opposition shifted from parliament to the civil society, the regime tightened its 
control over NGOs, forcing them to re-register with the state and criminalising the activities 
of organisations that operated outside the state-controlled system (Sahm 2009).  
Regularly, Lukashenka also held elections to strengthen his rule. These allowed him to send a 
clear signal to the opposition about the regime’s strength (Simpser, 2013), but also to identify 
the leaders of the opposition and decapitate the opposition movements from the beginning. 
This was the case after the 2001, 2006, and 2010 presidential elections, when presidential 
contenders faced sham trials and were sent to prison on petty criminal charges (Ash, 2015). 
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Finally, elections also sent a signal about the President’s strength to his own ranks, 
discouraging internal splits and allowing Lukashenka to surround himself by loyalists 
(Burger and Minchuk, 2006).  
Lukashenka’s strategy to survive in power followed many old Soviet authoritarian practices. 
Firstly, when preparing for elections, Lukashenka created and revived old political parties 
like the Communist Party of Belarus, which were led by regime puppets to attract and divert 
a share of the opposition’s vote (Wilson, 2011: 177). Secondly, he used referendums to 
sideline and impose his will over other institutions. For example, the 1996 referendum on a 
new constitution increased the President’s power substantially: it extended his mandate by 
two additional years, it created a much weaker bicameral Parliament where ‘the 110 members 
of the newly created House of Representatives were handpicked by the President’, it gave 
Presidential decrees the force of law and it extended the President’s powers over the 
appointment of institutional figures and government expenditure (Wilson, 2011: 184). 
Finally, Lukashenka bribed potential veto players with rewards and institutional 
appointments and, when this failed, he used the security services to intimidate those who 
resisted him (Silitski, 2005). 
However, Lukashenka’s electoral victories were also the consequence of his popularity 
amongst the Belarusian electorate. Indeed, despite the regime’s consistent efforts at rigging 
the electoral results, independent polls estimated that, had the elections been free and fair, 
Lukashenka would still have won with around 30% to 50% of the votes (Silitski, 2005). The 
key to explain his electoral success resided in his capacity to respond to the preoccupations of 
a large part of the Belarusian population and, in particular, to concerns regarding the 
economic stability and the welfare of the population (Korosteleva, 2012a). Lukashenka’s 
ability to respond to these needs proved pivotal in assuring the regime’s survival by 
maintaining Lukashenka’s approval rate high.  
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Indeed, despite Lukashenka’s strategy to isolate the country from globalisation, Belarus’ 
GDP grew constantly between 3.4% and 11.4% between 1997 and 2006 (World Bank, 
2014b). The country’s strong economic performance in the absence of economic 
liberalisation stunned many analysts, who dubbed this phenomenon the “Belarusian 
economic miracle” (Zlotnikov, 2009). The state’s almost absolute control of the economy and 
the scarcity of private investment made Belarus a singular case of economic success in the 
region. GDP per capita advantaged that of neighbouring Lithuania and Latvia, which had 
implemented tight fiscal adjustment programmes as part of IMF and EU sponsored structural 
reform programmes. In addition, the regime’s control of the economy allowed Lukashenka to 
provide a Soviet-style welfare state, keep unemployment low and grant generous pensions to 
the population (Wilson, 2011).  
However, due to the international isolation of the country, the “Belarusian economic miracle” 
was only sustainable thanks to Russia’s generous and unconditional economic and financial 
support (Portela, 2011). Between 1995 and 1999, Belarus and Russia signed a series of 
agreements to integrate their economies.
92
 These agreements established open borders 
between the two countries, helping to revive and expand the Belarusian export sector 
(Wilson, 2011: 172). Moreover, they also allowed an opportunistic Lukashenka to foster 
smuggling activities across the border and to obtain millions of dollars to feed his patronage 
network at the expense of the Russian budget (Zlotnikov, 2009). Most importantly, Belarus 
obtained huge benefits from importing gas and crude oil at highly subsidised prices from 
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 In 1995, Belarus and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation and 
founded the Union of Belarus and Russia in 1996. Finally, the two countries constituted a Union State in 
December 1999. 
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Russia. Belarus then refined the crude oil and exported at market prices to Europe (Grant and 
Leonard, 2006).
93
  
Consequently, up to 2006 Lukashenka was able to maintain together his winning coalition 
thanks to the large source of revenue that Russian subsidies and trade preferences provided 
(Wilson, 2011). Yet this advantageous situation came to an abrupt end in December 2006, 
when Russian President Vladimir Putin flexed his muscle and started a gas and oil war with 
Belarus to increase his leverage vis-à-vis Lukashenka  (Balmaceda, 2009). While Putin’s 
decision came as a shock to the Belarusian regime, the former had already warned 
Lukashenka in several occasions that Russian subsidies could be halted if Lukashenka 
continued breaking the economic agreements that bound the two countries and failed to 
deliver on his promise to foster integration with Russia (Financial Times, 2007). Moreover, 
Putin’s personal dislike for Lukashenka rendered it more a question of when – rather than 
whether – this would happen (Trenin, 2005).  
The new scenario seriously threatened to undermine the regime’s survival. Under the new 
conditions stipulated by Moscow, ‘Gazprom acquired 50% of Beltransgaz – the national 
Belarusian national Belarusian pipeline network which supplies Europe and domestic 
consumers – for $2.5 billion. It also set down a gradual increase of the gas price paid by 
Belarus to Gazprom over the coming years [jumping from] $46.68 to $100 per 1000 cubic 
meters [in January 2007 and then again] to $119 per 1000 cubic meters, and [...] $150 in the 
latter part of 2008 (Dura, 2008). The spike of gas prices also had ‘an adverse impact on the 
profitability of enterprises affected by rising energy costs and the relatively high energy 
intensity of Belarusian industries [undermining] the competitiveness of export–oriented 
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 According to some estimates, the benefit made accounted for 10 to 20% of the country’s yearly GDP 
(Ditrych, 2013).This was particularly the case since the increase in oil prices since 2003. For a resource-rich 
country like Russia this was a political price worth paying to keep Belarus within its orbit.  
 
244 
 
enterprises [and] widening the trade deficit’ (Korosteleva, 2012b: 21). Finally, the agreement 
also imposed a duty on the export of Russian crude oil, forcing Belarus to ‘transfer 70% of 
the tax revenues from refined oil products to Russia’ (Dura, 2008; Grant and Leonard, 2006; 
Korosteleva, 2012b: 21). 
The reduction of Russian subsidies – which accounted for nearly 60% of the Belarusian state 
budget – put the regime under an enormous strain (Wilson, 2011). Even worse, the economic 
crisis of 2007 further deteriorated the regime’s situation, as demand for Belarusian products 
fell in Europe and Russia (Jarabik, 2009). Cornered by the new circumstances, Lukashenka 
was pushed to modernise the country’s economy, improve its energy efficiency and attract 
foreign capital from other parts of the world to feed his large patronage system (Liakhovich, 
2009). 
These changes pushed the regime to undertake serious reforms of the country’s economy. 
Lukashenka understood well that, was his regime to survive, he would need to make 
concessions to the EU to benefit from its assistance. Thus, the regime initiated dialogues in 
technical areas with the EU and launched a privatisation programme in 2008. Lukashenka 
also released the most prominent opposition leaders, initiated a human rights dialogue with 
the EU and – to the anger of Moscow –, refused to recognise the separatist regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia (Wilson, 2008). 
Yet most importantly, Lukashenka understood that the political structure of his regime had to 
change if it were to deal effectively with the new challenges. Thus, since 2006 he initiated a 
slow but irreversible reshuffle of elites, pushing aside hard-liners and siloviki and replacing 
them with a new generation of well-educated technocrats. The loss of influence of the 
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security services was evident in the decline of Viktar Sheiman
94
 and his cronies since 2006, 
when ‘private companies and other economic structures that had been sources of income for 
the members of this group were dissolved or expropriated, and some of their owners were 
arrested’ (Liakhovich, 2009: 41-2; 2012).  
The replacement of the old guard by a younger and more qualified generation amongst which 
the son of the president, Viktar Lukashenka, stood out served the regime to achieve three 
goals: i) to modernise the economy in the eve of an exhausted economic model based on 
Russian subsidies; ii) to provide a new and more liberal image to appeal to a changing 
Belarusian society; and iii) to steer and control Belarus’ political opening to the West to 
counterbalance the influence of Moscow (Liakhovich, 2009: 45-6). 
However, the scope and depth of Lukashenka’s reforms were ‘limited, as his endeavours 
were driven by the desire for his regime to survive’ (Boonstra and Shapovalova, 2010: 11). 
Indeed, although Minsk’s controlled liberalisation fostered cooperation in certain areas with 
the EU and even obtained a loan from the IMF in 2009 (Wagstyl, 2009), it also made sure not 
to go as far as to jeopardise the regime’s position. Thus, whilst the regime was eager to 
undertake privatisations and liberalise and modernise the economy, it failed to comply with 
key demands of the EU, such as the reform on the Electoral Code and the respect of OSCE 
electoral standards (Portela, 2011).  
On the contrary, Minsk’s search for increased cooperation with Europe was not motivated by 
a genuine will to liberalise the country, but rather by Lukashenka’s strategic need to 
blackmail Russia in order to obtain larger concessions from Moscow (Hett, 2007; Jarabik and 
Silitski, 2008). Not surprisingly, after the crackdown and the imposition of new sanctions by 
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 Sheiman had played a prominent role in the security of the regime, first as assistant to the president for 
defence and security issues and as Secretary of the Security Council until 2000, then as prosecutor-general 
between 2000-2004, as head of the presidential administration until 2006 and finally as Secretary of the Security 
Council until 2008 (Liakhovich, 2009).  
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the EU in 2011, the ailing Belarusian economy was once again saved by Russia. Indeed, 
despite Putin’s hatred of Lukashenka and Russian growing assertiveness, Lukashenka’s 
regime still remained a lesser evil for Putin than a colour revolution or a pro–West 
government just 400km away from Moscow (Economist, 2007; Jarabik and Rabagliati, 
2007). 
However, Russian assistance has come at an increasing cost for Lukashenka and with strings 
attached (Moshes and Rácz, 2015). Indeed, while Lukashenka managed to secure a $3 billion 
bailout from Moscow in May 2011, he was also forced to undertake further privatisations in 
the oil and gas sectors (BBC, 2011). This has played into Russia’s hands and has weakened 
Lukashenka’s position. Finally, Lukashenka’s margin of manoeuvre has shrunk since 2006, 
as Belarus has been pressed to join Russia and other CIS countries in the newly created 
Eurasian Union (Barbashin, 2015).  
Ironically though, increased Russian penetration in Belarus has generated concerns in EU 
capitals about the counterproductive effects of sanctions and international isolation in 
pushing Belarus closer to Moscow (Interview, 2015a). As a consequence, the EU has become 
increasingly pragmatic and, despite the maintenance of restrictive measures, it has sought to 
engage the regime in a critical but cooperative spirit (Bosse, 2012).  
Finally, since the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict in March 2014, Lukashenka has been 
able to increase his political autonomy. His role in brokering the Minsk agreements between 
Ukraine, Russia and the EU have been greatly appreciated and rewarded accordingly by the 
EU, which has broken the regime’s isolation and invited Lukashenka to the EaP summit in 
Riga (Interview, 2015a; Socor, 2015). Moreover, Lukashenka has taken advantage of 
Russia’s ban on the import of EU food products by rebranding EU goods like cheese and 
meat and selling them through the open border with Russia as Belarusian goods (Euractiv, 
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2014). While Lukashenka’s opportunism has angered Russia, it is likely that Lukashenka will 
obtain something in return from Moscow if he falls back in line with the Kremlin  (Interview, 
2015a). 
 
6.2.2.2. Human rights and democracy 
Soon after Lukashenka’s electoral victory in 1994, the country saw a worsening in the rule of 
law, the level of democracy, and the respect of human rights (see Graph 6.1 below). Already 
in 1996, Lukashenka won a flawed referendum to amend the country’s constitution and 
increase his presidential powers. Another flawed plebiscite in 2004 saw him amending the 
1996 constitution to further undermine the rule of law and democracy by allowing him to run 
for a consecutive third term  (Simpser, 2013).  
Lukashenka’s flawed victories were accompanied by the targeted and systematic harassment 
and intimidation of the domestic opposition before, during, and after the elections. The level 
of intimidation reached a climax between 1999 and 2000, when four prominent Belarusian 
individuals disappeared with the alleged connivance of the authorities (BBC, 2001; EU 
Presidency, 2004). Torture, inhuman treatment and extrajudicial killings also contributed to a 
state of fear in the country, pushing many opposition figures to exile  (Wilson, 2011).  
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Graph 6.1. Level of democracy and human rights in Belarus, 1988–2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data for democracy from Wahman et al. (2013); data for human rights from 
Gibney et al. (2015). 
 
Undoubtedly, the increasing disrespect displayed by Lukashenka for the rule of law in 
Belarus, the disappearances of people and the imprisonment of opposition politicians had a 
clear impact on the EU’s decision to impose sanctions. Over the years, the EU deplored the 
regime’s restrictions on the registration of NGOs and its prohibition to allow them to receive 
external funding (Interview, 2015f). NGOs faced restrictive registration procedures, difficult 
tax regulations and intensive state supervision [forcing them to operate] under a constant 
threat of suspension’ (Sahm, 2009). As a consequence, the number of registered NGOs 
shrunk considerably and forced many of them to close down, operate from outside Belarus, or 
go underground.  
The regime also maintained a tight censorship and control over the media, threatening and 
closing down independent publications (Sannikov and Kuley, 2006). Worse perhaps, Belarus 
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maintained the death penalty, something over which the EU has repeatedly expressed its 
concern about (Harding and Karmanau, 2012). Finally, although the short period of 
rapprochement between the EU and Belarus during 2007-2010 saw an improvement in the 
situation of human rights and the release of most political prisoners in 2008, the situation 
deteriorated again in 2009 and especially, after the 2010 post-electoral crackdown.  
 
6.2.2.3. Economic leverage 
The EU’s leverage over Belarus has been limited, although it has increased over the last 
years. The bilateral trade has more than doubled in the last decade, increasing from 5.344€ 
millions in 2004 to about 16.086€ millions in 2013 – or 26.2% of Belarus’ trade with the 
world (European Commission, 2015a). However, even though the EU’s economic penetration 
in Belarus has expanded its influence in Minsk remains eclipsed by Russia’s omnipresence. 
Indeed, even though the EU is Belarus’ second largest trading partner, it lags far behind 
Russia, who concentrates nearly 50% of Belarus’ trade (European Commission, 2015a). As 
one EU official summed it up, ‘Belarus is almost part of Russia’ (Interview, 2015a). 
The EU’s influence has also been hampered for many years due to low levels of investment, 
aid, information flows and a lack of exchange and mobility opportunities for Belarusian 
citizens (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Potocki, 2011). However, this situation has changed 
considerably in the last decade, as Belarusian citizens travel abroad more frequently and are 
able to compare the life quality of their country with that of Russia and the EU ((Potocki, 
2011).  In addition, the EU’s negotiation of a visa facilitation and readmission agreement with 
Belarus will increase the EU’s leverage considerably. Belarus’ willingness to push forward 
on this issue has surprised EU officials, who attribute this concession to Lukashenka’s self-
confidence (Interview, 2015f).  
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Finally, the EU’s has repeatedly offered to assist Belarus financially through the granting of 
aid and loans, but these offers have been continuously rejected by Lukashenka due to the 
strings that come attached to them. This has also applied to Belarus’ disinterest to be included 
in the ENP, as ‘the price to be paid by the [Belarusian] political elite for strengthening ties 
with the EU is too high’ (Dura, 2008: 6). Indeed, increased cooperation with the EU would 
force Lukashenka ‘to democratise Belarusian politics and society’ (Dura, 2008: 6), thereby 
seriously jeopardising the regime’s grip on power. Finally, Lukashenka’s disinterest for EU 
incentives is also a matter of substance, as the EU cannot match Russian subsidies and 
economic cooperation. 
 
6.2.2.4. Black knights 
Lukashenka’s capacity to resist EU sanctions for such a long period of time is directly related 
to the support that his regime has received from Russia. Indeed, Moscow’s economic and 
political backing can be considered a necessary and almost sufficient condition to explain the 
regime’s resistance to external pressure (Portela, 2011). In fact, Belarus’ economic and 
political integration with Russia is so important that, in many respects, it can be considered 
almost part of Russia (Interview, 2015a).  
Belarus has benefitted enormously from a close relationship with Russia, first through the 
formation of the Union State in December 1999, then the Eurasian Customs Union in 2010, 
and more recently, with the creation of the Eurasian Union. Since 1995 Belarus has exported 
to Russia on very generous trade terms, as the latter imported certain products like sugar at 
highly subsidised prices (Wilson, 2011: 240). Moreover, as the result of the customs union 
created in 1995, ‘Belarusian goods began to enter the Russian market duty-free [...] and the 
production and export of goods to Russia grew considerably (Zlotnikov, 2009: 67). Until 
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2000, Belarus also profited enormously from contraband across the Russian border. Some 
analysts estimate that the contribution of illegal flows of commodities like cigarettes and 
vodka contributed around 9-12% to the Belarusian GDP in 1999 (Zlotnikov, 2009: 69). 
However, the most important source of revenue for the Belarusian regime was the import of 
heavily subsidised oil and gas. Cheap gas allowed Belarusian firms to remain competitive 
despite their energetic inefficiency, whilst cheap crude oil was refined at Belarusian refineries 
and then exported at much higher market prices to the EU and Russia. Some estimates claim 
that the benefits obtained by Belarus from Russian subsidised energy accounted for 10% to 
20% of the country’s GDP (Dura, 2008; Wilson, 2011; Zlotnikov, 2009). Although this 
situation changed since 2007 when Russia imposed duties on the export of crude oil and 
increased the prices of gas, it is obvious that Moscow’s subsidies had a clear influence on the 
regime’s capacity to withstand EU pressure and to remain relatively isolated from external 
economic and political dynamics (Korosteleva, 2012b).  
However, Russia has been as much a source of stability as one of fear and insecurity for the 
survival of Lukashenka’s regime. Although Lukashenka has certainly ‘managed to obtain 
money from Russia every time he needed it’ (Interview, 2015a), it is also true that this 
assistance has come at an increasingly higher cost since Putin rules in Russia. The 2006-7 oil 
and gas dispute or the 2013 potash wars with Moscow have forced Lukashenka to look for 
alternative sources of income, forcing him to open up the overregulated economic system of 
the country to foreign investment. The privatisation of entities that have ensued from these 
disputes have played into Russia’s hands, which has increased its economic penetration in the 
country (Aslund, 2011).  
Finally, Russia’s increasing assertiveness after its military invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its 
role in Ukraine in 2014 have generated great anxiety in Minsk and tensed the bilateral 
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relationship. In a display of its political ambiguity, Lukashenka has distanced himself from 
Russia’s economic warfare against Ukraine and has even threatened to abandon the Eurasian 
Union due to the high economic burden that the Russian economic crisis and the war in 
Ukraine are imposing on Belarus (Coyer, 2015). Lukashenka has also sought closer 
cooperation with the EU and has claimed that the presence of “green men” in Belarus would 
constitute a declaration of war (Radio Free Europe, 2015).
95
  
 
6.3. Zimbabwe (2002–ongoing) 
Zimbabwe is one of the most puzzling cases of EU sanctions. After more than 13 years, it 
stands as one of the longest-lived sanctions regimes ever imposed by the EU. However, it 
also counts as one of the EU’s most ineffective sanctions regimes. Zimbabwe poses a serious 
challenge to my argument since, according to my theoretical account, the regime is weak and 
should have surrendered to EU pressure very early during the sanctions episode. However, 
Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
party have shown a perplexing and extraordinary resilience vis-à-vis sanctions over the last 
one and a half decades. 
What is most striking about the Zimbabwean regime’s defiance has been its capacity to 
survive in power despite the huge economic, political, and humanitarian problems that it has 
faced. Indeed, Mugabe’s rule has not only been threatened by the dire economic situation in 
the country; it has also faced an increasingly confident and electorally successful domestic 
opposition in the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Since the empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that Mugabe and the ZANU-PF should have relinquished power under the 
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 The notion of “green men” refers to the unidentified and allegedly Russian soldiers that have undertaken 
illegal military operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014.  
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weight of sanctions, I analyse here why this has not been the case and why Zimbabwe 
constitutes an outlier to my argument.   
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Table 6.2. Coding summary: Zimbabwe. 
Episode Zimbabwe: 2002–ongoing 
Background In 2002, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party won Zimbabwe’s Presidential elections by a small margin over 
the opposition party, the MDC. The election was rigged, Western media was denied access to the 
country, and the EU was not allowed to deploy an election observation mission. Since then, state–
sponsored violence has been regularly employed against the opposition prior to elections and 
sanctions have been imposed and maintained for over 12 years. The last Presidential election of 
2013, which saw Mugabe win a fifth consecutive term in office has led to a progressive change in the 
EU’s approach to Zimbabwe.  
Dependent Variable  
 
In 2001, the EU opened negotiations with Zimbabwe under Articles 8 and 96 of the Cotonou 
Agreement. The EU threatened to terminate the consultation process and impose sanctions if 
Zimbabwe did not to comply with its demands. The deterioration of the situation on the ground and 
Mugabe’s defiance to comply with the EU led the latter to impose sanctions in February 2002. Since 
2011, marginal progress in the country has led the EU to progressively delist individuals from its 
blacklist, and in November 2014 it resumed development cooperation with Zimbabwe.  
Independent Variables 
 
Regime type Multi–party (weak). Since the 2000 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF 
party has faced an increasing domestic opposition to its rule by the MDC.  
Winning coalition Moderate–Large: Robert Mugabe has ruled in Zimbabwe with the support of ample sections of the 
country’s society, including his political party ZANU-PF, the military, the police, the war veterans, 
and youth–militias. 
Human rights The situation of human rights has deteriorated considerably since the contested 2000 elections. The 
ruling ZANU-PF has been accomplice of the forceful land acquisitions by war veterans. Moreover, 
the ZANU-PF has used the war veterans, the army, the police and youth militias to harass and 
intimidate opposition leaders, especially before elections took place. 
Democratization Although the country holds multi–party elections, these are neither free nor fair. The situation of 
democracy has deteriorated gravely since 2002. The President has assumed increasing powers, a 
tight media censorship has been imposed, and the independence of the judiciary has been 
undermined by the regime.    
Political instability  
Protests The MDC has generally refrained from staging mass demonstrations against the regime for fear of 
retaliation by the security forces. Moreover, the security services regularly impede meetings and 
electoral rallies from the opposition.  
Tenure Long: Mugabe has served as Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister from 1980 to 1987 and as President since 
1987. 
Economic leverage  
Trade dependence Large: The EU is Zimbabwe’s second largest trading partner after South Africa. Although trade 
between the EU and Zimbabwe decreased up to 2009, it has continuously increased since.  
Aid dependence Large: The EU has been one of the largest donors of Zimbabwe. However, since 2002 aid has been 
mainly channelled through NGOs, avoiding the participation of the government.  
Black knights Yes: African countries – and in particular South Africa – have openly defended Robert Mugabe and 
demanded the lifting of sanctions. In addition, China has increasingly ailed Zimbabwe by providing 
financial assistance in exchange for access to the country’s mineral resources.   
Source: Own elaboration. 
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6.3.1. Dependent variables: Threat of sanctions, resistance and sanctions 
In June 2000, the ZANU-PF obtained a marginal victory over the newly formed MDC. The 
elections however had been deeply flawed, the rule of law had been systematically attacked 
by the regime, and state–sponsored violence against the opposition had been unravelled by 
the regime in the run–up to the election (International Crisis Group, 2000b). After the 
elections, EU member state delegations in Harare proposed the opening of a political 
dialogue with the government of Zimbabwe under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. Yet 
from the very beginning, the dialogue suffered from serious delays in the schedule, which the 
EU interpreted as ‘as a sign of [Zimbabwean] unwillingness to proceed’ with the process 
(Laakso et al., 2006: 69). Frustrated by the lack of cooperation, the Council decided to go one 
step further and instructed the Commission to open consultations with Zimbabwe under 
Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement in October 2001 (Portela, 2007a). 
In its letter to the Zimbabwean government, the Commission expressed its concern for the 
situation on the ground and asked the government to respect human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law. In particular, it urged the latter to i) hold a credible Presidential 
election in 2002; ii) allow an EU observing mission to monitor the campaign and voting 
process;  iii) put an end to political violence in the country; iv) respect the independence of 
the judiciary; and v) to protect the freedom of the mass media. Finally, the Commission 
requested Zimbabwe to commit to and implement swiftly the Abuja accord on land reform, a 
latent political issue contributing to the instability in the country (European Commission, 
2001a). 
However, as a last and unproductive meeting between EU and Zimbabwean delegations on 
11 January 2002 evidenced, the Zimbabwean authorities showed no interest in cooperating 
with the EU. Disgruntled by Mugabe’s behaviour and with the March Presidential elections 
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fast approaching, the Council of the European Union issued on 28 January 2002 an unusually 
strong statement threatening to conclude the consultation process with Zimbabwe and impose 
targeted sanctions if i) the latter did not allow and EU observation mission to monitor the 
Presidential election; ii) there was a serious deterioration in the situation on the ground; or iii) 
the election was flawed (Council of the European Union, 2002a).    
This threat did not dissuade Mugabe and the ZANU-PF, who in the build–up to the election 
‘brutalised opposition […] supporters into staying home, [scared] potential opposition 
supporters into voting ZANU-PF, [stole] hundreds of thousands of votes by manipulating 
voter rolls and eligibility rules, and [disenfranchised] hundreds of thousands of potential 
opposition supporters through myriad other legal and legislative moves’ (International Crisis 
Group, 2002c: 1). The government also passed new legislation to increase the control over 
the press, escalated state violence and intimidation against the MDC and broke with its 
commitment to the Abuja Agreement by tolerating new illegal farm invasions (International 
Crisis Group, 2002a, b).    
On 18 February 2002, the Council backed its threat and adopted ‘appropriate measures’ by 
suspending development cooperation with the country (Council of the European Union, 
2002d; Portela, 2007a). Moreover, and deviating from normal EU practice, the suspension of 
development assistance was accompanied by CFSP sanctions imposing an embargo on the 
sale of arms to Zimbabwe, and travel bans and assets freezes on over seventy individuals who 
were ‘engaged in activities that seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights and 
the rule of law in Zimbabwe’ (Council of the European Union, 2002b).  
Mugabe defined the sanctions as “economic terrorism” and enacted counter–measures like 
the withdrawal of passports and the introduction of exit and entry visas on the domestic 
political opposition for its support of EU sanctions. Moreover, he reshuffled his government 
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to circumvent sanctions, but the EU replied by updating its blacklist, delisted those 
individuals that had been replaced from Zimbabwe’s government, and added new names to 
the list (Council of the European Union, 2002c; Eriksson, 2007)
96
. 
Other international actors also imposed sanctions against the Mugabe regime. In December 
2001, the US enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA), a 
piece of legislation instructing US representatives in international financial institutions ‘to 
oppose credit and loan extensions (to Zimbabwe), except for basic human needs or good 
governance purposes’ (International Crisis Group, 2012: 3). Zimbabwe was also suspended 
from the Commonwealth in March 2002 for violating the terms of the Harare Declaration 
(BBC, 2003; Marquez, 2006), which included the respect for human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law.
97
  
The outcome of the negotiations between the EU and Zimbabwe does not support my 
expectations of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Mugabe’s resistance to a very strong threat of sanctions 
refutes my expectation that multi–party regimes should be more likely to comply with the 
sender before sanctions are imposed. Although Zimbabwe certainly entered into negotiations 
with the EU, its predisposition to negotiate seemed to be driven more by a delaying and time–
buying strategy than by a serious commitment to improve the situation. In fact, the empirical 
evidence seems to suggest that the regime anticipated sanctions and bought itself some time 
to move money in Europe to safe heavens by acceding to negotiate with the EU (Eriksson, 
2005).  
Similarly, the actual imposition of sanctions invalidates my Hypothesis 2 that multi–party 
regimes should be less likely to be sanctioned. Surprisingly, while sanctions have certainly 
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 Notably, the Council added Mugabe’s spouse, Grace, to the blacklist.  
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 In December 2003 the suspension was renewed for another year, after which Zimbabwe withdrew from the 
organisation altogether.  
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generated discomfort to the Zimbabwean ruling elite (Eriksson, 2011; Giumelli, 2013a), they 
have not changed Mugabe’s behaviour. The regime’s defiant attitude is especially puzzling if 
one takes into consideration the dire economic situation of the country. 
After the first round of sanctions in 2002, the EU and Zimbabwe became entangled in a 
political deadlock. Sanctions were routinely extended and expanded over the years through 
the addition of new names to the blacklist, but Mugabe retaliated with measures of his own, 
like travel bans on UK officials visiting Zimbabwe (Eriksson, 2007). Moreover, the 
Zimbabwean regime skilfully used sanctions to its advantage, blaming Western countries for 
the economic problems of the country and portraying sanctions as an instrument of Western 
imperialism  (Foley, 2011).  
In 2008, a critical moment was reached when Mugabe lost the first round of the Presidential 
elections to the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai (BBC, 2008). However, Mugabe refused to 
concede defeat and unleashed a campaign of political violence and intimidation against the 
opposition (McGreal, 2008). Severely weakened by this attack, Tsvangirai abandoned the 
electoral race and Mugabe obtained an easy victory in the second round of the Presidential 
elections  (Dugger and Bearak, 2008). Mugabe’s flawed victory sparked international 
condemnation. The EU demanded him to step down and added more names to the sanctions 
blacklist (Reuters, 2008), whilst the increasing political and economic crisis in the country 
exacerbated the need for international action. 
Although a consensus on the need for action grew, the international community was split on 
the course of action to be pursued. On the one hand, the South African Development 
Community (SADC) opted to sponsor a dialogue between the ZANU-PF and the opposition 
parties to address the situation in Zimbabwe; on the other, the EU and the US chose a more 
coercive approach and added more names to their sanctions blacklists (Alden, 2010; Council 
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of the European Union, 2008c; International Crisis Group, 2008b). Moreover, the UK and the 
US pushed in July 2008 for a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution to impose 
multilateral United Nations (UN) sanctions against the regime (International Crisis Group, 
2008b), but this effort failed after China and Russia voted against it (United Nations, 2008). 
By the end of 2008, the SADC brokered an agreement for the creation of a government of 
national unity (GNU) between the ZANU-PF and the opposition parties,
98
 where Mugabe 
would retain the presidency and Tsvangirai would become the Prime Minister. In addition, a 
Global Political Agreement (GPA) was reached that outlined the basic aspects of the GNU 
and sketched an agenda of reforms for the country, which included the drafting of a new 
constitution and the holding of new elections (Darracq, 2010; International Crisis Group, 
2009).  
The SADC’s brokered agreement included a reference to the lifting of sanctions, but the EU 
and the US contended that these would stay in place as long as nothing changed on the 
ground (CNN, 2009; Pleming, 2009). The deadlock seemed insurmountable: while the 
ZANU-PF accused the MDC to renege from its GPA commitments and support sanctions, 
Tsvangirai replied that he ‘ha[d] no control over sanctions, and [that] there would be a 
stronger basis for their removal if GPA violations ended, and ZANU-PF did not block the 
reforms’ (International Crisis Group, 2012: 1). 
Nevertheless, for the first time in years MDC members begun lobbying the US and the EU to 
modify their approach and lift sanctions to show support to the GNU (Wikileaks, 2009). This 
change of attitude responded to the increasing perception amongst the Zimbabwean 
population that sanctions were having negative effects on the country’s economy. Although 
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 In 2005, the MDC split into two parties, the MDC-Tsvangirai and the MDC-Mutambara (see below). 
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unproven,
99
 this claim was shared by other international actors like the SADC or the UN’s 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (Telegraph, 2012b). But most importantly perhaps, 
the MDC’s request was primarily driven by the fact that, after seven years in place, sanctions 
had not only failed to destabilise Mugabe and his regime; they were also being used by the 
ZANU-PF to blame the MDC for the poor state of the economy and to rally political support 
for Mugabe. 
The formation of the GNU opened a window of opportunity for the revision of the EU’s 
sanctions based approach. In 2009, an EU delegation visited Zimbabwe for the first time in 
years  (Lunn and Thomson, 2010), and in 2011 the sanctions regime was revised to 
encourage progress by granting exemptions to the travel ban on grounds of humanitarian 
need or to attend international conferences and EU political dialogues to promote democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law in Zimbabwe (Council of the European Union, 2011c). 
Moreover, in 2012 the Council temporarily suspended the appropriate measures imposed 
under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to ‘demonstrate the Union’s continued 
commitment to the Global Political Agreement process’ (Council of the European Union, 
2012a).  
Although progress under the GNU and the GPA was slow and barred by the ZANU-PF’s 
resistance to implement reforms (Kriger, 2012; Raftopolos, 2013), the EU continued its re-
engagement with the regime and hinted that the completion of a peaceful referendum on a 
new constitution in 2013 would represent an important step for the lifting of sanctions 
(Council of the European Union, 2012b). On 16 March 2013 the constitution was approved in 
a referendum that the EU considered “credible” (BBC, 2013a). This marked an important 
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 While the sanctions imposed by the EU and the US were targeted in nature – and hence, not intended to inflict 
damage on the country’s economy -, sanctions might have had indirect effects by internationally stigmatising 
the country and scaring away investment. However, while this argument might be partially true, the poor state of 
the economy has primarily been caused by the ZANU-PF’s economic policies since the 1990s.  
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breakthrough in the relationship with Zimbabwe (Portela, 2014), as the Council proceeded to 
suspend the travel ban and the assets freeze of a majority of the blacklisted individuals 
(Council of the European Union, 2013b). 
The EU paved the way for the complete removal of sanctions if the presidential election of 
July 2013 was peaceful, transparent and credible (Council of the European Union, 2013c, e). 
Although serious concerns about the freedom and fairness of the election were raised  
(Euractiv, 2013b), the SADC’s and the African Union’s reports hailing the election as ‘free, 
peaceful and generally credible’ left the EU in a political conundrum with little room to 
manoeuvre (International Crisis Group, 2013, 2014; Raftopoulos, 2013: 978). Consequently, 
on 18 February 2014 the Council took a step further in the normalisation of the relationship 
with Zimbabwe by suspending most of its sanctions. Moreover, it allowed the appropriate 
measures imposed under Article 96 of the Cotonou agreement to expire in November 2014 
and resumed direct cooperation on development assistance with the government (Council of 
the European Union, 2014). At the same time though, it maintained the arms embargo, the 
travel ban and the assets freeze on Mugabe, his wife, and one entity
100
 (Reuters, 2015).  
Admittedly, the evidence of the Zimbabwean sanctions regime contradicts my predictions of 
the additional hypotheses 3 and 4. First, the longevity of sanctions goes against my 
expectation that multi-party regimes should be targeted for short periods of time (H3). At the 
time of writing, sanctions against Zimbabwe have been in place for over 13 years, a spell that 
is clearly above the average of three years in the case of multi-party regimes. Second, 
sanctions have not destabilised Mugabe or the ZANU-PF. This evidence also contradicts my 
Hypothesis 4. At the age of 91, Mugabe is one of the most long-standing leaders in Africa. 
He has survived in office for over 35 years, 13 of which have been under EU and US 
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 This entity was the Zimbabwe Defence Industries. 
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sanctions. This period is clearly above the average survival rate of autocrats in multi–party 
regimes, which is close to three-and-a-half-years according to my data.  
The failure of sanctions to alter Mugabe’s behaviour can be partially accounted by several 
factors. First of all, the imposition of sanctions generated unexpected or perverse effects, the 
most important of which was a “rally-around-the-flag” effect. Thanks to the ZANU-PF’s 
control of the media, the regime succeeded in portraying sanctions as an imperialist attack on 
Zimbabwe and blamed sanctions for the economic woes of the country. This boosted 
Zimbabwean nationalism and increased the support for the regime, whilst at the same time 
stigmatised the MDC as an anti-patriotic party for supporting sanctions (International Crisis 
Group, 2012; Marquez, 2006).  
Second, sanctions were poorly implemented and enforced. Inconsistencies, exceptions and 
exemptions in the sanctions regime generated important legal loopholes that permitted 
targeted individuals to bypass them easily (Eriksson, 2007, 2011; Grebe, 2010). For instance, 
exceptions to the travel ban were allowed if the targeted individuals had to enter Europe to 
attend international conferences. Once in Europe, these individuals faced no constraints to 
pursue their private interests (Smith-Höhn, 2010). Furthermore, due to time lags between the 
imposition of sanctions and their implementation, the targets had enough time to move 
money to safe-havens (Eriksson, 2007, 2011). In fact, the amount of money frozen was so 
small that it questioned the entire effectiveness of ‘assets freezes […] as a means of inhibiting 
or changing the behaviour of those who are targeted’ (House of Lords, 2007: 26, para. 68).101 
Lastly, the EU’s arms embargo was easily circumvented by importing weapons from 
countries like China or Russia (Jeuck, 2011; Munnion, 2008). 
                                                          
101
 According to the Foreign Office, the UK had only frozen £160,000 from Zimbabwean individuals and 
entities (House of Lords 2007, 26, para. 68).  
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Third, sanctions also generated tensions between EU member states. A row erupted between 
the UK and France in 2003, when the latter invited Mugabe to a Franco-African conference 
in Paris (Morris and Peta, 2003). Similarly, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown boycotted the 
EU-Africa meeting in Lisbon in 2007 due to Zimbabwe’s presence (BBC, 2007). Moreover, 
Belgium’s lobbying for the lifting of sanctions against the Zimbabwe Mining Development 
Corporation – Zimbabwe’s largest diamond exporter and a source of patronage for the regime 
– generated a rift between Belgium and the UK (Blair and Laing, 2013; Rettman, 2013). 
Finally, the lack of regional and international support for sanctions undermined their 
effectiveness by allowing Mugabe to see the EU’s bet and raise the stakes of the 
confrontation. Indeed, regional actors like the SADC and, especially, South Africa, have 
continuously backed Mugabe in his confrontation with the West, branding EU and US 
sanctions as illegal and demanding their removal (Adelmann, 2004; Aljazeera, 2013).    
 
 
6.3.2. Independent variables 
6.3.2.1. Regime type: multi-party regime (weak), large winning coalition 
Zimbabwe is coded as a multi–party (or weak) regime in my dataset. According to my theory, 
this implies that Mugabe and the ZANU-PF should have complied with the EU’s demands 
before sanctions were imposed. However, as I have shown above, Mugabe has not only 
ignored EU requests to respect the rule of law, democracy and human rights; he has also been 
able to resist sanctions for over 13 years. In fact, Mugabe has shown an outstanding resilience 
against an increasingly hostile domestic and international scenario. His capacity to survive in 
office for such a prolonged period of time puts the validity of my argument into question, 
despite strong evidence that would suggest otherwise. 
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Since the 1990s, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF have faced mounting challenges to their rule. 
First, the regime has had to deal with an adverse economic situation. Since 1999, the IMF and 
the World Bank suspended the provision of balance of payment support, soft loans and 
credits due to Zimbabwe’s incapacity to pay back its arrears (International Crisis Group, 
2001). Moreover, the government’s economic mismanagement102 has undermined the rule of 
law in Zimbabwe, generating a huge legal uncertainty that has scared investors away from the 
country (International Crisis Group, 2000b). Its policies have also led to the shrinking of the 
economy: up to 2008, the country’s GDP systematically shrank between 3 to 17% a year 
(World Bank, 2014a). Inflation skyrocketed to 231 million % in 2008 (Economist, 2013b), 
and unemployment and interest rates have remained at extremely high levels. The economic 
woes of the country have forced almost 3 million Zimbabweans – amongst them highly 
qualified workers – to emigrate (Tevera and Crush, 2010). 
Second, the ZANU-PF’s position has been challenged by an increasingly confident domestic 
opposition. In 2000, despite major efforts to rig the general elections, the ZANU-PF only 
managed to obtain a marginal edge over the newly formed MDC (Simpser, 2013). The 
ZANU-PF’s electoral weakness was further evidenced in February 2000, when it lost a 
referendum on a new constitution by a 55-45 margin. Over the years, the regime has proven 
incapable of securing electoral victories, despite making a systematic use of irregular means 
(Simpser, 2013). In fact, Mugabe’s rule came close to an end after losing the first round of 
the 2008 Presidential election against Tsvangirai, yet he managed to remain in office after 
unleashing a campaign of violence and intimidation against the opposition (McGreal, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the ZANU-PF was not strong enough to rule by itself, and the political 
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 In August 1998, Mugabe decided to deploy Zimbabwean armed forces to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
with an estimated cost to the public budget of 3$ million a month. Moreover, in November 1997 he gave in to 
the demands of the war veterans by agreeing to meet their demands of compensation (Raftopoulos, 2003: 229). 
This decision imposed an excessive burden on an already fragile economy. Finally, Mugabe’s decision to back 
the war veterans’ farm invasions after February 2000 further ‘shattered domestic and international confidence’ 
in Zimbabwe. 
265 
 
deadlock of 2008 forced Mugabe to reach an agreement with the MDC to form a GNU 
between 2009 and 2013. 
Finally, since 2002 the regime has faced a hostile international environment. The imposition 
of economic sanctions by the EU and the US has stigmatised the regime and made the life of 
ZANU-PF members difficult (Eriksson, 2007). According to one report, financial sanctions 
have generated discomfort within ZANU-PF ranks, leading some of its members to desire 
Mugabe’s removal from office (International Crisis Group, 2007). Moreover, as Mugabe’s 
power has eroded over time, splits within the ZANU-PF have proliferated. This has increased 
the price that Mugabe pays for staying in office, forcing him to make major concessions to 
powerful interests groups to sustain his rule – most notably, the war veterans and the military. 
As a consequence, rumours have spread that it is the military, and not Mugabe, who controls 
political power in Zimbabwe (BBC, 2010a). To make things worse, concerns about Mugabe’s 
health and his ‘unwillingness to identify a successor have fed the ongoing internecine battles’ 
within the ZANU-PF, generating further uncertainty and instability in the country 
(International Crisis Group, 2014: 19). 
Since these elements posed a serious challenge to ZANU-PF rule, it is necessary to explain 
why Mugabe has been able to survive in power for so long. Three factors help to account for 
it: i) the composition of Mugabe’s winning coalition and the system of patronage that 
maintained it; ii) the incapacity of the MDC to form an alternative winning coalition to oust 
Mugabe; and iii) the uncertainty that surrounds the scenario of a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.  
In the 1990s, a series of droughts, the decline of exports, and the government’s 
implementation of an IMF/World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
impacted negatively on the country’s economy (Muzondidya, 2009). As the crisis intensified, 
protests aroused and the government increasingly turned to the security services and the army 
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to repress the surges of discontent. Mugabe increasingly relied on the security services, the 
army, the war veterans and newly established youth militias to sustain his rule, signalling a 
clear shift in the balance of power within his winning coalition (International Crisis Group, 
2000b, 2001; Muzondidya, 2009).  
The “securitisation” of the state was achieved through the creation of a patronage system that 
co–opted relevant actors through direct cash payments, business concessions, and privileged 
access to state resources and positions (Tendi, 2013). In 1997, Mugabe obtained the loyalty 
of the war veterans by increasing the government’s compensation for their service in the 
liberation wars (International Crisis Group, 2001; Raftopoulos, 2003: 229) and, since 2000, 
by backing the war veterans’ illegal farms invasions. Moreover, Zimbabwe’s participation in 
the conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo helped Mugabe to establish new 
companies and contractual arrangements in the exploitation and trade of mineral resources 
and diamonds, which have been employed to fund the regime’s patronage system 
(International Crisis Group, 2014; United Nations, 2002).  
Importantly, the vast benefits and privileges that Mugabe’s patronage system has granted to 
the armed forces and the war veterans has generated great incentives for these groups to 
defend the status quo (International Crisis Group, 2009; Tendi, 2013). These groups also fear 
a potential retribution by the opposition for their past crimes and actions. Therefore, they 
advised Mugabe not to step down after losing the 2008 elections, but to increase the level of 
repression against the opposition instead (Mail Online, 2008; Wines, 2008). 
The second factor that has contributed to Mugabe’s survival in power has been the 
opposition’s inability to build a sufficiently large winning coalition to oust the ZANU-PF. 
Although the MDC has increased its electoral support since 2000, it has been unable to 
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transform this into a winning coalition (Interview, 2015d).
103
 The MDC has proven too weak 
to generate mass rallies or demonstrations against the regime (Mair, 2008), and even when it 
came very close to victory in 2008, it was unable to resist the regime’s repression and 
intimidation campaign. Critical in this respect has been the MDC’s incapacity to gain control 
of – yet alone support – from the state’s security apparatus (Interview, 2015d; Wikileaks, 
2010).  
MDC efforts to oust Mugabe from power have also been undermined by internal fights. 
During the 2005 Senate elections, the MDC split into two parties, the MDC-T and the MDC-
M (BBC, 2005; Wines, 2007).
104
 While the first remained the larger of the two, the presence 
of the MDC-M has played against the MDC-T in subsequent elections, thereby limiting the 
former’s capacity to beat the ZANU-PF. Moreover, even though the 2008 GNU and GPA 
have often been regarded as a success of the opposition in curbing Mugabe’s power, Mugabe 
managed to retain the upper hand in the negotiations by playing the MDC-M and the MDC-T 
against each other (Raftopoulos, 2013) .  
Finally, Mugabe’s survival owes much to the uncertainty that surrounds his potential exit 
from the political scene. Since the ZANU-PF’s tight victory in 2000, speculation has grown 
about who will replace Mugabe as the ZANU-PF’s leader (Muleya and Ncube, 2015). 
However, factionalism and divisions within the ZANU-PF cast doubts about the party’s 
capacity to remain united without its leader. Moreover, the role of the security services in a 
post-Mugabe Zimbabwe remains a great uncertainty. As the group that has benefited most 
from Mugabe’s patronage, it is likely to lose most from the leader’s departure (International 
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 Some suggest that, were it not for the massive and systematic electoral manipulation performed by the 
ZANU-PF, the MDC would have won almost every election in Zimbabwe since 2002 (Simpser, 2013). 
104
 The split was produced by the willingness of one sector of the party led by Mutambara to participate in the 
elections, while the section led by Tsvangirai opposed participating due to the regime’s manipulation (Marquez, 
2006: 185). 
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Crisis Group, 2010). Its dislike for the opposition and its fear of retribution for past actions 
against the opposition raises the question of how it would react were the MDC to gain control 
of the government (Chitiyo, 2009).  
Recent concerns about Mugabe’s health and his travels to Singapore for medical purposes 
have generated further tensions and uncertainty about the future (Chinaka, 2014). Although 
the regime has denied Mugabe’s health problems, everyone in the ZANU-PF is making 
tactical movements whilst they wait for Mugabe to leave the political scene (Chidza and 
Mushava, 2015; International Crisis Group, 2014; Muleya and Ncube, 2015). Most 
worryingly, Mugabe’s weakness has led to alleged assassination plots from within ZANU-PF 
ranks and to retaliatory purges of prominent members of the party (Phiri, 2014). Fears that 
the country could follow the path of Liberia, Sierra Leona or the Ivory Coast if Mugabe goes 
renders the old President the least worst option for the foreseeable future and explains why 
ZANU-PF party members often refer to Mugabe as the ‘glue that keeps the country together’ 
(International Crisis Group, 2001: 11). 
 
6.3.2.2. Human rights and democracy 
The deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Zimbabwe 
since 2000 was decisive in the EU’s decision to impose sanctions against Mugabe and the 
ZANU-PF. The regime became increasingly coercive after it came close to an electoral defeat 
against the newly created MDC in the 2000 elections (Kriger, 2005). Moreover, its failure to 
win the 2000 constitutional referendum led it to initiate a massive campaign of repression, 
intimidations, and violence against the opposition (Addison and Laakso, 2003).  
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In the early 2000s, Mugabe attacked the independence of the judiciary, harassing and purging 
individual Supreme Court and High Court judges, and appointing new judges from ZANU-
PF ranks (Compagnon, 2011). The regime also passed a new draconian Public Order and 
Security Act to harass the MDC, and ignored the violence triggered by the war veterans’ 
invasion of farms across the country (International Crisis Group, 2001). Mugabe also 
tightened the control over the independent media through the regulation of the accreditation 
of journalists and employed the war veterans in a campaign of harassment and violence 
against several independent publications (Freedom House, 2006).  
Graph 6.2. Level of democracy and human rights in Zimbabwe, 1988–2010 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data for democracy from Wahman et al. (2013); data for human rights from 
Gibney et al. (2015). 
 
After the GNU was formed and the GPA signed, the EU reengaged with the country and 
initiated a progressive suspension of sanctions. The 2013 referendum marked a breakthrough 
in the reengagement process and, despite its concerns about the flaws of the 2013 Presidential 
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elections, in 2014 the EU noted that the situation of human rights and democracy in the 
country had not deteriorated and proceeded to lift most of its sanctions (Portela, 2014). 
 
6.3.2.3. Economic leverage 
The EU’s economic leverage vis-à-vis Zimbabwe is quite large (Levitsky and Way, 2010; 
Portela, 2010). The EU is Zimbabwe’s second largest trading partner after South Africa and, 
although bilateral trade decreased until 2009, it has since increased again to values of over 
600€ million in 2014 (European Commission, 2015c). However, despite its large economic 
leverage, the EU has refrained from imposing tougher measures like trade embargoes to 
induce change in Zimbabwe for at least two reasons. Indeed, the EU has been wary that trade 
sanctions could further deteriorate the already dire economic situation on the ground and 
harm the innocent population (EU Commission Delegation to Zimbabwe, n.d.-b; Interview, 
2015d).  
Zimbabwe is also highly dependent on external aid. In 2008, official development assistance 
accounted for 15% of Zimbabwe’s GDP (Lunn and Thomson, 2010). The EU has been 
Zimbabwe’s second largest donor after the US and, though development assistance was 
suspended in 2002, the EU has redirected large amounts of aid to Zimbabwe via NGO’s and 
grassroots organisations to address the critical humanitarian situation in the country (EU 
Commission Delegation to Zimbabwe, n.d.-a).   
 
6.3.2.4. Black knights 
External support for the regime has played a major role in Mugabe’s ability to resist 
sanctions. Several African countries and regional organisations like the African Union and 
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the SADC have continuously voiced criticism against EU and US sanctions and demanded 
their lifting (Adolfo, 2009). Although Mugabe has been capable of gathering regional support 
to his defiant stance vis-à-vis the West by portraying sanctions as a form of neo-colonialism 
(Mutiga, 2013; Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004), some more pragmatic considerations have 
motivated the support that these organisations have granted to Mugabe.  
First, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe face similar domestic challenges with regard to 
the fulfilment of the liberation-era promises (Alden, 2010). As a consequence, these countries 
dislike the possibility of an MDC victory, as it would set a bad precedent of a labour-based 
movement defeating a hero of the liberation struggle against colonialism and apartheid 
(International Crisis Group, 2002c; Interview, 2015d). Second, since the economies of South 
Africa and Namibia are closely connected to that of Zimbabwe, the former have opposed 
sanctions due to the negative effects that these could have on their own economies (Alden, 
2010). Lastly, SADC leaders have argued that sanctions could further destabilise the situation 
in Zimbabwe by triggering a civil conflict and increasing the already high refugee flows from 
the country (Wintour, Elliott and McGreal, 2008).  
Finally, Russia and China have systematically shielded Mugabe and his regime from tougher 
UN sanctions. Indeed, both countries vetoed the West’s push in the UN Security Council for 
tougher multilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe in 2008. At the same time, China has sold 
Mugabe weapons and, since the late 2000s, it has also offered increasing financial support to 
the Mugabe regime in exchange for access to Zimbabwe’s mineral resources (Chun, 2014; 
Smith, 2011). This assistance has contributed to a booming of the Zimbabwean economy 
(Nelson, 2013). Moreover, China has provided Zimbabwe with much needed soft loans and 
credit lines that Zimbabwe could not obtain from international financial markets. Yet, in 
recent years China has become increasingly reluctant to provide additional loans to 
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Zimbabwe, as the latter has failed to pay back even modest arrears (Hornby and Hawkins, 
2014). 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain why the case studies of Belarus and Zimbabwe pose such a 
touch challenge to my theoretical argument. The longstanding EU sanctions regimes imposed 
against Lukashenka’s Belarus and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe defy my expectation that regimes 
with large winning coalition should be less likely to be sanctioned. Moreover, they also 
challenge my assumption that regimes with large winning coalitions should be sanctioned for 
shorter spells. A few elements that have arisen throughout this chapter help to understand 
why my model performs so poorly to predict the outcome of the dependent variables 
correctly.   
First of all, the case studies have shown that both regimes were much stronger that their large 
winning coalition would suggest. The regimes’ resilience was based on a iron–fist control of 
the state apparatus and, in particular of the security services, who responded directly to each 
president. Indeed, Lukashenka relied on the siloviki and the KGB for many years to repress 
any green sprout of pro–democracy movements in the country. Mugabe also relied on the 
security services, the military, and the war veterans to harass and intimidate the opposition.  
Nevertheless, the control of the security apparatuses was never sufficient for both leaders to 
rule. In fact, both regimes relied on a much larger winning coalition which needed to be fed 
and satisfied permanently. In fact, the effort that both dictatorships put into rigging elections 
is probably the clearest indicator that Mugabe and Lukashenka needed to legitimise their rule 
to a broader W. Consequently, Mugabe’s and Lukashenka’s hold on power required of huge 
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and permanent efforts to feed their W. Indeed, Mugabe encouraged the invasion of farms and 
relied on the exploitation of natural resources to keep his coalition together, whereas 
Lukashenka maintained a high popularity thanks to the provision of a Soviet-style welfare 
system. However, these practices were only possible thanks to the political and economic 
backing of powerful neighbours, which shielded the regimes against external criticism and 
sanctions. 
In this regard, Russia and China played a determinant role in maintaining Lukashenka’s rule 
in Belarus and Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe respectively. Russia was pivotal in ensuring 
the political, financial and economic stability of Lukashenka’s regime through the granting of 
huge subsidies on the import of oil and gas, preferential access to the Russian market, and 
diplomatic support and protection for Lukashenka’s policies. This support was crucial for 
Lukashenka to shield his regime from international economic dynamics and, especially, from 
EU sanctions. Similarly, South Africa played a decisive role in maintaining African unity to 
shield Mugabe and make a common front against “European colonialism”. In addition, China 
and Russia also protected Zimbabwe in the UN’s Security Council, whilst South Africa 
diffused external criticism against the critical humanitarian situation caused by Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe during its bilateral meetings with the EU. Finally, China provided Mugabe with 
weapons and lines of credit that Zimbabwe would not have otherwise obtained in 
international markets. 
Finally, these two case studies also show that the efficacy of sanctions can be seriously 
undermined by the presence of perverse effects. In Zimbabwe, where the memories of British 
colonialism are still fresh, Mugabe was able to portray sanctions as a tool of British 
colonialism. He successfully portrayed the MDC as a fifth column within the country and 
managed to rally support for his rule. Similarly, Lukashenka also rallied nationalistic support 
for his regime by accusing the EU – and Poland and Lithuania in particular – of plotting to 
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destabilise Belarus. But even worse, EU sanctions have contributed to the country’s 
international isolation, limiting the EU’s leverage vis-à-vis Belarus and pushing the country 
further towards Russia.  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis has been to develop a theoretical explanation about the imposition 
of sanctions, and to test this argument empirically against a newly designed dataset of EU 
sanctions. This chapter summarises the results of my thesis and discusses their academic and 
policy implications. First, I summarise the main findings of my study, showing that multi-
party regimes are more likely to comply with the EU – and therefore, less likely to be 
sanctioned – than strong regimes. Moreover, I also review my evidence that sanctions against 
weak regimes last less than those imposed against strong regimes, and that the former and 
also more likely to be destabilised by sanctions than the latter.  
The second part of this chapter discusses the relevance of my findings to the academic 
literature on sanctions. My results have relevant implications for the study of sanctions 
effectiveness, since they suggest that the conventional knowledge about the conditions under 
which sanctions are likely to work only applies to a subset of cases. In other words, my 
findings show that selection effects are present in the study of sanctions, and warn about the 
need of careful research designs. In this sense, my conclusions advise to look beyond cases 
where sanctions were imposed, and analyse cases where sanctions were threatened but not 
imposed as well. Lastly, I argue that selection bias needs to be modelled appropriately in 
empirical work, and suggest that the use of two-stage selection models where a target’s 
compliance is controlled for can improve our results and allow us to overcome this problem.  
In the third section of the chapter I debate the generalizability of my model by applying it to 
other prominent cases where sanctions were threatened or imposed on other grounds than 
human rights or democratic concerns. The chosen cases are 1) the sanctions threatened 
against the Yanukovich regime in Ukraine during the Maidan revolution in 2014; 2) the 
276 
 
stand-off with Russia for its invasion of Crimea and its destabilisation efforts in Eastern 
Ukraine since 2014; 3) the UN, EU, and US’ sanctions regimes imposed against Iran’s 
nuclear proliferation programme since 2007; and 4) the sanctions imposed by the West 
against Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria for its repression of demonstrators and to halt the 
civil conflict since 2011.  
The fourth section then addresses the main limitations of my theoretical approach and 
sketches an agenda for future sanctions research. Finally, I discuss the substantive 
implications of my findings in the last section of the chapter, and conclude by providing some 
policy recommendations of when and how sanctions should be employed to increase their 
effectiveness. 
  
7.2. Findings 
The main finding of this thesis has been to demonstrate empirically the existence of target 
selection effects in the study of sanctions imposition. Using a new dataset on EU sanctions, I 
have provided evidence that the EU’s employment of sanctions varies considerably amongst 
different types of autocratic regimes. I have found that strong regimes like military and one-
party regimes are sanctioned more often than their weaker counterparts, multi-party regimes. 
To account for this variation, I have shown that regimes with small W face lower constraints 
than regimes with large W, and therefore display a higher resilience vis-à-vis sanctions than 
the latter. My results demonstrate that the lack of  domestic constraints increase the 
likelihood that strong regimes are sanctioned, as they are willing to defy the EU’s threats of 
sanctions and thus self-select themselves into sanctions. Consequently, I have provided 
empirical evidence that selection effects are channelled through a target regime’s domestic 
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institutions, which constrain the target regime’s leeway and shape its policy choices when 
faced with the threat of sanctions.  
The robustness of my results lies in the combination of various strategies to address and 
identify the presence of target selection effects. I have used different regression models to 
capture 1) the variation in the target’s compliance with the threat of sanctions; 2) the 
likelihood that a target is sanctioned; 3) the duration of a sanctions regime across different 
types of autocratic regimes; and 4) whether sanctions destabilise some autocratic regimes 
more than others. Lastly, I have also corroborated the strength of my findings by running 
numerous robustness checks to control for other plausible explanations that could be driving 
the imposition of EU sanctions and by using different regression models to make sure that my 
results were not model-dependent. 
First, I have shown that regimes with large W (multi-party regimes) are likelier to comply 
with the EU’s threat of sanctions than those regimes with small W (strong regimes). This 
finding is of particular relevance, as it supports game theoretic approaches in their 
expectation that vulnerable regimes have larger incentives to comply with the sender country 
before sanctions are actually enacted  (Drezner, 1999, 2003; Morgan et al., 2009; Morgan and 
Miers, 1999; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997; Smith, 1995). Most importantly however, my 
results suggest that strong regimes are less likely to comply with the EU’s threat, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that they are targeted with EU sanctions. In other words, they 
confirm my argument that certain regimes feel sufficiently strong and confident to ignore the 
threat of sanctions, and thus choose to self-select themselves into sanctions.    
Furthermore, I have demonstrated that the strong regimes like military and one-party regimes 
have a higher probability to be sanctioned than multi-party regimes. These results are robust 
in different model specifications and even when I control for other explanations of sanctions 
278 
 
imposition. Thus, they provide strong support for my claim that the domestic institutions in 
the target country determine to a large extent the probability that a regime is (not) sanctioned.  
Moreover, I have provided further evidence of the presence of target selection effects by 
performing two additional tests. First, I have analysed the duration of sanctions episodes 
across different types of regimes, showing that strong regimes face much longer sanctions 
spells than multi-party regimes. This finding supports my claim that weak regimes are more 
likely to comply with the sender soon after sanctions have been imposed, acknowledging 
thereby that they have miscalculated the sender’s threat and that sanctions are imposing a 
high burden on them. Second, I have also shown that, when faced with sanctions, weak 
regimes are more likely to be destabilised and lose office than strong regimes. This finding 
confirms that weak regimes are likely to lose the support of key elements of their Ws and, as 
a consequence, face a higher probability of losing office.  
Finally, through the analysis of several case studies of EU sanctions episodes I have 
identified and traced the ways in which different domestic institutional settings in target 
regimes influence the latter’s reactions to the threat and imposition of sanctions. In Chapter 5, 
I have found evidence that the autocratic regimes in Fiji II (2006-2014) and Myanmar (1990-
ongoing) were able to ignore the threat of sanctions and resist their pressure thanks to the 
small size of the regimes’ W, whereas the civil-military regime in Fiji I (2000-03) was 
incapable of maintaining a united front towards sanctions due to the large size of its W. 
Indeed, the cohesiveness of the military regime in Fiji II allowed Bainimarama to resist the 
pressure of sanctions for many years. The unity and support of the Armed Forces proved vital 
for his survival in power, thwarting any opposition to his rule and allowing Bainimarama to 
undertake an ambitious process of reforms. Thus, international pressure and sanctions against 
the military regime were futile in influencing its policies and, after many years of political 
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deadlock, sanctions were lifted even though Bainimarama remained in power. However, the 
regime’s response to sanctions was quite different in Fiji I, as Prime Minister Qarase could 
not smooth over the deep divisions that existed within his W. As a consequence of these 
divisions, the coalition crumbled when sanctions were imposed, paving the way for a quick 
return to democratic rule. 
Similarly, the SLORC/SPDC’s long rule in Myanmar was only possible due to the cohesion 
of the military junta and the small size of its W. Faced with economic sanctions for over 
twenty years, the junta systematically ignored Western demands for democratization and 
repressed the domestic opposition emboldened in the figure of Aung San Suu Kyi. Using the 
country’s natural resources to feed a wide patronage system, the SPDC remained in power 
uncontested despite its nation-wide unpopularity, and it only agreed to a limited liberalization 
of the political system once it had assured that the interests of the armed forces within new 
emerging regime would be guaranteed.  
In Chapter 6, I have analysed the cases of Belarus (1994-ongoing) and Zimbabwe (2002-
ongoing). These cases are clear outliers to my theoretical approach, as dropping them from 
the statistical analyses leads to a significant improvement of the coefficients for the 
“dominant” regime type category. I have shown that Alexander Lukashenka’s capacity to 
survive in power and resist the pressure of EU sanctions for over 10 years can be attributed to 
Russia’s economic subsidies and diplomatic support, which have rendered Belarus almost 
completely dependent on Moscow. Thus, Russia’s role as a black knight is determinant in 
explaining Belarus’ resilience towards sanctions.  
Lastly, in the case of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe’s capacity to hold onto power despite facing 
a strong domestic opposition, over ten years of economic sanctions, and a mounting 
economic crisis in the country can be largely ascribed to three factors. First, notwithstanding 
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the West’s demonization of Mugabe, he is still regarded as a hero of the national liberation 
wars in Zimbabwe and remains popular in the country. Second, he also obtained the support 
of several “black knights”. On the one hand, Mugabe has received the diplomatic support of 
many African leaders, who see him as a peer and a symbol of the African struggle against 
colonialism (Alden, 2010). African countries and South Africa in particular have criticised 
EU sanctions and rallied around Mugabe. On the other hand, Mugabe has benefited from 
China’s lines of credits, which has allowed Zimbabwe to circumvent the West’s ban on IMF 
and World Bank funding. Finally, Mugabe has withstood the domestic electoral challenge 
posed by the MDC thanks to the loyalty of the security services, his party, and the war 
veterans. His W has remained together thanks to the large rents obtained from the 
exploitation of diamond fields in the DRC and the Marange area in Zimbabwe, and the 
expropriation and redistribution of farms amongst his supporters (Interview, 2015e).  
 
7.3. Theoretical implications for the study of sanctions 
My findings have several implications for the study of sanctions and beyond. First of all, they 
confirm that selection effects are present during the imposition of sanctions and that the use 
of economic statecraft is most effective at the threat stage (Bapat et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 
2009; Morgan and Miers, 1999; Morgan and Schwebach, 1997). Indeed, I have shown that 
multi-party regimes are more likely to comply with the EU when sanctions are threatened 
than strong regimes and, as a consequence, they are less likely to be sanctioned. Moreover, I 
have also demonstrated that, once sanctions have been imposed, multi-party regimes are more 
likely to be destabilised than strong regimes. The same is true of dominant regimes if we 
exclude the sanctions regimes imposed against the three hard cases of Belarus, Equatorial 
Guinea and Zimbabwe.  
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At the same time however, the evidence about selection effects implies a second thing: 
namely, that the conventional wisdom that sanctions are not very effective instruments only 
applies to a subset of cases that has not been randomly selected. Indeed, since I have shown 
that some regimes are more likely to be sanctioned than others, it is very likely that what we 
know about the effects of sanctions is only relevant to countries that fall within one of two 
scenarios of my model: 1) the outcome where regimes prefer to resist the threat of sanctions 
and are thus sanctioned (self-selection scenario); and 2) the outcome where weak countries 
miscalculate their strength and are sanctioned (miscalculation scenario). Consequently, my 
findings suggest that we should not only evaluate the effectiveness of these measures against 
a sample of “hard” cases where sanctions were actually imposed, but also against a sample of 
“control” cases were sanctions were threatened but not adopted. Careful research design 
should therefore be a primary consideration of researchers, and particular attention should be 
paid to the incentives structures that target regimes face to comply or resist the threat of 
sanctions. 
Moreover, the existence of selection bias in the study of sanctions imposition requires to be 
addressed appropriately in empirical research. Indeed, as my results demonstrate, the 
compliance and the sanctions stages of my models are correlated at statistically significant 
levels, implying that the two stages of the strategic bargaining game are not analytically 
separable from each other. Thus, modelling selection bias is not a mere methodological 
choice for researchers; on the contrary, it is a critical issue that has substantive implications 
for our results – and hence, for our understanding of how and when sanctions are more likely 
to work. Whilst a first step in the right direction requires robust research designs, scholars 
should also make use of available methodological techniques to model these effects. In this 
regard, a two-stage Heckman selection model constitutes a helpful and well suited tool to 
capture and minimise the influence of selection effects.  
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Third, my findings highlight the role of target regimes in determining the outcome of the 
sanctioning process. I have shown that target regimes play an important role in a sender’s 
determination to impose sanctions, since its decision to comply or resist the sender’s threat 
determines to a very large extent the outcome of the negotiating process. Target regimes 
display an extraordinary dynamism and variation in their response to the threat and 
imposition of sanctions. Indeed, the extent to which sanctions impose political and economic 
costs on a target is contingent on its domestic institutional setting, which determines how the 
impact of external shocks like sanctions are distributed, absorbed, diffused, and eventually 
deflected (Allen, 2008a, b). As sanctions exert increasing economic pressure on weak 
regimes, they also raise the opportunity cost of non-compliance and empower the opposition, 
thereby jeopardising the stability of the ruling elites.  
Finally, my findings have relevant implications for the way in which we assess a target 
country’s vulnerability. While most of the literature assumes that a country’s economic 
structure determines its exposure to sanctions (Hufbauer et al., 2007), I have demonstrated 
that political factors are at least as important if not more in accounting for a target country’s 
vulnerability. Although this conclusion has been raised elsewhere before (Blanchard and 
Ripsman, 1999; Galtung, 1967), it is too often forgotten by scholars and practitioners who 
maintain the assumption that higher levels of economic pressure will automatically translate 
into political concessions by the target.  
As examples of highly autocratic regimes like Syria evidence, dictators easily find ways to 
transfer the economic cost of sanctions to other segments of the society by increasing the 
levels of taxation or by forcefully appropriating goods and resources (Yazigi, 2014). 
Moreover, while sanctions have reduced the level of public goods that Bashar el-Assad 
employs to feed his patronage system, he has compensated for this loss by curtailing state 
spending in health and education to opposition controlled sectors of the Syrian society 
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(Hokayem, 2013). Thus, as this example evidences, autocrats are able to dilute the impact of 
sanctions by using scarce resources as carrots and sticks to reward loyalty and punish 
opposition to the regime.  
 
7.4. A generalizable approach to the imposition of sanctions 
In this thesis I have demonstrated that my analytical framework is able to explain the EU’s 
imposition of sanctions against autocratic regimes that violate human rights and democratic 
principles. However, my framework is not necessarily limited to the EU as a sender of 
sanctions, or to a particular issue area like the promotion of human rights and democratic 
principles. In this section, I show the generalizability of my analytical model to other 
scenarios in which the EU imposed sanctions following other concerns. For this purpose, I 
briefly analyse four current and relevant sanctions episodes that demonstrate the 
generalizability of my argument beyond the promotion of human rights and democracy. 
These cases are 1) the crisis in Ukraine during early 2014 where the EU and the US 
threatened sanctions against President Yanukovich and his regime; 2) the sanctions against 
Russia for its invasion of Crimea and its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine since 2014; 3) the 
sanctions regime imposed against Iran for its nuclear programme since 2006; and 4) the 
measures adopted against the Syrian regime for its brutal crackdown on pro-democracy 
demonstrators in 2011 and its role in the country’s civil war.   
 
7.4.1. Ukraine: the success of the threat of sanctions (2014) 
After Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich decided not to sign an association agreement 
with the EU in November 2013, protests against his rule sparked in Kiev and grew in 
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intensity during early 2014 (BBC, 2013b). Tensions increased after the regime passed 
“draconian” public laws to deal with a growing popular discontent and mass demonstrations, 
yet the crisis would reach its climax when Yanukovich incarcerated hundreds of protestors 
and over 70 demonstrators were killed in clashes with the police in late February (Traynor, 
2014). 
Following these developments, the EU and the US threatened sanctions – including travel 
bans and assets freezes – against Yanukovich and other individuals responsible for the state-
sponsored violence and the killings of demonstrators in Kiev’s Independence Square (Lewis, 
Oltermann and Roberts, 2014). After late night negotiations on 20 February 2014, 
Yanukovich accepted an agreement brokered by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, 
and Poland. By the terms of this agreement, Yanukovich agreed to slash his Presidential 
powers, hold early elections, form a government of national unity, restore the 2004 
constitution, and free renowned political prisoners like Yulia Timoshenko (BBC, 2014d).  
The weak domestic position of Yanukovich in Ukraine (multi-party regime) was galvanised 
by the threat of EU and US sanctions. Indeed, external pressure and a weak and fragmented 
W forced him to comply with the senders’ demands and avoid sanctions (Bloomberg, 2014). 
However, Yanukovich’s weakness was evidenced one day later, when members of his own 
Party of the Regions joined the opposition in a vote to impeach him and forced him to flee to 
Russia overnight (BBC, 2014c; Friedman, 2014; International Business Times, 2014). Thus, 
overall my model predicts the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis well, as Yanukovich political 
weakness forced him to accommodate the Western demands when sanctions were threatened.  
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7.4.2. Russia (2014-ongoing) 
Following the Ukrainian crisis in early 2014, pro-Russian armed groups in Crimea seized 
official buildings and pressed on holding a referendum to gain independence from Ukraine 
and integrate into the Russian Federation (Yuhas and Jalabi, 2014). Although the West 
considered this referendum a sham given the climate of intimidation and the lack of 
preparation for holding a vote in fair conditions (BBC, 2014a), Russia threw its weight 
behind this plan amidst EU and US threats of sanctions against Crimean and Russian officials 
if the process were to go on (Gearin, 2014). On 16 March, the referendum on joining Russia 
was held, being backed by 97% of the population. Russia hastened to approve the annexation 
of Crimea into the federation, whilst the West refused to recognise the outcome and imposed 
a first round of assets freezes and travel bans against a few Russian and Crimean individuals 
(Croft and Strupczewski, 2014).   
After this quick annexation of Crimea, “little green men”105 dressed and heavy-armed like 
Russian soldiers, joined pro-Russian rebel groups in the Eastern Ukrainian regions of the 
Donbass and the city of Odessa. Once again, the EU and the West threatened new sanctions 
against Russia for its ambiguous tactics in destabilising the region (BBC, 2014b; European 
Council, 2014), yet it would only be after the downing of a commercial plane of Malaysian 
airlines by rebel forces with (allegedly) Russian supplied missile systems that the West would 
back its threat (Aljazeera, 2014). Thus, on 30 July the EU and the US adopted so-called tier 
                                                          
105
 These groups of unmarked soldiers – called “little green men” by the local population – first appeared in 
Crimea before the holding of the referendum and then re-appeared in Eastern Ukraine to support local rebel 
efforts against the central government in Kiev. 
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three or sectoral sanctions, expanding the sanctions blacklist and targeting for the first time 
the Russian banking, energy, and military sectors
106
 (Hille, 2014a).  
The impact of sanctions, coupled with a stagnant Russian economy, the dramatic fall of oil 
prices, and the devaluation of the rouble have evidenced Putin’s miscalculation and pushed 
him into a defensive position (Bond, Odendahl  and Rankin, 2015; Financial Times, 2014; 
White and Troianovski, 2014). Although the crisis is far from being resolved, some evidence 
suggests that sanctions are affecting Putin’s inner circle far more than the latter would have 
expected. In fact, the cost of sanctions has led Putin to compensate his core supporters for 
their sanctions-related losses in order to keep his W together (Hille, 2014b).  
Although it is unclear how long sanctions will be in place and whether these will deter Russia 
from continuing its destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, the cost of pursuing its expansionist 
policy is coming at a high expense to the Russian treasury (Kolyandr, 2014). Moreover, even 
though it is too early to assess the effects of sanctions on Russia’s behaviour, this episode 
shows that my model can also be useful to understand the Kremlin’s actions during the crisis. 
Indeed, even though the regime did not buck to the threat of sanctions, some evidence seems 
to suggest that their actual imposition has led to a re-assessment of its policy preferences in 
Eastern Ukraine (Financial Times, 2014). However, it is also possible that, due to the absence 
of domestic institutional constraints, Russia preferred to self-select itself into sanctions and 
resist their pressure. At the time of writing, the cost of sanctions does not seem to have 
outweighed the utility that Putin obtains from resisting, as his high popularity ratings in 
Russia seem to suggest (Clark II and Elkin, 2015). In other words, the Kremlin’s cost of non-
                                                          
106
 The EU’s sectoral sanctions included restrictions on Russian banks’ access to long-term loans, an embargo 
on the export of dual-use equipment for military use, and a prohibition to access services and technology related 
to the exploration and production in the oil industry. 
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compliance might still be lower for the Kremlin than the political cost of conceding to the 
West.   
 
7.4.3. Iran (2006-ongoing) 
In 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found Iran to be in violation of its 
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issue 
was elevated to the UNSC, which threated to impose sanctions if Iran did not comply with its 
obligations and accepted to halt its clandestine nuclear programme (United Nations, 2006). 
However, the latter ignored the threat claiming that its nuclear programme was merely 
intended for civilian purposes. As a consequence of Iran’s non-compliance, the UNSC 
imposed an embargo on the provision of goods and technology that could be used in the 
development of Iran’s nuclear programme on 23 December 2006, and adopted an assets 
freeze and a travel ban on designated persons and entities (Gootman, 2006). These measures 
were reinforced by additional US and EU sanctions targeting Iran’s oil and banking sectors in 
2007 (Portela, 2014).  
After years of political deadlock, on 14 July 2015 negotiations between Iran on the one hand, 
and France, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, China, Russia and the US on the other 
hand – the EU3+3/P5+1 107  – agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) 
(Gordon and Sanger, 2015; Keating, 2009). This agreement stipulates that Iran will halt its 
nuclear programme in exchange of sanctions relief, which will free billions of US$ frozen in 
European and US bank accounts and, eventually, pave the way to the normalization of 
relations with Iran. While some analysts credit sanctions for succeeding in brining Iran back 
                                                          
107
 The term EU3+3 makes reference to the three European countries, the UK, France, and Germany (EU3), plus 
China, Russia, and the US (3). Similarly, the term P5+1 makes reference to the five permanent members of the 
UNSC – the US, UK, France, Russia and China – plus Germany.   
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to the negotiation table (Takeyh and Maloney, 2011), others contend that the ayatollahs’ 
willingness to reach an agreement was motivated by the change in the regional and 
international context that led to a reassessment of Iran’s preferences (Einhorn, 2015).  
Indeed, Iran’s willingness to compromise came at a turning point, when a new administration 
led by the moderate Rouhani took over and at a time when experts acknowledged that Iran 
had almost – if not already – developed the technology to create nuclear weapons if it wanted 
to do so (Economist, 2013a). Moreover, the agreement reached in Vienna seems to benefit 
Iran most, as it will obtain billions of frozen funds and might contribute to normalize a 
poisoned relation that, in turn, might lower the likelihood of pre-emptive US or Israeli 
military strikes to end the nuclear programme.
108
  
Thus, Iran’s strong regime (other/party-based regime) 109 was probably better off by resisting 
external pressures and seeking to develop the technology to build a bomb, as it felt threatened 
by an aggressive international and regional context (Khan, 2010). In line with my model, 
Iran’s resistance led to the imposition of UNSC sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Sanctions however were ineffective in altering Teheran’s policy, which continued 
enriching uranium despite the enormous economic cost that sanctions inflicted on the 
country’s economy. Finally, Iran’s strategic calculations changed after the Obama 
administration in the US took over and showed a willingness to reach a compromise after 
years of political deadlock (Einhorn, 2015). This new international atmosphere and the fact 
that Iran has achieved most of its goals help to account for the negotiated settlement.  
                                                          
108
 Indeed, the agreement leaves many questions regarding the implementation of the Plan of Action 
unanswered. Importantly, the wording of the JCPA seems to grant Iran a central role in the implementation and 
monitoring of the agreement, something that has raised many alarms in conservative circles in the West and 
Israel (Ernst, 2015). 
109
 Wahman et al. (2013) classify Iran as “other” regime, whilst Geddes et al. (2014) include it in the category 
“party-based” regimes. As a theocracy, Iran is a hard case that is difficult to classify. However, the domestic 
strength of the regime can also be seen in the small size of the regime’s W (.25).  
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7.4.4. Syria (2011-ongoing) 
In early 2011, the spark of the Arab Spring reached Syria. The regime’s response to the first 
demonstrations was brutal, clamping down on protestors and imprisoning hundreds of them 
(Williams, 2011).  By the end of April, the EU deplored the escalating crisis in the country 
and the toll in human lives that the regime’s violent reaction was causing. In response to the 
deteriorating situation, the EU threatened to review its policies towards Syria and impose 
sanctions if Basher al Assad’s regime did not put an end to state-sponsored violence against 
the demonstrators (Cody, 2011; Rettman, 2011a). However, the latter simply ignored 
Western requests, and the EU and the US imposed a first battery of smart sanctions against 
the regime, including travel bans and assets freezes against army leaders, business people, 
and government officials (Moret, 2014; Portela, 2012; Seeberg, 2015). 
As the crisis escalated even further and became a fully-fledged conflict, the EU’s and the US’ 
sanctions regimes were adapted and expanded, adding more names to the blacklist and 
targeting Syria’s oil and banking sectors (Portela, 2012). However, the increasing 
coerciveness of sanctions did not alter the Syrian’s regime (military regime)110 behaviour, 
since the conditions spelled out by the West to lift sanctions would have jeopardised the 
regime’s position even more (Wilson and Warrick, 2011). At the time of writing, the Syrian 
conflict nears its fifth year, and the Assad regime continues fighting for its survival. 
Moreover, sanctions do not seem to have altered the regime’s calculations, as no attempt at 
complying with the West has been observed.    
                                                          
110
 While Wahman et al. (2013) classify Syria as a military regime, Geddes et al. (2014) catalogue it as a party-
based regime.  
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On the contrary, sanctions and the civil war’s threat to Assad’s rule seem to have 
strengthened and brought the regime’s W closer together (Hokayem, 2013). Thus, the threats 
that the regime face seem to have reduced its incentives to find a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict (Hudson, 2013). Moreover, the Syrian civil war has become a multi-faceted and 
complex regional conflict, as different regional powers have intervened financially and 
diplomatically to support the different factions involved. In this regard, the role of Iran, 
Russia and Hezbollah in providing arms, logistical and financial support to the regime have 
been pivotal, whilst Turkey, the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia have played a major role 
backing the opposition to the Assad regime (Hokayem, 2013). Russia and Iran in particular 
have taken up the role of “black knights”, as they have provided the regime with extensive 
diplomatic, financial and military support. This help has allowed the regime to circumvent 
Western sanctions, break its international isolation, and maintain the armed struggle against 
rebel forces for its survival  (Seeberg, 2015). 
In any case, my model provides a plausible explanation to account for the regime’s reluctance 
to comply with Western demands. Indeed, the EU’s and US’ demand for Assad to resign has 
never been seriously contemplated by the regime. Thus, the Syrian regime ignored the West’s 
threat and self-selected itself into sanctions, just as my model would predict.   
 
7.5. Limitations and future research 
Although my analytical framework has a wide applicability to explain different aspects of the 
sanctions game, new questions and puzzles have arisen during the writing of this thesis that 
my approach cannot answer directly. In this section, I discuss some of the methodological 
and substantive issues that I have faced, and sketch a few lines for future research that could 
help us to enhance our knowledge on the usages and effects of sanctions. 
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First, I have portrayed the EU as a unitary sender of sanctions. However, even though 
sanctions are coordinated and agreed upon by EU member states at the Council of the 
European Union (Portela, 2010), the EU is a complex multi-level entity, where decisions are 
taken by many different actors and through different legal and voting procedures.  Moreover, 
the decision to impose sanctions usually requires the consent of all EU member states, 
making it at times hard to reach agreements due to diverging commercial and strategic 
interests of its member states  (Interview, 2015e). Finally, although the implementation of 
sanctions tends to be relatively consistent across EU countries, member states might have 
incentives to deviate and exploit the loopholes in the legislation (Bapat and Kwon, 2015; 
Gebert, 2013). 
As a consequence, intra-EU disagreements might affect the credibility of the EU’s threat of 
sanctions. This can be costly to the EU in terms of its reputation and policy coherence, 
sparking domestic criticism and sending a dangerous message about the existence of weak 
spots in its policy. Not surprisingly, during 2014 Russia’s President Putin keenly exploited 
the frailness of the EU’s unity on sanctions to push for the lifting of the sanctions regime in 
place against his country (Kaminski, 2014). Although scholars have recently begun to analyse 
the role of audience costs during (Hart, 2000) the threatening and imposition of sanctions 
(Krustev, 2010; Krustev and Morgan, 2011; Peterson, 2013), future research could assess 
how the policy preferences of EU member states affect the credibility of the EU’s threats and, 
in turn, the consistency of its sanctions policy. 
A second limitation that should be addressed in the future relates to the nature and quality of 
the data employed to operationalise certain variables in this study. For instance, I have shown 
that the aggregate volume of trade between the EU and a target country is not related to the 
EU’s imposition of sanctions. Not surprisingly, given that the EU is one of the largest trading 
blocs in the world, its bilateral trade with many countries is relatively small in aggregated 
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terms. However, it is plausible that due to historical and cultural linkages, a large variation 
exists in the geographical spread of commercial links between EU member states and third 
countries. Although mapping these flows goes beyond the scope and possibilities of this 
thesis, it would be interesting to assess the extent to which commercial relationships between 
member states and third countries correlate with a regime’s likelihood to be sanctioned. A 
similar approach could also be taken with regard to the disbursement of official development 
assistance, as some evidence suggests that the application of political conditionality varies 
between EU member states (Carbone, 2010, 2011a; Carey, 2007; De Felice, 2014).  
Third, an important issue that needs to be addressed in the future relates to the measurement 
of “black knights” or sanctions busters. My case studies on Belarus and Zimbabwe have 
provided evidence that the presence of black knights allowed these regimes to withstand EU 
sanctions for a prolonged period of time. This finding suggests that the presence of external 
support is a variable that should be controlled for in statistical analyses. However, while 
identifying the presence of black knights is relatively straightforward in qualitative case 
studies, it is much harder to come up with a suitable measure of this concept for a cross-
country comparison. An interesting attempt to capture the presence of black knights is Early’s 
(2009, 2011) indicator that measures abrupt and sizeable changes in the levels of bilateral 
trade between a sanctioned country and a third country that previously had no important trade 
links.  
Notwithstanding the merits of Early’s (2007, 2011) work, trade is seldom the only way in 
which black knights provide assistance to sanctioned countries nowadays. More research 
could build up on Early’s (2007, 2011) findings by focusing on how the provision of other 
types of assistance like loans, grants, or debt relief by third countries allow sanctioned 
regimes to offset the impact of sanctions. Moreover, research could also analyse the extent to 
which sanctioned countries develop “best-practices” on how to circumvent sanctions. Indeed, 
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countries like Iran that have lived under sanctions for many years have become specialists in 
evading sanctions, and have begun to share this knowledge with other sanctioned countries 
like Syria (Hokayem, 2013). Thus, the role in which black knights provide financial, 
economic, logistic, or diplomatic assistance to sanctioned countries constitutes a very 
promising and interesting area that future research could look into. 
Finally, throughout the thesis I have made no analytical distinction regarding the types of 
sanctions imposed, or the degree of economic hardship that these measures cause to a target 
regime. Although this has not been the primary goal of this thesis, the differentiation between 
comprehensive and smart sanctions, and between different types of political, economic, and 
financial tools is important inasmuch as some of these measures are likely to inflict more 
harm on a target regime than others. For instance, scholars generally agree that 
comprehensive trade embargoes have devastating effects on a target’s economy (Biersteker, 
Eckert and Tourinho, 2012; Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Hufbauer et al., 2007), whilst 
targeted sanctions limit that damage to those individuals or entities that are responsible for 
the violation that a sender seeks to redress (Biersteker and Eckert, 2004; Cortright and Lopez, 
2002; Wallensteen, Staibano and Eriksson, 2003).  
However, despite the relevance of this issue, constructing an indicator that captures these 
distinctions in a reliable way is a challenging task faced with serious theoretical and 
methodological problems. First, not all countries are necessarily affected in the same way by 
the imposition of sanctions, as the impact of the latter might largely depend on a target 
country’s economic structure, its self-sufficiency, and its integration into the world economy. 
For instance, the current financial sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia are certainly 
causing more economic hardship nowadays than if they would have been imposed some 20 
years ago, when Russia was much less exposed to the fluctuations of international financial 
markets. However, the same types of financial sanctions are unlikely to have any impact on 
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isolated regimes like Myanmar. Thus, the same instrument is not comparable across time or 
space in a systematic way.  
Second, some scholars have sought to overcome this difficulty by dividing sanctions into 
different categories according to their degree of “comprehensiveness” (Biersteker et al., 
2012). According to this classification, those measures that are tailored in such a way that 
they only affect a specific individual are catalogued as very targeted, whilst those instruments 
whose impact affects large segments of a target country are considered the least targeted 
sanctions. While this effort certainly constitutes a promising way forward to assess the impact 
of sanctions in terms of their scope, this classification does not necessarily overlap with the 
actual degree of coerciveness of specific types of sanctions.  
Moreover, even though targeted sanctions are supposed to avoid harm to the population, they 
might still have side-effects that end up affecting it in different ways. First, targeted sanctions 
can put a stigma on an entire country by signalling the existence of political risks of doing 
business (Eriksson, 2011). This, in turn, can scare international investment away and affect 
the aggregate welfare of the population negatively. Moreover, sanctions can reduce the 
number of commercial activities and discourage investment in target countries by imposing 
legal requirements that businesses find difficult to comply with  (British Bankers' 
Association, 2013). In fact, even though in many occasions senders like the EU and the US 
have included humanitarian exceptions to their sanctions regimes precisely to avoid causing 
harm to the innocent population, the complexity of these sanctions regimes is so high that 
many businesses – and especially financial institutions – have become weary of operating in 
certain countries out of fear of breaking the sanctions legislation and face enormous fines as a 
consequence (Johnston, 2015).  
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Finally, targeted sanctions practice has become increasingly “less targeted”, as senders like 
the EU have sanctioned entire sectors of a target’s economy. These “sectoral” or “tier three” 
sanctions affect key sectors like banking, energy, and technology, and constitute a new 
development in EU sanctions practice which deserves further scholarly scrutiny. Thus, future 
research should carefully assess this new category of “sectoral” sanctions is more effective in 
achieving the sender’s goals, and in particular, evaluate as precisely as possible whether its 
effects vary in comparison to its more targeted or comprehensive counterparts.  
 
7.6. Policy implications and recommendations 
Although every sanctions episode is unique and presents its own particularities, the findings 
of my thesis have some policy ramifications that apply across different cases and which can 
be relevant to the general use, design, and implementation of sanctions. A first conclusion of 
my thesis is that sanctions (and in particular the threat thereof) are likely to be more effective 
when a structure of resonance exists inside a target country (Kotzian et al., 2011). Indeed, 
sanctions are more likely to obtain a target regime’s compliance when the target ruler faces 
powerful domestic challengers that are capable of capitalising on her weakness and build an 
alternative W to oust her from office. Therefore, a credible domestic threat to an autocrat’s 
rule acts as a magnifying lens that augments the effects of sanctions and puts additional 
pressure on the latter. However, if the challengers to the incumbent are atomized and unable 
to form a W, the imposition of sanctions might not hinder the continuity of the ruling regime. 
Thus, senders should look at the domestic structure of a target regime carefully before 
imposing sanctions, and assess how the impact of sanctions is likely to be distributed within 
the domestic power structures of a target regime (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). Indeed, as the 
case studies of Belarus and Zimbabwe illustrate, the challengers to Lukashenka and Mugabe 
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have continuously failed to build an alternative W, which in turn has contributed to 
continuous electoral defeats and factional splits within opposition forces. Therefore, senders 
should select their targets strategically to enhance the probability of success while avoiding 
entering into a protracted dispute with a resilient target. 
Second, senders should be realistic about their expectations when using sanctions. As I have 
shown, many times sanctions are imposed because targets are better off by being punished 
than by complying with the sender. Hence, as long as the utility that targets obtain from 
resisting is equal or higher than the utility that they would obtain from acquiescing to the 
sender’s demands, the political deadlock is likely to remain (Smith, 1995). This implies that, 
for this situation to change, something needs to happen that makes both the sender and the 
target better off than when sanctions are in place. For this reason, senders should anticipate 
and evaluate the extent to which sanctions can actually alter the target regime’s utility 
function and make the cost of non-compliance more costly than the cost of compliance.
111
   
Moreover, although a solution to a dispute might not always be easily reachable, senders 
should be flexible and ready to adapt to the needs of the circumstances. Indeed, even though 
sanctions are a useful instrument to increase the target’s cost of non-compliance, they are not 
the only tools that senders can employ to alter a target regime’s strategic calculations. For 
instance, senders can also induce a behavioural change of the target regime by reducing its 
compliance costs – and not simply by increasing a target’s resistance costs. In this regard, 
senders can offer economic or political incentives to a target to make compliance a more 
desirable outcome. Thus, they should keep in mind that other tools like diplomacy and 
                                                          
111
 Theoretically, two other scenarios are feasible, namely that the sender or the target back down. However, this 
is not necessarily a rational outcome (in game theoretic terms), as a defeat after having imposes sanctions would 
made either side worse off. 
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positive incentives can generate trust and change the logic of the game (Nincic, 2006; 
Wallensteen, 2005). 
Similarly, senders should refrain from making disproportional demands that jeopardise the 
stability of target regimes. Indeed, if the goals of sanctions entail a high sacrifice for targets, 
then they are highly likely to fail (Bapat et al., 2013; Drezner, 2003; Hufbauer et al., 2007; 
Smith, 1995). For this reason, senders should develop coherent and reasonably sized demands 
that a target can accept and work with. This can facilitate a win-win scenario where both 
sides obtain some benefit from an agreement. Only in this way is an agreement likely to last, 
as it will allow both sides to reduce domestic audience costs.  
Third, my findings have also relevant implications for the employment of targeted sanctions. 
Although many scholars have advocated the use of smart sanctions to avoid the negative 
effects that comprehensive trade embargoes have on the population (Brzoska, 2003; Cortright 
and Lopez, 2002; Weiss, 1999), senders should be aware that limited measures like travel 
bans or assets freezes are highly unlikely to influence target regimes, and especially strong 
ones. In fact, these measures tend to be highly symbolic if implemented unilaterally outside 
the framework of the UN, and there is no conclusive empirical evidence that suggests that 
targeted sanctions are more effective than other types of sanctions (Blanchard and Ripsman, 
2013; Drezner, 2011; Ripsman, 2002; Tostensen and Bull, 2002).  
Moreover, the debate about the design of sanctions has become relevant again after the EU’s 
growing use of economic sanctions targeting entire sectors of a target country’s economy. 
Although these sectoral or “tier three” sanctions have – at least in theory – the potential to 
generate very high costs to targets and push them to reassess their policy preferences, they are 
less targeted than selective arms embargoes, asset freezes or visa bans. Indeed, they affect the 
normal functioning of vital sectors of a target’s economy like the oil and energy sectors in 
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Iran, Syria, and Russia. Moreover, while sectoral sanctions certainly inflict more harm to a 
target regime, they also have spill-over effects that affect the innocent population. Finally, 
tier three sanctions also impose high costs to the sender’s economy, disrupting trade relations 
and investment with target countries. Thus, senders will inevitably face a trade-off between 
reducing the fallout of sanctions to the population and exerting real pressure on the target 
regime.   
In sum, sender states should understand that sanctions are not a silver bullet that will 
automatically solve complex foreign policy crises. Policy makers should never expect 
sanctions to achieve what they cannot, and should therefore never use economic statecraft as 
a stand-alone measure. As I have shown in this thesis, the likelihood that sanctions might be 
more or less effective in altering a target country’s policy preferences depends largely on the 
target’s willingness to alter its policy curse, which in turn will be contingent on its domestic 
political considerations. In this regard, policy makers should be aware that a stick might 
sometimes be ill-suited to deal with a non-compliant target, and that other policy tools like a 
carrot and diplomacy might achieve better results.  
Finally, senders should always keep channels of communication open with a target regime 
and engage with it at all times. Indeed, sanctioning a target but offering no alternative 
proposal to find a common solution is likely to push the latter towards increased isolation and 
prologue the dispute. Thus, sanctions should be used wisely and responsibly as a way to solve 
a problem, and not to make it worse. In this sense, senders should think carefully why 
sanctions should be employed in the first instance, plan ahead of the expected and unexpected 
effects that their imposition might trigger, and design sanctions regimes accordingly to meet 
the needs of the situation (Biersteker et al., 2012; Biersteker et al., 2013; De Vries, Portela 
and Guijarro-Usobiaga, 2014; Wallensteen et al., 2003). This advice can enhance the prospect 
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of success of sanctions, turning sanctions into a useful tool to shape and solve international 
disputes.   
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